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ABSTRACT
This work investigates whether the advanced light water reactor designs with passive safety
systems are more desirable than advanced reactor designs with active safety systems from the
point of view of uncertainty in the performance of safety systems as well as the economic
implications of the passive safety systems. Two advanced pressurized water reactors and two
advanced boiling water reactors, one representing passive reactors and the other active reactors
for each type of coolant, are compared in terms of operation and responses to accidents as
reported by the vendors.
Considering a simplified decay heat removal system that utilizes an isolation condenser for
decay heat removal, the uncertainty in the main parameters affecting the system performance
upon a reactor isolation accident is characterized when the system is to rely on natural
convection and when it is to rely on a pump to remove the core heat. It is found that the passive
system is less certain in its performance if the pump of the active system is tested at least once
every five months. In addition, a cost model is used to evaluate the economic differences and
benefits between the active and passive reactors. It is found that while the passive systems could
have the benefit of fewer components to inspect and maintain during operation, they do suffer
from a larger uncertainty about the time that would be required for their licensing due to more
limited data on the reliability of their operation.
Finally, a survey among nuclear energy experts with a variety of affiliations was conducted to
determine the current professional attitude towards these two competing nuclear design options.
The results of the survey show that reactors with passive safety systems are more desirable
among the surveyed expert groups. The perceived advantages of passive systems are an increase
in plant safety with a decrease in cost.
Thesis Supervisor: Mujid S. Kazimi
Title: Professor of Nuclear Engineering and Mechanical Engineering
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 General
As the power generation market in the United States continues its transition towards
deregulation, each company must constantly decide on the most optimal energy producing
portfolio. In the past, new technological breakthroughs were the driving force behind changes in
the market. Today with deregulation, the emphasis is placed on technologies that are
inexpensive, can be deployed in a short time, and reliable in a way to maximize profits to its
investors. This financial driver of the market is changing the decision making process in the
power generation industry. Certainly, federal legislation and other local public policies are
factors that must be taken into account to find this optimal alternative as these policies can often
make one energy alternative more or less costly than originally planned. Invoking carbon taxes,
emission standards, and waste restrictions are just a few of the ways that lawmakers can make
one energy alternative more attractive than another.
Nuclear power is one of potential energy alternatives for the U.S. power generation industry.
Currently, nuclear power comprises approximately 20 percent (~780 trillion kilowatt hours
annually) of the electrical energy generation in the United States, second only to coal. Nuclear
energy production has increased over the years, although no new nuclear plant has been started
by the industry since 1994. Even though most of the currently operating 103 nuclear reactors
will apply for 20-year license extensions from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the
capacity factor for these plants is already about 90%. This means that new plants will need to be
built to meet national energy growth demands over the next 50 years if nuclear power is to keep
or increase its 20% share of the power generation portfolio. The Energy Information
Administration (EIA) estimates the anticipated growth of electricity in the United States at 1.9
percent annually.' This expected annual increase yields an increase in U.S. nuclear capacity
from 100 to 300 GWe by 2050 in order to maintain a national energy portfolio with 20 percent
nuclear power generation. With little room left to increase the capacity factors of operating
plants, it will take adding 2-3 new reactors per year (with capacities ranging from I to 1.5 GWe
each) in addition to re-licensing all 103 currently operating reactors, and even to replace some of
12
them, in order to meet this demand. Considering it's been almost 30 years since the last reactor
was ordered to be built, this is no small feat.
In 2003, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) produced an interdisciplinary study
called The Future of Nuclear Power. The study observed that nuclear power's future hinged on
four key areas: Cost, safety, proliferation, and waste management. It concluded that based on
these four factors, nuclear power should remain an energy option but that it had some hurdles to
clear before becoming attractive in a deregulated market. First, it had to significantly reduce its
cost while maintaining an optimal level of safety and proliferation resistance to the public.
Second, it had to finish a solution to long term nuclear waste management. The study supported
the open, "once-through" fuel cycle, light water reactor design as the best model to achieve these
goals. "Once-through" fuel cycles simply mean that the spent reactor fuel is not reprocessed,
and the light water design means that H20 is used as the moderator.
Concurrent with the MIT study, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) developed its
"2010 Initiative" which reduces costs through cost-sharing in new design certification, site
banking, and combined construction and operation licenses so that new plants can compete in a
deregulated energy market. Its goal, stated specifically on its website, is to "expand the number
of new advanced nuclear power plants (Generation III+) in the United States and have a new
nuclear plant ordered by 2010."2 Furthermore, The Energy Policy Act of 2005 outlined even
more benefits for new nuclear power plants to help ignite a rebirth in the industry. This policy
offered among other things:
-Loan guarantees: up to 80% of the project cost
-Production tax credits: 1.8 cents per kilowatt-hour for 6,000 megawatts (MW) of
capacity from new nuclear power plants for the first eight years of operation
-"Standby Support" for new reactor delays: provides for 100 percent coverage of the cost
of delays for the first two new plants (up to $500 million each) and 50 percent of the cost
of delays for the next four plants (up to $250 million each)
13
The Generation III+ reactors, also known as Advanced Light-Water Reactors, in competition for
this order are the:
1. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)
2. Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR)
3. Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR)
4. Advanced Passive Pressurized Water Reactor (AP1000)
All four of the reactors are "once-through" fuel cycle plants with light water moderators
supported by the MIT study as the best model choice for the future of nuclear power. The
question becomes which of the four designs is the most optimal choice for nuclear power in
order for it to compete with other alternatives such as coal, natural gas, and renewables (solar,
wind)? First, one must understand their differences.
1.2 Advanced Light Water Reactors (AL WRs)
All four of the advanced light water reactors are based on evolutionary designs from predecessor
reactors. While the four Generation III+ designs share a common fuel cycle and moderator
design, they have their differences. The ABWR and ESBWR are boiling water reactors (BWR)
while the EPR and AP1000 are pressurized water reactors (PWR). The boiling water reactor
operates in essentially the same way as a fossil fuel generating plant. Steam is produced when
the water (coolant) moves upward along the fuel in the core absorbing its heat. The steam
formed rises and passes through moisture separators out of the top of the pressure vessel and then
proceeds to the turbine. The pressurized water reactor differs from the BWR in that the steam to
run the turbine is produced in a steam generator (in a secondary loop) which receives its heat
from the primary loop of water (coolant) leaving the core. This primary, or first loop, has a
pressurizer unit to prevent its higher temperature coolant water from boiling as it circulates
through the core. Its coolant water transfers the core's heat to the secondary water in the steam
generator producing steam. The general diagrams for each are shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2.
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Approximately two-thirds of the 103 operating reactors in the U.S. are PWRs. This is not to say
that BWRs are inferior. Each reactor type has its own advantages and disadvantages. Some
utilities may prefer one type over another to suit their own experience, but for the most part, they
are comparable designs as far as energy production is concerned. Neither design difference
impacts the desirability of the reactors as a whole.
The other, more important difference in the aforementioned Generation III+ reactors besides
reactor type, is their safety system design. The ABWR and EPR use advanced active safety
system designs with pumps while the AP1000 and ESBWR use passive safety system designs
utilizing natural circulation. Current U.S. reactors use active designs, although not as advanced
as the ABWR and EPR. Passive safety systems, while simple in design, are relatively new in
nuclear reactor design, and therefore lack a deep record of demonstrated performance.
Another possibility are "hybrid" reactors, like Toshiba's AB1600 (a BWR), that utilize both
active and passive systems to maximize the advantages that each system has to offer. Most of
the safety systems on these hybrid reactors are taken from the ESBWR and ABWR designs with
minor improvements. These types of reactors will be discussed more in depth in Chapter 8.
1.3 Passive Safety
It is important to define what is considered "passive" in the scope of this study. In addition,
there is also the difference between passive components and passive systems which must be
defined. The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) definitions4 are as follows:
Passive component: A component whose functioning does not depend on an external input. A
passive component has no moving part, and, for example, only experiences a change in pressure,
in temperature, or in fluid flow in performing its functions. In addition, certain components that
function with very high reliability based on irreversible action or change may be assigned to this
category. Examples of passive components are heat exchangers, pipes, vessels, electrical cables
and structures. Certain components, such as rupture discs, check valves, safety valves, injectors
16
and some solid state electronic devices, have characteristics which require special consideration
before designation as an active or passive component. Any component that is not a passive
component is an active component.
Passive system: A passive system is either a system which is composed of passive components
and structures or a system which uses active components in a very limited way to initiate
subsequent passive operation. Passive systems are further classified into four subgroups based
on their dependence on active components.
Category A: This category is characterized by no signal inputs of "intelligence", no
external power sources or forces, no moving mechanical parts, and no moving working
fluid.
Examples: physical barriers against the release of fission products, such as nuclear fuel
cladding and pressure boundary systems, hardened building structures for the protection
of a plant against seismic and other external events, core cooling systems relying only on
heat radiation and/or conduction and static components of safety related passive systems
(e.g. tubes, pressurizers, accumulators) as well as structural parts (e.g. supports, shields).
Category B: This category is characterized by no signal inputs of "intelligence", no
external power sources or forces, no moving mechanical parts, but moving working
fluids. The fluid movement is only due to thermal-hydraulic conditions occurring when
the safety function is activated.
Examples: reactor shutdown/emergency cooling systems based on injection of borated
water from an external water pool, reactor emergency cooling systems based on air or
water natural circulation in heat exchangers immersed in water pools (inside the
containment), containment cooling systems based on natural circulation of air flowing
around the containment walls.
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Category C: This category is characterized by no signal inputs of "intelligence", no
external power sources or forces, moving mechanical parts, whether or not moving
working fluids are also present. The fluid motion is characterized as in category B;
mechanical movements are due to imbalances within the system (e.g., static pressure in
check and relief valves, hydrostatic pressure in accumulators) and forces directly exerted
by the process.
Examples: emergency injection systems consisting of accumulators or storage tanks and
discharge lines equipped with check valves, and mechanical actuator, such as check
valves and spring-loaded relief valves.
Category D: This category addresses the intermediary zone between active and passive
where the execution of the safety function is made through passive methods as described
in the previous categories except that internal intelligence is not available to initiate the
process. In these cases an external signal is permitted to trigger the passive process.
Examples: emergency core cooling systems, based on gravity-driven flow of water,
activated by valves which break open on demand.
A simplified breakdown of the four categories is shown in Table 1.1 below:
Table 1.1 Passive Safety Categories4
Characteristic Category A Category B Category C Category D
Signal Inputs of No No No Yes
intelligence
External power No No No No
sources or forces
Moving No No Yes Yes/No
mechanical parts
Moving working No Yes Yes Yes/No
fluid
18
As previously mentioned, the ESBWR and AP 1000 utilize various categories of passive safety
systems. A simplified summary of the four Generation III+ reactor designs is shown in Table
1.2. It is important to note that all four reactors use a mixture of both active and passive systems
throughout their designs; however, as discussed in Chapter 2, these general classifications speak
to the degree of passive safety usage in the design, with a specific focus on the emergency core
cooling systems.
Table 1.2 Generation I+ Summary
Design Safety
ABWR Active
BWR
ESBWR Passive
EPR Active
PWR
AP 000 Passive
1.4 Reactor Design Status
The ABWR and ESBWR are designed by General Electric (GE) and manufactured by GE and a
host of other companies. Currently, there are four ABWRs operating in Japan, two under
construction in Taiwan, and more planned in Japan. The ABWR has already passed its U.S.
design certification by the NRC and if ordered by a utility, claims it could be operational by
2012.5 The ESBWR is currently under design certification by the NRC and GE believes it can
achieve certification that would support commercial operation of ESBWRs by 2014.5
The EPR is manufactured by AREVA who has one EPR under construction in Finland that
began construction in 2005. That EPR is scheduled to come into commercial operation in 2009.
AREVA also has another order for an EPR in France where construction is expected to start in
2007, with expected commercial operation beginning 2012. In the U.S., AREVA has completed
phase one of its U.S. EPR design certification pre-application process with the NRC. It is
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expected that the complete design certification application will be submitted by the end of 2007,
in order to support the company's plans to have a U.S. EPR be licensed and ready for operation
in 2015.
In January 2006, the NRC approved the final design certification for the AP 1000. Thus, utilities
can place on order on it just like the ABWR. Two AP1000s are planned by southern utilities
working on site permits.
As of right now, the ABWR and AP1000 are the only two certified reactors that can be ordered
by U.S. utilities out of the four Generation III+ types discussed. It is unclear whether the
ESBWR and EPR will complete their design certifications in time to meet the potential initial
demand for new nuclear plants in the U.S. Currently the process for building a new nuclear plant
requires utilities to complete an early site permit (ESP) and combined operating license (COL)
with the NRC. The ESP is a partial construction permit, good for 10 to 20 years, that addresses
site safety issues including emergencies along with any environmental protection issues. The
ESP is completed at a site selected by the utility independent of the review of a specific nuclear
plant design. The COL authorizes construction and conditional operation of a nuclear power
facility. In addition, the plant design itself must pass its own final design certification. Table 1.3
provides a summary of the planned orders for ESPs and COLs for each plant type from the NRC
including those that are already in progress or completed.
Table 1.3 Requests for ESPs and COLs to the NRC
6
COLs ESPs Units
ABWR 2 1 4
ESBWR 3 2 3
EPR 5 0 5
AP1000 6 1 11
Unspecified 3 3 3
TOTAL 19 7 26
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1.5 Goals
The immediate future of nuclear power in the United States rests in the potential of these four
generation III+ reactors. Two of the four concerns discussed in the MIT study, safety and cost,
will have a major impact on which of the four reactors will dominate the deregulated market.
The other two concerns, proliferation and waste, are similar for all four Generation III+ reactors
since they have the same fuel cycle. Market drivers and political drivers will steer a path of least
resistance for one of these alternatives. This study focuses on the impact of passive safety
systems on desirability of these advanced light water reactors.
Chapter 2 provides the background for understanding the competing safety designs of
ALWRs.
Chapter 3 provides vendor safety claims for these four reactors and discusses advantages
and disadvantages of each system in terms of safety.
Chapter 4 describes an industry accepted methodology for analyzing passive safety
system reliability when thermal hydraulic uncertainty is introduced into the transient.
Chapter 5 describes the simplified safety system modeled, per the methodology outlined
in Chapter 4, that is used to compare active and passive system responses and discusses
these safety results with regards to passive safety desirability.
Chapter 6 outlines the cost model used in the previous MIT study and how it can be used
to identify potential cost benefits between Generation III+ designs.
Chapter 7 discusses a ten question survey conducted among nuclear energy experts of
various affiliations to determine their views and opinions on the safety, cost, and
licensing of reactors with passive safety systems, especially in comparison to reactors
with active safety systems.
Chapter 8 discusses the current and future energy policies and their impact on passive
safety desirability.
21
Chapter 9 concludes with a summary and recommendations for future work.
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Chapter 2. Background
2.1 Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Designs
The BWR nuclear plant, like the PWR, has its origins in the technology developed in the 1950's
for the U.S. Navy's nuclear submarine program. The purpose of the BWR evolutionary design
changes has been to simplify the reactor while improving the economics and safety. Historically,
the GE BWR design has been simplified in two key areas-the reactor systems and the
containment design. Table 2.1 chronicles the development of the GE BWR.
Table 2.1 GE BWR History Before Introducing the ESBWR 7
Product First Commercial Representative Plant/
Line Operation Date Characteristics
BWRI1 1960 Dresden 1
Initial commercial-size BWR
BWRl2 1969 Oyster Creek
Plants purchased solely on economics CLarge direct cycle
BWR/3 1971 Dresden 2
First jet pump application
Improved ECCS: spray and tlood capability
BWR/4 1972 Vermont Yankee
Increased power density (20%)
BWRIS 1977 Tokai 2
Improved ECCS CValve flow control
BWR/6 1978 Kuo Sheng
Compact control room
Solid-state nuclear system protection system C
ABWR 1996 Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 6
(Advanced BWR)
Reactor internal pumps
Fine-motion control rod drives
Advanced control room, digital solid-state
microprocessors
Fiber optic data transmission / multiplexing
Increased number ot tuel bundles
Titanium condenser
Improved ECCS: high/low pressure flooders
C
Mark-l
ontainment
Mark-Il
ontainment
Mark-IlIl
ontainment
ABWR
ontainment
A major improvement over this evolutionary process was the elimination of the steam generators
and the use of five external recirculation loops in the BWR/2. Later, reactor systems were
further simplified by the introduction of internal jet pumps in BWR/3 which produced enough
recirculation flow to reduce the number of external loops from five to two. The ABWR design
uses 10 internal reactor pumps, further simplifying the recirculation system design. By using
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these 10 pumps mounted directly to the vessel itself, the external recirculation systems, with all
their pumps, valves, piping, and scrubbers, have been eliminated altogether. This design feature
is the source of many of the ABWR's safety and operational advantages to be discussed later.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the evolution of the GE BWR system design.
BWR System Design
GmbH from Germany)
Evolution 7
ABwr
KRB=Kernkraftwerk RWE -Bayernwerk
In addition to these reactor improvements, positive changes to BWR containment have occurred.
BWR containments have shifted from "dry" spherical structures to a "pressure suppression"
containment design, which includes a suppression pool, because of its many advantages. Among
7these advantages are:
- High heat capacity.
- Lower design pressure.
- Superior ability to accommodate rapid depressurization.
- Unique ability to filter and retain fission products.
- Provision of a large source of readily available makeup water in the case of accidents.
- Simplified, compact design.
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Dresden I KRB
Oyster Creek Dresden 2
Figure 2.1 GE
It is the reduction in containment design pressures through these measures, together with
the elimination of the external recirculation loops, that allows the containment, and thus the
reactor building to be more compact. The containment shape has shifted over time from the
Mark I (light bulb) to the Mark III (right cylinder) which is much easier and less costly to
construct. The ABWR containment is smaller than the Mark III containment due to the
elimination of the external recirculation loops. There are other general improvements for the
ABWR outlined in Table 2.2 below:
Table 2.2 Advanced BWR Improvements8
Feature BWR/6 ABWR ESBWR
Two external loop 10 vessel mounted
Recirculation Recirc systems with internal reactor natural circulation
jet pumps inside RPV pumps
Control Rod Drives Locking Piston CRDs Fine-motion CRDs Fine-motion CRDs*
ECCS 2-division ECCS plus 3-division ECCS 4-division ECCS
HPCS
Analog, hardwired, Digital, multiplexed, Digital, multiplexed,
Control/Instrumentation Single-channel fiber optics, multi- fiber optics, multi-
channel Channel
*This was the initial proposal, later given up to allow speedy certification
The containment and recirculation improvements have already been discussed briefly. All other
improvements will be discussed in more detail in the next section. Most of these improvements
have a large impact on increased safety and reduction in cost. This study will compare some
aspects of these "advanced" active safety system upgrades with the passive safety system
upgrades of GE's next evolutionary design--the ESBWR.
Following the ABWR, GE started to introduce the Simplified Boiling Reactor (SBWR), a 600
MWe reactor with passive safety systems, through the government's ALWR funding program.
In 1996, GE cancelled the SBWR stating "GE Nuclear Energy is redirecting the focus of its
SBWR technology programs to plants of 1000 MWe or larger since extensive evaluations of the
market competitiveness of a 600 MWe size ALWR have not established the commercial viability
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of these designs, particularly in light of the increasingly competitive nature of the electric
industry throughout the world."9 Thus, the ESBWR concept was born to try and make a more
market competitive reactor using a continued evolutionary design from ABWR to SBWR to
ESBWR.
The ESBWR design continued to push towards simplicity and incorporate more passive safety
features. Figure 2.2 shows the difference between ABWR and ESBWR reactor designs and
containments.
I
ABWR ESBWR ABWR ESBWR
(Reactor Vessel) (Containment)
Figure 2.2 ABWR/ESBWR Comparisons
10
A comparison of key parameters also illustrates the move towards simplicity and the higher rated
power (1550 MWe) achieved shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 Comparison of ESBWR Key Parameters to Previous BWRs'
0
Parameter BWR/6 ABWR ESBWR
Power (MWt) 3293 3926 4500
Power (MWe) 1290 1350 1550
Vessel Height (m) 21.8 21.1 27.7
Vessel Diameter (m) 6.4 7.1 7.1
Fuel Bundles (number) 800 872 1132
Active Fuel Length (m) 3.6 3.6 3.0
NumberofCRDs 193 205 269
Power Density (kW/l) 54.2 51 54.3
Number of RIPs N/A 10 0
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By changing many of these parameters, the ESBWR was able to achieve 2 to 3 times greater
natural circulation in its core and nearly similar power-to-flow ratio as pumped plants at rated
conditions. Generally, a typical BWR/6 can be operated on natural circulation up to about 25
percent of rated power. Beyond that level, pumps are required. The ESBWR operates
completely under natural circulation at all rated power levels which greatly simplifies vessel
construction and reduces cost. Figure 2.3 illustrates the comparison of natural circulation flow
for BWRs and shows the ESBWR has a large margin to unstable regions.
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Figure 2.3 Comparison of Natural Circulation Flows
8
As stated earlier, several vendors have sought to improve current BWR design through
simplification while improving safety and reducing cost. The method of improving current
designs can be done in a variety of ways. Both the ABWR and ESBWR have significantly
improved BWR reactor features. This study is focusing on whether there is an advantage (in
terms of safety, cost, licensing, and acceptance) in utilizing active safety improvements instead
of passive safety improvements or vice versa.
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2.1.1 ABWR Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
The ABWR ECCS network was designed as a full three-division system in contrast to the two-
division system of the BWR/6. A "division" means that all systems and components necessary
to complete the safety function are contained within the division, and that a division is physically
separated from other divisions to avoid any propagating failures, such as threats due to fire or
flood. Thus, adding another independent, redundant division increased the defense in depth in
the ABWR. As discussed earlier, the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) has no external recirculation
loops or large pipe nozzles below the top of the core region. This allows for a reduced capacity
ECCS while still keeping the fuel covered for the full spectrum of postulated "loss of coolant
accidents" (LOCA) even assuming a single failure. Each of the three divisions has both a high
and low-pressure injection pump and heat removal capability. The Reactor Core Isolation
Cooling (RCIC) System includes a steam-driven, high-pressure pump. This steam-driven pump
adds diversity to pumping power for even greater defense in depth. Transient response was
improved by designing three available high-pressure injection systems in addition to feedwater.
Furthermore, the adoption of three on-site emergency diesel-generators to support core cooling
and heat removal, as well as the addition of an on-site gas turbine-generator, reduces the
potential for "station blackout" (SBO). The balanced ECCS system has less reliance on the
Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function, since a single, motor driven high pressure
core flooder (HPCF) can maintain core safety for any postulated pipe break The HPCF pumps
provide core makeup over the entire range of system operating pressures. The RCIC System,
which has been upgraded to a safety system, has the dual function of providing high pressure
ECCS flow following a postulated LOCA and reactor coolant inventory control for reactor
isolation transients. The low pressure ECCS for the ABWR utilizes the three residual heat
removal (RHR) pumps in the post-LOCA Low Pressure Flooding (LPFL) mode and are labeled
LPFL. For small LOCAs that do not depressurize the reactor system, if the high pressure makeup
is unavailable, an Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) actuates to vent steam from the
reactor through the safety/relief valves (SRVs) to the suppression pool, and depressurizes the
reactor vessel to allow the LPFL pumps to provide core coolant makeup flow. Figure 2.4 shows
the ABWR ECCS diagram. We will now discuss each ECCS system more in depth.
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2.1.1.1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System
The RHR System has a dual role of providing reactor cooling for normal shutdown and
providing core and containment cooling following a postulated LOCA or reactor isolation. The
ABWR RHR System has been improved such that core and suppression pool cooling are
achieved simultaneously since, in the core-cooling mode, the flow from the suppression pool
passes through the RHR heat exchanger and the supporting heat removal systems. This system,
which consists of three divisions (A, B and C), has six principal functions (in addition to
test/bypass modes), each with a specific purpose outlined below. A diagram of the RHR is
shown in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5 ABWR Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System6
i. Low Pressure Core Flooder Mode (Division A, B, and C)
The RHR System is automatically initiated when either a high drywell pressure or low reactor
water level condition exists (i.e., LOCA signal). The processors use a 2-out-of-4 voting logic for
RHR System initiation. Each RHR division can also be initiated manually. Following receipt of
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an initiation signal, the RHR System automatically initiates and operates in the LPFL mode to
provide emergency makeup to the reactor vessel. The initiation signal starts the pumps, which
run in the minimum flow mode until the reactor depressurizes to less than the pump's developed
head pressure. A low reactor pressure signal occurs somewhat above the pump's developed head
pressure which signals the injection valve to open. As the injection valve opens, the reactor
pressure is contained by the testable check valve until the reactor pressure becomes less than the
pump's developed head pressure at the minimum flow mode, at which time injection flow begins.
This sequence satisfies the response requirements for all potential LOCA pipe breaks when the
injection valve opens within 36 seconds after receiving the low reactor pressure permissive
signal. The LPFL mode is accomplished by all 3 divisions of the RHR system by transferring
water from the suppression pool to the RPV, via the RHR heat exchangers. The RPV injection
valve in each division requires a low rector pressure permissive signal to open, and closes
automatically on receipt of a high reactor vessel pressure signal."
ii. Suppression Pool Cooling Mode (Division A, B, and C)
The suppression pool cooling mode of the RHR System limits the long-term post-LOCA
temperature of the suppression pool, and limits the long-term peak temperatures and pressures
within the wetwell and drywell regions of the containment. In this mode, the RHR System
circulates water through the RHR heat exchangers and returns it directly to the suppression pool.
This mode is manually initiated by control of individual system components or automatically
initiated by high suppression pool temperature. The RHR pumps have sufficient net positive
suction head (NPSH) available at the pump. Suction from the suppression pool is the limiting
NPSH condition of all the RHR modes.12
iii. Shutdown cooling mode (Division A, B, and C)
In the shutdown cooling mode of operation, the RHR System removes decay heat from the
reactor core, and is used to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown condition by removing decay
and sensible heat from the core and reactor vessel. This mode reduces reactor pressure and
temperature to cold shutdown conditions. In this mode, each division takes suction from the
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RPV via its dedicated suction line, pumps the water through its respective heat exchanger tubes,
and returns the cooled water to the RPV. B and C divisions discharge water back to the RPV via
dedicated spargers, while division A utilizes the vessel spargers of one of the two feedwater
lines. Shutdown cooling is initiated manually once the RPV has been depressurized below the
system low pressure permissive.
iv. Containment Spray Mode (Division B, and C)
The containment spray mode of the RHR System is available in Divisions B and C, and consists
of the wetwell spray and drywell spray operating together. In this mode, the RHR System pumps
suppression pool water to a single wetwell spray header and single drywell spray header through
the associated RHR heat exchanger. The containment spray mode of the RHR System is
initiated manually by control of individual system components. The drywell spray inlet valves
can only be opened if a high drywell pressure condition exists and if the injection valves are fully
closed. 12
v. AC-Independent Water Addition (Division C)
The ACIWA mode of RHR Loop C provides a means for introducing water from Fire Protection
(FP) through RHR Loop C piping and valves directly into either the RPV, drywell spray header,
or wetwell spray header. The purpose is to prevent core damage or, if core damage has already
occurred, to terminate melt progression when AC power is not available from either onsite or
offsite sources. The ACIWA mode of RHR provides manual capability to prevent core damage
when all ECCS are lost. 12
vi. Augmented Fuel Pool Cooling and Fuel Pool Makeup (Division A, B, C)
The augmented fuel pool cooling mode of the RHR System can supplement the Fuel Pool
Cooling (FPC) System by directly cooling the fuel pool by circulation of fuel pool water through
the RHR heat exchanger and returning it to the fuel pool or return the cooled RHR shutdown
cooling flow to the fuel pool when providing shutdown cooling during refueling.12
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2.1.1.2 High Pressure Core Flooder System (Division B, and C)
The High Pressure Core Flooder (HPCF) System is comprised of two separate divisions. The
function of the HPCF System is to provide emergency makeup water to the reactor vessel for
transient or LOCA event, especially after small breaks which do not depressurize the reactor
vessel. The primary source of suction is the condensate storage tank (CST) and the secondary
source of supply is the suppression pool (S/P). The HPCF system is shown in Figure 2.6 below:
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Figure 2.6 ABWR High Pressure Core Flooder (HPCF) System7
The HPCF System is automatically initiated when either a high drywell pressure signal or low
reactor water level signal exists. Both divisions of the HPCF System are actuated at a reactor
water level below the RCIC actuation level and thus provide a backup to RCIC for transients.
The processors use a 2-out-of-4 voting logic for system initiation and shutdown. Manual
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initiation can also be performed. Following receipt of an initiation signal, the HPCF System
automatically initiates and operates in the high-pressure flooder mode to provide water to the
core region of the reactor. The pumps are motor-driven centrifugal pumps that provide flow as a
function of reactor vessel pressure. The flow in each division is not less than a value
corresponding to a straight line between a flow of 182 m3/hr at a differential pressure of 8.12
MPa and a flow of 727 m3/hr at a differential pressure of 0.69 MPa. The HPCF System has the
capability to deliver at least 50% of these flow rates with 171'C water at the pump suction. The
differential pressure values represent the difference between the reactor vessel pressure and the
pressure of the air space of the source water for the pump. System flow into the reactor vessel is
achieved within 16 seconds of receipt of an initiation signal and power available at the
emergency busses. Pump suction is from the CST. Automatic transfer of pump suction from the
CST to the S/P occurs when a low CST water level or high suppression pool water level signal
exists. When a high water level signal in the reactor pressure vessel exists, the reactor vessel
injection valve is automatically closed. When the low reactor water level initiation signal recurs,
the injection valve automatically re-opens to reestablish HPCF flow. Emergency diesel
generators power the HPCF System pump motors if auxiliary power is not available.12
2.1.1.3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System
The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System's primary purpose is to provide makeup
water to the reactor vessel when the vessel is isolated. The steam drives the RCIC turbine from
the RPV which then drives the RCIC pump. This pump operates automatically in time and with
sufficient coolant flow to maintain adequate water level in the reactor vessel for station blackout
(loss of all AC). The RCIC steam supply to the turbine branches off one of the main steamlines
inside containment upstream of the inboard MSIV and exhausts to the S/P. The primary source
of RCIC pump suction is the CST. The S/P is the secondary source of RCIC pump suction and
suction is transferred to this pool when a low CST water level or high S/P water level signal
exists. Figure 2.7 shows the RCIC system:
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Figure 2.7 ABWR Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System7
The RCIC System is automatically initiated when either a high drywell pressure or low reactor
water level condition exists. RCIC System is actuated at a reactor water level higher than the
HPCF System actuation level. The processors use a 2-out-of-4 voting logic for system initiation
and shutdown. Manual RCIC System can be started by local operation of components outside
the main control room. The RCIC automatically shuts down when a high reactor water level
condition exists. Following RCIC shutdown on high reactor water level signal, the RCIC System
automatically restarts to provide RPV water makeup, if the low reactor water level initiation
signal recurs. The RCIC pump delivers a flow rate of at least 182 m3/hr against a maximum
differential pressure of 8.12 MPa (between the RPV and the suction source). This flow rate is
achieved within seconds of receipt of the system initiation signal. The RCIC system operates for
a period of at least 2 hours under conditions of no AC power availability and no other
simultaneous failures, accidents, or other design basis conditions.
12
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2.1.1.4 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)
The Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) logic is automatically initiated after a short delay
if an RPV low water level signal is present concurrently with a high drywell pressure signal. The
ADS logic is also automatically initiated if only the RPV low water level signal is present. This
initiation will occur after a longer delay to allow the high pressure ECCS a chance to restore the
RPV water level to normal levels and thus avoid the ADS actuation. Both ADS initiation paths
require an indication that at least one of the RHR or HPCF pumps is running before the initiation
sequence is complete. ADS initiation is accomplished by redundant trip channels arranged in
two divisionally separated logics that control two separate, solenoid-operated pneumatic pilots
on each ADS SRV. Automatic initiation of the ADS is inhibited unless there is a coincident low
reactor water level signal and an average power range monitors (APRMs) downscale signal.
There are also main control room switches for the manual inhibit of automatic initiation of the
ADS. The ADS can also be initiated manually. On a manual initiation signal, concurrent with
positive indication of at least one of the RHR or HPCF pumps is running, the ADS function is
initiated.7
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2.1.2 Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESB WR)
The ESBWR used many of the same improvements made on the ABWR but also focused on
designing more passive features. For the purposes of this study, we will focus on the passive
safety system upgrades and the use of natural circulation during normal operation. Most of the
ESBWR passive safety systems fall under the IAEA's classification of "passive B" systems
because of their minimal reliance on some active components such as motor operated valves.
Later we will examine what, if any, benefits these systems offer.
Significant natural circulation flow exists in all BWRs as previously discussed. For a given core
power, there is a corresponding natural circulation flow. In order to maintain sufficient flow at
higher power levels using natural circulation, modifications were made to the ABWR design.
The "pressure losses" encountered by the coolant as it followed its tortuous path through the core
were identified and minimized. Figure 2.8 shows the typical flow of coolant through the
ESBWR.
The following modifications were
iN made to the ESBWR to improve
natural circulation:
Aimulusi
-Increased chimney height
-Unrestricted downcomer
-Shorter fuel/core length (-10 feet
sorated wPater instead of usual 12 feet)
7 ,mlmred steam -Improved steam separators
Figure 2.8 Coolant Flow Through ESBWR Vessel
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The increased chimney height resulted in a greater buoyancy driving head while the shorter fuel,
unrestricted downcomer, and improved separators minimized flow pressure losses. The
downcomer in the ABWR has a very large pressure loss at the internal pump minimum flow
area. Since the ESBWR has no internal pump, its downcomer flow is less restrictive. Figure 2.9
summarizes these improvements.
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Figure 2.9 ESBWR Natural Circulation Improvements12
Under normal operation, the natural circulation in the ESBWR is established due to the density
differences between the water in the vessel annulus (outside the shroud and chimney) and the
steam/water mixture inside the shroud and chimney. The colder, higher density water in the
annulus creates a higher pressure or a driving head when compared to the hotter, lower density
fluid (steam/water) in the core and chimney. It's the energy produced in the core of the reactor
which heats the water entering at the bottom of the core, and converts it to a steam/water
mixture. In the core the subcooled water is first heated to the saturation temperature and then
additional heat is added, starting the boiling process of the core coolant. As the coolant travels
38
upward through the core, the fraction of saturated steam increases until at the exit of the core the
fraction of saturated steam is about 18-weight % (18% quality). This low-density steam/water
mixture travels upward through the chimney to the steam separators where centrifugal force
separates the steam from the water. The separated, saturated water returns to the volume around
the separators while the slightly "wet" steam travels upward to the steam dryers and eventually
out the main steam nozzle and piping to the turbine. Cooler feedwater re-enters the vessel at the
top of the annulus, to mix with the saturated water around the separators and subcool this water.
The resulting mixture is subcooled only a few degrees below the saturation temperature. The
cooler mixture then travels downward through the annulus to re-enter the core. The water
therefore forms a recirculation loop within the vessel. The mass of steam leaving the vessel is
matched by the mass of feedwater entering. The chimney adds height to this density difference,
in effect providing additional driving head to the circulation process. A forced circulation BWR
acts in the same basic manner but uses the internal or external pumps to add driving head to this
recirculation flow instead of the elevation head provided by the chimney. A pump has entrance
and exit losses associated with it and the pump must produce the driving head to overcome these
additional losses.
Using complete natural circulation greatly simplifies the reactor design while still maintaining
power/flow ratios similar to the ABWR. The taller ESBWR vessel used to stimulate natural
circulation also offers a greater margin to the core becoming uncovered because of the greater
initial volume of makeup water in the vessel during operation. This added margin is shown in
the next chapter. The next area of focus will be the passive safety systems employed by the
ESBWR.
The passive safety systems of the ESBWR can be broken up into the following systems:
Isolation Condenser, Passive Containment Cooling System, and Gravity Drain Cooling System.
Each of these systems has its own responsibilities. In addition, they all evolved from the SBWR
and have previously been tested. Figure 2.10 shows a schematic for these passive systems.
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Figure 2.10 ESBWR Passive Safety Systems
2.1.2.1 Gravity Drain Cooling System
The GDCS is a passive safety system which uses gravity to inject water into the reactor from the
GDCS pool, an annular pressure suppression pool located at an elevation above the reactor core.
It provides a simple approach to Emergency Core Cooling eliminating the need for pump or
diesels, and does not need short term (three days) operator action. It requires more water in the
reactor vessel above the core and additional depressurization capacity, so the reactor can be
depressurized to very low pressures and gravity flow from the elevated GDCS pool can keep the
core covered. The additional water can also reduce pressure rise rates for transients and add
substantially more time before the core uncovers in multiple failure scenarios. Because ESBWR
is a natural-circulation design, there are no large pipes attached to the vessel near or below the
core elevation. Thus, the design insures full core coverage for all design basis events. A plant
using the GDCS feature has the potential to be more economical to design, construct, and operate
due to the reduction in safety system equipment and the resulting reduction in support systems.
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The GDCS has four separate divisions, three pools, and vessel depressurization by two diverse
valve designs--the SRV and the depressurization valve (DPV). The SRV is air operated while
the DPV is explosive charge. The GDCS has three subsystems-short term, long term, and
deluge. The short term system flow path is from the GDCS pool to the vessel through two
injection lines per division. This system handles all LOCA scenarios. The squib valves open
150 seconds after the low-low vessel level signal. The long term system flow path is from the
suppression pool to the vessel through one equalizing line per division. In this case, the squib
valves open 30 minutes after the low-low vessel level signal. This system is primarily for
protection against bottom drain line breaks. The deluge system uses GDCS water to provide
corium cooling to the lower drywell. Here, the squib valves open on high concrete temperature.
Figure 2.11 shows the GDCS system.
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2.1.2.2 Isolation Condenser System
The isolation condenser system (ICS) is a similar system to those used in older boiling water
reactor designs. It consists of a pool located outside of the containment with a heat exchanger.
The ICS transfers residual and decay heat from the reactor coolant to the water in the shell side
of the heat exchanger resulting in steam generation. The steam generated in the shell side of the
heat exchanger is then vented to the outside atmosphere. The system employs natural circulation
as the driving head from the reactor steam side, through the isolation condenser tubes, and back
to the reactor. The ICS is automatically initiated if a high reactor pressure condition is sustained
for 15 seconds. The time delay prevents unnecessary system initiation during turbine trips. Also,
the ICS automatically initiates on a low vessel water level to aid in reducing reactor pressure for
small line breaks or when all main steam isolation valves are shut. The ICS is designed to
provide core cooling regardless of whether electrical power is available which is beneficial
during station blackout. It also provides decay heat removal during transients. The ESBWR ICS
has four heat exchangers rated at 33.75 MWt each. Each condenser is connected through a
separate loop to the reactor. Figure 2.12 shows a simplified ICS.
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2.1.2.3 Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS)
The heat transfer to the suppression pool during a LOCA accident can be removed automatically
and passively for three days (72 hours) by the natural circulation water flow of the PCCS. The
PCCS design includes a water filled annulus that is built into the side of suppression pool wall
(also the containment wall). The heat of the pool is transfer to this "water wall" which in turn is
cooled by natural circulation of the water inside the annulus. The PCCS is capable of cooling the
pool this way for three days without the need for active pumps and standby diesels. Beyond 3
days, water makeup is all that is needed to continue the passive cooling functions. Containment
venting is, therefore, not necessary to prevent pressure buildup or to retain containment integrity.
Each heat exchanger is driven by drywell-to-wetwell pressure differential such that the steam-gas
mixture seeks to find the lowest resistance pathway to restore pressure equilibrium. The heat
exchanger vent lines are at less submergence than steam vents. The condensate drains to the
open-top drain and holding tank which is sized to hold the condensate from initial 20 minutes of
operation following a LOCA. These same tanks drain back to RPV after a time delay of- 30
minutes when explosive valves open. If these return valves fail to open, the condensate is not
lost but returned to the lower drywell. The design pressure and temperature is 110 psig and
340'F and the 6 heat exchangers are rated at 11 MWt. Figure 2.13 shows a PCCS system.
Passive Containment Coolin-
Simplified
Figure 2.13 ESBWR Passive Containment Cooling System
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2.2 Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Designs
The PWR nuclear plant also has its origins in the U.S. Navy which continues to be the plant type
of choice for all nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. As mentioned, 69 of the 103 operating
U.S. nuclear plants are of the PWR type while the remainder are BWRs. Like the BWR, the
PWR has seen evolutionary design changes that have focused on simplification and enhanced
safety. One recent passive design and one active design will be reviewed in detail here to
contrast them against each other, and ensure that their differences are clear to the reader.
The EPR is a 1,600 MWe reactor that utilizes experience from several light water reactors
worldwide to shape its design, primarily focusing on the more recent technologies of the French
N4 and German KONVOI reactors. The EPR was developed in the mid 1990's by Framatome
and Siemens, whose nuclear activities were combined in January 2001 to form Framatome ANP,
a subsidiary of AREVA and Siemens. This collaborative effort also received assistance from
French and German utilities. The extensive multi-national development effort used in its design
has made it more advanced than any currently operating PWR. EPR designers chose an
evolutionary course emphasizing active safety features, as active features are the standard in
operating PWRs. The overall goal is to produce an economically competitive reactor while
achieving a greater level of safety. Some of the more notable EPR design features are the
following1:
* Aircraft crash resistance upgrade
* In-containment borated water storage tank
* Features to mitigate accidents beyond design base accidents (DBA)
* State-of-the-art digital control systems and control room design.
* Four trains of active safety equipment to maximize reliability and maintainability.
The four-train concept will be discussed in more depth in the next section. Table 2.4 outlines the
evolutionary specifications for the EPR:
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Table 2.4 EPR Specifications
15
N4 KONVOI
Framatome Siemens
Thermal power Mh 4250 3850
Electrical power Mwe 1475 1365
Efficiency % 34,7 35.4
Number of primary loops 4 4
Number of fuel assemblies 205 193
Design service lifetime years 40 40
Around the same time of EPR design, Westinghouse was working on a new PWR that featured
passive safety systems as part of the U.S. Department of Energy funded "Advanced Light Water
Reactor" Program. This new reactor was known as the AP600 because of its passive safety and
the fact that it generated 600MWe of electricity. The AP600 was more of a "revolutionary"
design for Westinghouse since no previous PWR had been licensed that featured passive safety
(although GE was simultaneously working on its SBWR, which featured passive safety).
During the AP600 design program, a comprehensive test program was carried out to verify plant
components, passive safety systems components, and containment behavior. When the test
program was completed at the end of 1994, AP600 became the most thoroughly tested advanced
reactor design ever reviewed by the U.S. NRC. The test results confirmed the exceptional
behavior of the passive systems and have been instrumental in facilitating code validations.
Aside from the simplified passive safety systems, the remainder of the AP600's major
components are based on years of operating experience and evolutionary design from other
PWRs. The AP600 received final design approval in the United States on September 3, 1998,
but received little commercial success perhaps due to its low rated power (please recall that this
is why GE cancelled its 600 MWe SBWR program to focus on the higher rated ESBWR).
Westinghouse realized that it could significantly improve the rated power of its passive reactor
by making only a few minor changes and utilizing economies of scale. Thus, the AP 1000 design
was born which could produce 1090 MWe. Table 2.5 outlines the major differences between the
AP600 and AP 1000 reactors.
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Table 2.5 AP600/AP1000 Differences 6
Feature AP600 AP1000
Net Electric Output, MWe 600 1090
Reactor Power, MWt 1933 2993
Hot leg temperature, OF 600 615
Number of Fuel Assemblies 145 157
Type of Fuel Assembly 17X 17 17 X 17
Active Fuel Length, ft. 12 14
Core loading, MTU 66.9 84.5
Linear Heat Rating, kw/ft 4.1 5.03
Average Power Density, kw/l 78.82 96.6
Reactor Coolant Pump Flow, gpm 51,000 65,000
Pressurizer volume, cubic ft 1600 1800
While the AP 1000 containment and pressure vessel remained the same diameter as the AP600,
the overall height of each increased to accommodate the increase in power. The AP1000
pressure vessel is 18 inches longer than the AP600 vessel. It should be noted that while the
thermal power was increased by nearly 50%, the coolant flow was increased by only 24%.
Increased heat removal capability by the flow was introduced by allowing a larger temperature
rise across the core. This also led to improved power conversion efficiency.
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2.2.1 Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR)
EPR's Emergency Core Cooling system (ECCS) or Safety Injection system (SIS) comprises four
trains, each of them consisting of a medium head safety injection (MHSI), an accumulator (a
passive safety component), and a low head safety injection (LHSI). The RHR system is also
included in this section because the SIS and RHR system are strongly correlated. With four
independent, identical trains, the EPR SIS utilizes defense in depth. Injection mode is into the
cold legs of the main coolant line (MCL) which is consistent with most French designs. The
German PWR designs use a combined injection into both the hot and cold legs. This caused
some tension in the early design phase as Framatome ANP had to prove the efficiency of the
ECCS over all relevant accident sequences to the German safety authorities.
The EPR's SIS configuration is based on evolutionary design. German (KONVOI) design is
characterized by a fourfold redundancy, strict separation of redundant systems (i.e. no headers),
and no functional separation between the LHSI and RHR. Conversely, French (N4) design
features twofold redundancy, no separation of redundancies (two trains are interconnected by
headers), and functional separation of the LHSI and RHR. Each of these design approaches has
its advantages: A high degree of redundancy enables the performance of preventive maintenance
during operation and therefore increases plant availability while providing a limited number of
redundant systems. Taking into account various backup functions is significantly beneficial for
fulfillment of probabilistic safety criteria. 17
The EPR SIS provides a fourfold redundancy as usual in the German design approach. A single
train will be discussed here. High-pressure safety injection (HPSI), used for N4 and KONVOI,
is replaced by a MHSI, which begins injection at 8.0 MPa into the cold leg. This is beneficial for
mitigation of steam generator (SG) tube ruptures, because the potential for overfeeding of the SG
and containment bypass are reduced. The SG pressure is reduced from 9.15 MPa to 6 MPa via
main steam relief valves which allows the MHS cooling to start. As the pressure continues to
decrease, the next system in line is the nitrogen accumulator which is kept at a pressure of 4.5
MPa (gas and water volumes are 15 and 32 m 3 respectively) and also injects into the cold leg.
Following the accumulators, the LHSI starts injection at 2.0 MPa, before complete emptying of
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the accumulators. LHSI pumps, in the short term, inject into the cold legs as well. In the long
term (two hours after accident beginning), LHSI is switched over to combined injection into both
the cold and the hot legs of main coolant line. This ensures a well-balanced pressure scaling of
SIS components. Table 2.6 shows the main EPR Safety system response to accidents. Figure
2.14 shows how the EPR SIS has evolved from the French N4 and German KONVOI safety
injection systems and outlines the improvements of the EPR safety system over its two
predecessors. 17
Table 2.6 Main EPR Safety System Actions 1 7
Signal Criteria
Reactor trip Pressure < 13 MPa
ECC signal Pressure < 11 MPa
RCP trip LOOP or saturation at cold leg
MHSI Pressure < 8.0 MPa and
ECC signal + 30 sa
LHSI Pressure < 2.0 MPa and
ECC signal + 30 sJ
Partial cooldownb ECC signal
EFWS SG level < 8 m + 50 s
aDelay due to diesel load step.
bThe SGs are cooled down via the SG relief valves from 9.15
to 6 MPa with a gradient of 100 K/h.
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EPR's SIS improvements over N4 SIS EPR SIS improvements over KONVOI SIS
Fourfold redundancy Increased accumulator pressure to 4.5 MPa
Strict separation of redundancies Optimized accumulator water-to-nitrogen ratio
Reduced shut-off head of MHSI pumps Reduced shut-off head of MHSI pumps
(8.0MPa instead of 4.5 MPa) (8.0 MPa instead of 11.0 MPa
Increased shut-off head of LHSI pumps
(2.0 MPa instead of 1.0 MPa)
No accumulator isolation
IRWST instead of water tanks (inside containment)
Reduced to 4 accumulators from 8 optimizing capacity
Figure 2.14 EPR Safety Injection System Evolution 
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The purpose of using four identical, completely independent trains is based on the following
logic. Loss of off-site power is assumed as an accident initiation. Assume one train is down for
preventive maintenance. A second diesel fails to start (single failure criterion). Therefore only
two MHSI pumps, two LHSI pumps and two trains of the Emergency Feed Water System
(EFWS) remain available. However, when the break is located in the cold leg, the corresponding
injections are not considered, thus leaving the operator with only one train available to provide
long term cooling. One train is sufficient to provide all necessary safety functions for all
relevant accident scenarios.' 8
These safety injection trains draw suction from the Incontainment Refueling Water Storage Tank
(IRWST) which is practically an unlimited water source. The water in the tank is cooled by
RHRS and/or LHSI heat exchangers. Together with the heat exchangers in the LHSI flow path,
this ensures emergency core cooling without the need for a containment spray system for design
basis accidents (a spray system of reduced size is provided for containment cooling in case of
severe accidents). The IRWST is located inside the containment in order to avoid the suction
switchover from injection to recirculation mode, which adds unreliability to the system. In case
of core melt accidents, IRWST provides water for corium cooling.
The Residual Heat Removal System is combined with the Low Head Injection System. It
transfers the residual heat from the reactor coolant system, via the cooling chain consisting of
component cooling water system and service water system, to the ultimate heat sink, when heat
removal via the steam generator is not sufficient. For residual heat removal from inside the
containment after severe accidents, a dedicated containment heat removal system is provided. Its
primary function is to limit the pressure increase inside the containment due to residual heat in
order to ensure that during a severe accident the containment design pressure is not exceeded.
Due to its high efficiency with regard to pressure reduction and its capability to maintain an
adequate long-term cooling, a spray system with heat exchangers has been selected. In case of
bleed the discharge of steam is done directly into the containment via a relief tank.
The steam generator emergency feedwater system consists of four separate and independent
trains, each providing injection to one of the four steam generators. Each emergency feedwater
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pump takes suction from an emergency feedwater tank. These tanks and the systems are located
in the four divisions, the safeguard buildings. The four emergency feedwater pumps are driven
by electric motors which are, in an emergency power case, supplied electricity by four diesel
generators. "Passive" headers can be manually opened when necessary in the long term. In
order to practically eliminate the risk of core melt in case of total station blackout, two small
diesel generators are also provided. They supply two emergency feedwater trains and the
necessary I&C.
This system organization fulfils the principle of simplification as well as the principle of
diversification, since any safety grade system function can be backed-up by another system (or a
group of systems). Figure 2.15 shows a simple diagram of the EPR safety injection system.
(Division 2)
FAgure2.15 RSaety(Divisionetin y3)Ate
LHSI LHSI
Accumula tor Accumulator
IRWST IRWST
Division 1 LHSI MHSI M H S I (JHS Division 4
Figure 2.15 EPR Safety Injection System 18
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2.2.2 AP1000 Reactor
The safety systems for the AP1000 include passive safety injection, passive residual heat
removal, and passive containment cooling. Proponents of passive systems argue that they do
more than increase safety, enhance public acceptance of nuclear power, and ease licensing - they
also simplify overall plant systems, equipment, and operation and maintenance. The
simplification of plant systems, combined with large plant operating margins, greatly reduces the
actions required by the operator in the unlikely event of an accident, a major contributor to the
accident at Three Mile Island.
Simple changes in the safety-related systems from AP600 to AP1000 allow accommodation of
the higher plant power without sacrificing design and safety margins. Since there are no safety-
related pumps, increased flow was achieved by increasing pipe size. Additional water volumes
were achieved by increasing tank sizes. These increases were made while keeping the plant
footprint unchanged. This ensures that the designs of other systems are not affected by layout
changes. The passive safety systems have been sized to provide increased safety margins,
especially for more probable initiating events. Table 2.7 illustrates the improved margins.
Table 2.7 AP1000 Improved Safety Margins
1 9
Event Typical Plant AP600 AP 000
Loss of Flow Margin to -15% -16% -19%
DNBR Limit
Feedline Break 0C (OF) >0 (>0) 
-94 (-170) -78 (-140)
Subcooling Margin
Operator actions Operator actions Operator actions
required in 10 min NOT required NOT required
3" LOCA < 8" LOCA < 8" LOCA
Small LOCA core uncovers NO core NO core
PCT -1 500OF uncovery uncovery
Large LOCA PCT *C 1093-1204 913 1162
(*F) with uncertainty (2000-2200) (1676) (2124)
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2.2.2.1 Passive Core Cooling System (PXS)
The passive core cooling system (PXS) protects the plant against leaks and ruptures of various
sizes and locations. The PXS provides core residual heat removal, safety injection, and
depressurization. The PXS is located inside the containment, and consists of the following major
subsystems and associated components:
-an incontainment refueling water storage tank (IRWST)
-a passive residual heat removal heat exchanger (PRHR HX)
-two core makeup tanks (CMTs)
-an automatic depressurization system (ADS)
-two accumulators
-pH adjustment baskets
-associated piping, valves, instrumentation, and other related equipment
These PXS subsystems or components require only a one-time alignment of valves upon
actuation. Once the initial actuation alignment is made, they rely solely on natural forces such
as gravity and stored energy to operate. The use of active equipment or supporting systems,
such as pumps, ac power sources, component cooling water or service water, is not required. The
PXS is designed to mitigate design-basis events that involve a decrease in the RCS inventory
such as a LOCA, or an increase or decrease in heat removal by the secondary system. For those
non-LOCA events that result in an increase or decrease in heat removal by the secondary system,
the PRHR HX and CMT are actuated by the protection to remove core decay heat and provide
makeup and boration for reactor coolant shrinkage. For events that reduce RCS inventory, the
CMTs are actuated by the protection to deliver borated water to the RCS via the DVI nozzles. As
the CMTs drain down, the ADS valves are sequentially actuated to depressurize the RCS and
establish the low-pressure conditions that allow injection from the accumulators, the IRWST and
the containment recirculation sump.20
The IRWST is a large tank located above the elevation of the RCS loops that contains more than
2,234 m3 (78,900 ft3) of borated water and is designed for atmospheric pressure. It is the source
of low-pressure safety injection by gravity and the heat sink for the PRHR HX, which is
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submerged within it. The IRWST water absorbs decay heat for more than one hour before the
water begins to boil. Once boiling starts, steam passes to the containment. The steam condenses
on the steel containment vessel and, after collection, drains by gravity back into the IRWST.
Thus, the IRWST can provide long-term injection water by means of gravity if the RCS is
depressurized. The RCS is automatically controlled to reduce pressure to about 0.83 bar (12
psig), at which point the head of water in the IRWST overcomes the low RCS pressure and the
pressure loss in the injection lines. The PRHR HX and the passive containment cooling system
provide indefinite decay heat removal capability with no operator action required.
The PRHR HX is connected to the RCS through an inlet line from one RCS hot-leg and an outlet
line to the associated SG cold-leg plenum (RCP suction). The PRHR HX removes core decay
heat by natural circulation. The PXS includes one PRHR HX. The PRHR HX protects the plant
against transients that upset the normal steam generator feedwater and steam systems. It satisfies
the safety criteria for loss of feedwater, feedwater line breaks, and steam line breaks.
The CMTs, which are filled with borated water during normal operation, are located at an
elevation above the RCS loops, and are connected to the RCS by pressure balance lines from the
cold-legs, which maintain the CMTs at the RCS pressure. The outlet line from the bottom of
each CMT provides an injection path to the direct vessel injection (DVI) lines into the reactor.
The accumulators are filled with borated water that is pressurized with nitrogen gas and will
inject via the DVI lines into the RCS when the RCS pressure falls below the accumulator
pressure.
The PXS provides depressurization using the four stages of the ADS to permit a relatively slow,
controlled RCS pressure reduction. The first three stages are connected to the top of the
pressurizer and discharge through a sparger into the IRWST, and the fourth stage valves connect
to the top of the RCS hot-legs and vent directly into the SG compartment. The ADS valves are
actuated sequentially to depressurize the RCS to allow for gravity injection from the IRWST.
The PXS is shown in Figures 2.16 and 2.17 below.
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2.2.2.2 Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS)
The passive containment cooling system (PCS) consists of the following components:
- a passive containment cooling water storage tank that is incorporated in the shield
building structure above the containment
- an air baffle that is located between the steel containment vessel and the concrete shield
building
- air inlet and exhaust paths that are incorporated in the shield building structure
- a water distribution system
- an ancillary water storage tank and two recirculation pumps for onsite storage of
additional PCS cooling water
The PCS provides the safety-related ultimate heat sink for the plant. The PCS cools the
containment following an accident so that design pressure is not exceeded and pressure is rapidly
reduced. On actuation, the PCS delivers water to the top, external surface of the steel
containment shell, which forms a film of water over the dome and sidewalls of the containment
structure. Air heating leads to flow over the steel containment as it is heated, causing a chimney
effect in the space between the steel and concrete shield. This airflow and cooling water
evaporation removes the heat generated within the containment and expels it to the outside air.
Westinghouse states that the passive containment cooling system maintains the containment
pressure and temperature within the appropriate design limits for both design basis and severe
accident scenarios. Figure 2.18 shows the passive containment cooling system.
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Figure 2.18 Passive Containment Cooling System"
The major function of the containment isolation system is to provide containment isolation to
allow the normal or emergency passage of fluids through the containment boundary while
preserving the integrity of the containment boundary. This prevents or limits the escape of
fission products that may result from postulated accidents. The containment isolation provisions
are designed so that fluid lines that penetrate the primary containment boundary are isolated in
the event of an accident. The system consists of the piping, valves, and actuators that isolate the
containment.
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Chapter 3. Reactor Safety Comparison
3.1 General
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the selected reactors in terms of safety, specifically
Core Damage Frequency (CDF). While there are other components of safety, such as
occupational dose or containment failure probability, this comparison focuses solely on CDF.
The reason for this is because this study focuses primarily on emergency core cooling system
differences and CDF is the best measure. To determine CDF, a probabilistic risk assessment
(PRA) can be performed or one can just use historical data if available. Probabilistic risk
assessment is a mature methodology that can provide a quantitative assessment of the risk from
accidents in nuclear power plants. It involves the development of models that delineate the
response of systems and operators to accident initiating events (either external or internal to the
reactor). Additional models are generated to identify the component failure modes required to
cause the accident mitigating systems to fail. Each component failure mode is represented as an
individual "basic event" in the systems models. Estimates of risk are obtained by propagating the
failure probability and uncertainty distributions for each of the parameters through the PRA and
its uncertainty models. For our comparisons here we will use reported PRA results from the
vendors to determine CDF.
It is important to note that PRA is usually done by a group of individuals or a team. Two
different teams are likely to get differing results when performing PRA on the same reactor.
Furthermore, the nearer one gets to low probabilities (10-8 or so), the more sensitive the result is
to minor changes in reliability/probability. Besides these limitations, PRA is a useful tool to help
understand the risk of core damage for a given reactor.
The current U.S. Nuclear Regulatory risk goal for CDF is I X 10-4 accidents per reactor year. All
licensed reactors in the U.S. must have a CDF less than this standard. After reactor modification
following TMI insights, most currently operating reactors in the U.S. have a CDF on the order of
5 X 10-5.
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3.2 ABWR vs. ESBWR
Earlier in Chapter 2, the safety systems of the GE's ABWR and ESBWR were discussed. While
overall these systems each maintain an excellent level of safety, some systems handle some
accidents better than others. Table 3.1 shows the overall CDF for the ABWR and ESBWR along
with the major contributions to each reactor's total CDF, as calculated by the vendor.
Table 3.1 CDF for ABWR and ESBWR2 2
Internal events PRA comparison
BWR,4 BWR6 ABWR ESBWR
Core Damage Frequency (CDF) x10 -5  2x10-6  2x10 -7  2x10-7
Contributors to CDF
Station Blackout 92% 80% 71% 7%
ATWS 1% 10% <1% <1%
LOCA 5% 5% 1% 62%
Transients 2% 5% 29% 30%
Conditional Containment
Failure Probability (CCFP) 70% 40% 0.2% 0.1%
Time to release for
dominant sequence 10 hr 15 hr >24 hr Indef.
This leads to some interesting observations. First of all, both the ABWR and ESBWR achieve a
factor of 10 decrease in CDF over current operating BWRs. In fact, the ABWR and ESBWR
have the same probability of core damage according to these PRA results. This means that
neither one is better than the other in terms of CDF even with a slight uncertainty. Furthermore,
both these advanced reactors are nearing the area of CDF sensitivity to the analysis method,
since both are on the order of 10-7 which means that these reactors could even be safer than these
current values suggest. Most recent ESBWR numbers now claim a CDF of 3 X 10-8 which
yields an order of magnitude less CDF than the ABWR although both well pass the current NRC
goal.- One BWR expert claims "the race for safety is over". It should be remembered that
risk from external events will add to the total risk of core damage. This includes risk from fires
and seismic events.
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Analyzing each of the reactors more carefully based on the different initiating events provides
some more insight. The ABWR improvements, fine motion control rods and automated controls,
helped reduce the anticipated transients without scram portion of CDF due to finer rod control
and less chance for human error. By adding a full third division to ECCS and an on-site gas
turbine generator, the ABWR also improved on LOCA, transient, and SBO risk over the BWR/6.
The ESBWR saw similar results against the BWR/6. What is intriguing is the discrepancy
between the ABWR and ESBWR against each other in SBO and LOCA. By substituting a
gravity fed ECCS into the reactor instead of an active one, the ESBWR LOCA contribution to
CDF went up relative to the other factors. This is due to the lack of high pressure ECCS.
However, the use of its isolation condensers for transients reduced SBO risk significantly. These
two competing effects both affected the contribution to CDF from transients which ultimately led
to about even CDF for these two reactors.
While both reactors are clearly "safe" per the NRC's guidelines, the ESBWR (passive) is more
apt to handle a station blackout event than the ABWR (active). In contrast, the ABWR is much
better at handling LOCA's due to its rapid, high-pressure injection ECCS availability. Table 3.2
shows the ABWR's top initiating events contributors to its overall CDF.
Table 3.2 ABWR Top Initiating Event Contributors to CDF
1 1
Initiating Event Events per year CDF X 1 E-8 Percent CDF
Station Blackout < 2 hours 1.20E-06 6.7 43%
Station Blackout 2 < X < 8 hours 4.50E-07 2.6 16%
Station Blackout > 8 hours 1.60E-08 1.7 11%
Isolation/loss of feedwater 0.18 1.7 11%
Unplanned manual reactor shutdown 1 1.2 7%
As one can see, SBO dominates (-70%) as earlier shown. Even with an added gas turbine
generator, this accident is the largest contributor to CDF. Although overall SBO CDF decreased
due to this addition, it did not decrease as much as other systems and thus led to an increase in
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percent contribution to overall CDF. SBO being the largest contributor to CDF is consistent with
risk profile estimates for many other BWR PRAs that have identified SBO as one of, if not the
leading, contributor to core damage frequency.
Important lessons learned from this evolutionary design in regards to safety are22 :
" Passive safety is not necessarily any better than active. Therefore, it should be
incorporated only when economic benefits can be achieved.
" Point of diminishing return for further risk reduction from internal events is being
reached in the 10-8 range due to the presence of external risk.
* There is little benefit from adding additional trains to an active ECCS when common-
mode failures dominate the risk.
* With an active ECCS, providing additional SBO protection has some merit.
* Providing passive containment heat removal diversity to active ECCS has merit.
* Increasing rod insertion reliability and FMCRDs mitigated ATWS.
* AC independent water addition system is believed by some to be the most important
system for helping to prevent severe accidents.
* It could eliminate 60 percent of sensor instrumentation in the reactor safety systems
without affecting plant safety.
63
3.3 EPR vs. AP1000
The EPR has submitted its final safety report to Finland safety regulators, but does not currently
allow access to the document. It will most likely have a very similar breakdown as the ABWR,
its active safety counterpart. The only CDF estimates given by Framatome ANP are that the
EPR reduces its CDF by a factor of 10 over current operating PWRs and more specifically, gives
an actual CDF estimate of I X 10-6 accidents per reactor year. This value is still an order of
magnitude higher than the CDF estimate for the AP1000 given in Table 3.3 below.
Table 3.3 AP1000 Initiating Event Contributions to CDF2 4
Initiating Event APINGC Operating PWRs
(CDFljr) (CDF rangeyrJ
IPE results
INUREG-15601
LOCAs (Total) 2.1E-07 1E-6 to 8E-5
- Large 4.5E-G8
- Spurious ADS Actuation 3.OE-C8
- Safety Injection Line Break 9.5E-C8
- Medium 1.6E-C8
- Small I.GE-CS
- CMT Line Break 4.OE-C9
- RCS Leak 3.OE-C9
Steam Generator Tube Rupture 'SGTR) 7.OE-C9 9E-9 to 3E-5
Transients G.OE-C9 5E-7 to 3E-4
Loss of Offsite Power;Station Blackout 1.OE-C9 1 E-8 to 7E-5
Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATW S, 5.OE-C9 1 E-8 to 4E-5
Interfacing Sys:ern LOCA 5.OE-1 1 1E-9 to OE-6
Vessel Rupture 1.DE-C8 1E-7
Total 2.4E-07 4E-6 to 3E-4
The reason for the differences could be a variety of things from conservative assumptions to an
actual safety advantage for the AP 1000. Regardless, both reactors are very safe and well exceed
NRC's standard. EPR would argue that they have many additional features to mitigate the
consequences of core failure in the event that it should occur such as a "core catcher" in the event
of meltdown and a reinforced containment for external threats. However since we do not have
the EPR's specific data, we will focus on the AP1000 PRA.
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Westinghouse's AP1000 PRA results identify 100 sequences initiated by internal events that
contribute almost 100 percent of the estimated CDF from internal events. The top 5 sequences
are summarized as follows2:
1) Event is initiated by a break in one of the two safety injection lines (a LOCA event) followed
by failure of the IRWST injection line, which is not affected by the break, to remove decay heat
from the core (CMT injection and RCS depressurization via the ADS system are successful). In
addition to the initiating event, risk important failures appearing in this sequence are:
- plugging of the IRWST discharge line strainer in the intact line,
" common cause failure (CCF) of the two check valves in the intact IRWST discharge
line
- CCF of the two explosive (squib) valves in the intact IRWST discharge line.
2) Event is initiated by a large LOCA event which is not due to spurious ADS actuation
(equivalent break diameter greater than 9 inches but smaller than a vessel rupture) followed by
failure of any one of the two accumulators to inject. In addition to the initiating event, risk
important failures appearing in this sequence are:
- failure of any check valve in the accumulator injection lines to open, and
- plugging of any flow tuning orifice in the accumulator injection lines.
3) Event is initiated by a spurious ADS actuation event that results in a large LOCA. The RCS
rapidly depressurizes and at least one of the accumulators injects, making up the RCS water loss
in the short time frame. However, due to failure of either the CMT injection or the ADS
actuation, the automatic IRWST injection is not actuated. In addition to the initiating event, risk
important failures appearing in this sequence are:
- CCF of hardware in the PMS engineered safety feature (ESF) input logic groups
(causes CMT injection actuation failure which results in failure of automatic IRWST
injection actuation with no adequate time for manual actuation),
- CCF of CMT level sensors which prevents IRWST injection actuation,
- CCF of CMT injection air-operated valves to open,
- CCF of CMT injection check valves to open, and
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- CCF of 2 or more fourth stage ADS explosive (squib) valves to operate.
4) Event is initiated by a break in one of the two safety injection lines (a LOCA event) followed
by successful CMT injection but failure of full RCS depressurization (to allow low pressure
IRWST injection). The failure that dominates the risk associated with this sequence is the CCF
of ADS stage #4 explosive (squib) valves.
5) Event is a reactor vessel rupture event which leads directly to core damage.
3.4 Passive vs. Active
A summary of the reactors analyzed at this point is provided in Table 3.4. It shows the safety
systems discussed in Chapter 2 along with the reactor's CDF discussed earlier in this Chapter.
Table 3.4 Summary of Generation III+ Reactors
BWR ABWR Active 2.0 E-7 RHR HPCF RCIC 
ADS
ESBWR Passive 2.0 E-7 GDCS* ICS* PCCS*
EPR Active 1.0 E-6 ECCS (comprised of 4 independent trains)
PWR
AP1 000 Passive 2.4 E-7 PXS* PCS*
*Classified as Passive "B" systems
Notice that similar to the ESBWR (passive), the most dominating event for the AP1000 is
LOCA. Not coincidentally, we find that SBO is a very small contributor as well. The following
are the most important features of the AP1000 design that contribute to the reduction in the
estimated CDF associated with loss of offsite power:
- Safety-related passive systems that do not rely on ac power for operation. They rely on
natural forces, such as gravity and stored energy, to perform their accident mitigation
functions once actuated and started. When power is needed to actuate and start such
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passive systems, dc power provided by Class lE batteries is used.
- The PRHR is automatically actuated, without the need for any electrical power, to
provide core cooling upon LOOP (Air Operated Valves (AOV) "fail safe" in the open
position).
- Class lE dc batteries with capability to support all front line passive safety-related
systems for 72 hours.
- Defense-in-depth, which provides alternative means for removing decay heat from the
RCS during a LOOP/SBO accident. Most current PWR plants rely on two alternative
means for core cooling:
- an Auxiliary Feedwater System, with at least one turbine driven pump for SBO
events, in addition to motor driven pump(s), and
- a manual "feed & bleed" capability when onsite ac power is available.
The AP1000 design provides better and more reliable defense-in-depth by relying on the
following alternative means for core cooling:
- the automatically actuated non-safety-related Startup Feedwater (SFW) system
when onsite ac power is available,
- the automatically actuated safety-related PRHR system, and
- an automatic with manual backup "feed & bleed" capability using systems with
adequate redundancy and defense against common-cause failures throughout
the RCS depressurization range for both the "feed" function (two CMTs, two
accumulators, the two RNS pumps and the two IWRST gravity injection lines)
and the "bleed" function (four ADS stages with two paths in each of the first three
stages and four paths in the fourth stage).
- The improved reliability of the PRHR system (as compared to the AFW system used in
most current PWR plants) contributes significantly to the reduced risk associated with
LOOP/SBO sequences (the function of the PRHR following a LOOP/SBO event is
similar to the AFW system function in operating PWRs).
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- Canned reactor coolant pumps eliminate seal LOCAs, which are likely in operating
PWRs during an SBO accident.
The PWR's situation is similar to the ABWR's in that passive reactors are much better at
protection against station blackout while active reactor are better at combating LOCAs.
However, with these advanced reactors, neither is necessarily "poor" at protection against their
most dominating initiating event. The reactor safety systems are just more suited to protect
against other accidents such that the contribution of the dominating events to CDF may be
higher.
The passive systems rely on natural forces, such as gravity and stored energy, to perform their
safety functions. In order for such systems to actuate and start, certain active components, such
as air operated valves (AOVs) or check valves (CVs), must open. Such components do not
require alternating current (ac) power for operation (to open) or for control and no support
systems are needed after actuation. This reduces significantly, compared to operating nuclear
power plants, the risk contribution from loss of offsite power (LOOP) and station blackout
(SBO) events. In addition, because of the passive systems, several important contributions to risk
in currently operating nuclear power plants have been eliminated in the AP1000 design. These
risks are associated with failure of support systems (e.g., ac power and component cooling) and
failure of active components (e.g., pumps and diesel generators) to start and run. Finally, the
passive nature of the safety systems reduces, compared to active reactors, the reliance on
operator actions to mitigate accidents. For a fair comparison to operating and evolutionary
reactor designs, which use mostly active safety-related systems, the potential impact of T-H
uncertainties on the performance of passive systems needs to be considered and appropriately
included in the PRA models. Analyses performed by Westinghouse concluded that the AP1000
design is "robust" with respect to T-H uncertainties. However, there is much less industrial
experience with some systems, such as the natural circulation systems.
The NRC has also been placing a special emphasis on PRA modeling of novel and passive
features in the design as well as addressing issues related to these features, such as the issue
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of thermal-hydraulic (T-H) uncertainties. The issue of T-H uncertainties arises from the
"passive" nature of the safety-related systems used for accident mitigation. Since passive safety
systems rely on natural forces, such as gravity, to perform their functions, their driving forces
are small compared to those of pumped systems. The uncertainty in the values used, as
predicted by a "best-estimate" T-H analysis, can be of comparable magnitude to the predicted
values themselves. Therefore, some accident sequences, with frequency high enough to
impact risk but not predicted to lead to core damage by a "best-estimate" T-H
analysis, may actually lead to core damage when T-H uncertainties are considered in the PRA
models. T-H uncertainties and their impact on PRA models are being considered in the
certification of the AP1000 design using the same approach that was used in the AP600 design
certification.
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Chapter 4. Safety Modeling Methodology
4.1 Introduction
Classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods are utilized to evaluate the failure
probability of the passive system. However, different from previous PRA's performed on active
systems, the failure probabilities considered in passive systems must include the virtual
components (natural circulation, gravity, etc.) in addition to the normally considered real
components (valves, pumps, etc.). Real component failure data is readily available for most
pumps, valves, and instrumentation due to years of operational and experimental data collected.
Virtual component failure data is not as prevalent because of limited operational and
experimental data on passive systems. In order to quantify these virtual component failure
probabilities, and subsequently use them in conjunction with real component failure probabilities
to develop a PRA on passive systems, a methodology must be developed.
ENEA, University of Pisa and Polytechnic of Milano, have outlined the basic steps in
quantifying the virtual component failure probabilities of a passive system. In addition, a joint
European Commission study called "Reliability Methods for Passive Safety Function" (RMPS)
along with previous work from Luciano Burgazzi in this field have helped shape this
methodology. The following sections outline their methodology.
4.2 Identification of the System and Parameters
The RMPS methodology starts with first identifying the passive system being analyzed and
determining all of its associated T-H uncertainties. In addition, one should be aware of the
specific mission of the system and also identify a specified event with which to test that system's
reliability. Figure 4.1 shows the passive loop system used in the RMPS study.25
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Figure 4.1 RMPS Passive Cooling System25
The next step is to identify the uncertain parameters that will affect the reliability of natural
circulation (virtual component). The RMPS study breaks the parameters into two categories-
design and critical. Design parameters act like physical links between subsystem and system
during the operational condition while critical parameters refer to quantities that could represent
a direct "source of failure" for the passive system, i.e. they could leave the mission unfulfilled.
The parameters must be independent of one another. For example, selecting RPV pressure and
temperature as parameters would not meet this criteria since they are not mutually exclusive
parameters. After the parameters are identified, a probability distribution is assigned to each
parameter. The distribution represents the potential values that the system's parameters may be
at the time of the event. The probabilities assigned to each of these values are based on
engineering judgment and expert opinion. Expert judgment is important in both selecting all the
important parameters and selecting all their associated probabilities for a given system.
Improper assigning of parameters and probabilities are a source of error in this methodology. It
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is important to reach a consensus on these factors to minimize this
RMPS selected parameters and corresponding probabilities for the
Table 4.1 RMPS Design and Critical Parameters
25
DESIGN PARAMETERS
error. Table 4.1 shows the
system shown in Figure 4.1.
Parameter Unit Nominal Range Discrete
Value Initial Values
P RPV pressure MPa 7 0.2-9 . 3 9
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.5 0.2
L, RPV collapsed level in 8.7 5-1- X J 8. 10 12
1__ 0.051 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.15
L; POOL level in 4.3 2-5 2 4.3 5
0.1 0.8 0.1
T(0) POOL initial temperature K 303 280-368 280 303 368
0.1 0.8 0.1
- System geomextry: layout - - Not -
assigned 1.0
CRITICAL PARAMETERS
Critical Parameter Discrete Values
x. RPV non-condensable 0. 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.
fraction 0.719 0.12 0.0- 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.001
x Non-condensable fraction 0. 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.
at the Inlet of IC piping 0.71 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01
0 Inclination of the IC piping 0. . 5. 10.
on the suction 0.5 0.4 0.08 0.02
C, Heat Losses piping - IC 0. 5 20. 100
Suction (kW) 0.10 0.-999 0.10 0.0001
LO) Initial condition liquid level - 0. 50 100.
IC tubes. inner side (O) 0.1 0.1 0.8
UL Undetected leakage (il) 0. I.E-5 5. E-5 10.E-5
0.8899 0.1 0.01 0.0001
POV Partially opened valve in the 1. 10. 50. 100.
IC discharne line (*0) 0.001 0.01 0.1 0.889
The total number of design and critical parameters is boundless for any system. The selection
above represents the most important, independent factors that could contribute to the virtual
component failure. In addition, there are millions of potential combinations using just the
bounded set of parameters chosen above. So even after the selection of important parameters is
bounded, the combinations of these discrete parameter values (as initial system conditions) must
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also be selected carefully to be statistically meaningful since it is assumed that one will not
complete millions of simulations for every possible combination of the above parameters. The
importance of selecting independent parameters will be shown when calculating the overall
system reliability for a given event.
4.3 Define Failure Criterion
The next step in the RMPS methodology defines the failure criterion for passive system
performance based on knowledge of the system mission. In order to do this, the acceptability or
design limits for the system operation being modeled must be known. The failure criterion
should be based on those limits that are specific to the system and connected with its mission.
The RMPS study chose to define a unique failure criterion as a function of time:
(Z - Zref)/ Zref< (- 0.2) (1)
If this equation is satisfied, then a failure has occurred. Zref is the reference case for the known
failure criteria and "Z" is the value of that criteria at any given time for a given system model.
The "0.2" factor illustrates how close to the reference case a Z-value must reach to be considered
a failure. The value for this factor is chosen based on engineering judgment and expert opinion.
The Z parameter should be based on system design limits or acceptability. The RMPS chose two
possible Z quantities: thermal power exchanged across the IC and mass flow rate at the IC inlet.
Using equation (1), they monitor both of these two values over the duration of the chosen event
and compared them to the reference case to determine if a failure has occurred.
4.4 Build a Model and Simulate
There are two ways to build a model for the chosen system on which to perform future
simulations of events. One way is to select a thermal hydraulic computer code and build a model
of your system using the code. Model errors will be introduced and there is still much debate as
to the limits of current computer codes for passive systems. The other alternative is to
experimentally build a model of the system much like the PANDA facility has done for passive
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systems. This will have its own model errors and can be very costly not only to build, but to set
up and run each potential event. Once a model is established, event simulations are run using
various combinations of the parameters in Table 4.1 as initial system conditions. The system
failure criterion is evaluated during each simulation to determine if the system accomplished its
mission.
4.5 Evaluate Results
It is tedious if not impractical to run every possible combination of parameters from Table 4.1 on
either a computer or physical model. However, it is important to select a representative sample
from the potential combinations and this can be done through Monte Carlo analysis. Each
combination simulated will have an overall system probability based on multiplying the discrete
probabilities for the individual initial parameters selected. For example, if one evaluated the
RMPS system to have the following initial conditions for each parameter:
(from Table 4.1)
P1 LI L3 Tp x1 x2 e C2 L2 UL POV
Initial
Value 0.2 12 4.3 303 0 0 0 5 100 0 100
Chosen
Associated 0.05 0.15 0.8 0.8 0.719 0.71 0.5 0.7999 0.8 0.8899 0.889
Probability I_ _ I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _
The system probability for this combination of parameters would be determined by multiplying
each of the associated probabilities together to get 6.2E-4. This is why the parameters initially
selected must be independent of one another. Otherwise, you would have multiple conditional
probabilities to take into account for each parameter making the calculations even more
cumbersome. If the failure criterion is not reached during the simulation, then the system is
"successful". All of the system probabilities (i.e. 6.2E-4) for successes are then added together
to determine the system reliability. Conversely, all of the system probabilities for failures are
added together to determine the system unreliability. These reliability values represent the
virtual component of natural circulation that can be then entered into a full PRA tree along with
the real component reliability values (pumps, valves, etc.). Thus, this methodology gives a way
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to quantify the reliability or unreliability of natural circulation (virtual component) including
potential T-H uncertainty.
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Chapter 5. Safety Model and Results
5.1 System Model Description
Since there is very limited experimental data on any of these Generation III+ designed safety
systems, computer codes are often used to prove an adequate safety margin exists. The vendor
CDF numbers discussed in Chapter 3 are based on computer modeling and PRA. Computer
modeling is an important aid in the design process. However, just like anything else, the code
has its limits. This is especially true with passive safety systems because their natural circulation
processes can be greatly affected during transient conditions by a variety of T-H mechanisms in
the system. These T-H mechanisms can cause delay or disruption in the predicted flow of
coolant from these safety systems especially during the initial period of the transient. What is
difficult, is finding a method to analyze these uncertainties. This work consisted of using the
accepted methodology described in Chapter 4 to develop a simple decay heat removal model and
analyze its reliability for both a passive and active system.
The first step is to choose a system to model. Reactor safety systems often work in tandem to
maintain a desired safety margin for certain events. . For example, in the ESBWR during a
LOCA, you will have the Gravity Drain Cooling System in operation along with the Isolation
Condenser and Passive Containment Cooling Systems. It can be very tough to model each T-H
uncertainty within each subsystem as the transient starts, with all systems simultaneously
operating together. Thus, it is much easier to find a transient condition that only requires the use
of a single system for simplicity. For this reason, the Isolation Condenser System operating
under a reactor isolation transient was chosen.
While the ICS does combine with other safety systems in various transients and accidents, it is
solely responsible for decay heat removal during a reactor isolation event. For overpressure
protection, the Isolation Condensers have sufficient capacity to preclude actuation of the SRVs.
Three out of four ICS trains remove post-reactor isolation decay heat and depressurize the
reactor to safe shutdown conditions when the reactor is isolated after operation at 100% power.2 6
Figure 5.1 is a simplified model diagram with the important features:
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Figure 5.1 Passive Decay Heat Removal Model
This is a very simplistic model of an Isolation Condenser System lumping 3 of its 4 IC loops into
one loop. This loop has the heat removal capacity of roughly 3 IC loops in the ESBWR. It does
not have the venting path for non-condensable gases from the isolation condensers to the
suppression pool nor the other auxiliary connecting systems and bypass valves that the real
isolation condenser system has. While the model is simple, it is not without merit. It has the key
features which are the heat exchanger and condensate line return valve (IC isolation valve),
which is the valve that initiates the passive system when opened. The isolation condensers are
located high above the core to facilitate the natural circulation process. Think of the model as a
simple passive loop heat removal system that could be used in either a PWR or BWR. A
comparable active system would replace the natural circulation process with a pump. Figure 5.2
shows a comparable active safety system for this simplified model.
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Figure 5.2 Active Decay Heat Removal Model
The most comparable active system in utility and function to the Isolation Condenser of the
ESBWR is the RCIC system in the ABWR discussed in Chapter 2. A steam turbine drives the
RCIC pump through auxiliary piping upstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) if the
reactor becomes isolated. The RCIC system pumps cool, make-up water into the core for decay
heat removal. Figure 5.2 uses a simple electric pump that can start or stop flow on demand of
the operator instead of the turbine driven pump for simplicity. It pumps the condensed water in
the loop back into the core. It is not meant to replicate the RCIC system but instead, represent a
simplified active system loop comparable to the passive system loop in Figure 5.1.
While neither of these simplified models represents exact replicas of safety systems used in
Generation III+ reactors, they are very similar in concept and useful in comparing passive safety
to active safety under the same transient, reactor isolation. Reactor isolation can occur for a
number of reasons. For this study, we will assume that there has been a steam line rupture
downstream of the MSIVs which requires the operator to shut all the MSIVs and scram the
reactor.
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5.2 Parameter Selection
Besides the pump, the modeled systems are identical. Selecting the T-H parameters and
associated probabilities is the next step in the methodology. Since the RMPS study had already
developed important parameters and associated probabilities (Table 4.1), two parameters were
chosen to analyze on the systems in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. This study chose "partially open valve
in the IC discharge line (POV)" and "non-condensable gas fraction in the heat exchanger (X3)".
The parameter values and probabilities for these two are shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Parameter Data Selected 25
Parameters Discrete Values
0 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 1
'X3 0.7196 0.121 0.071 0.051 0.03 0.01 0.0001
1 10 50 100
0.001 0.01 0.1 0.889
'X3 = "Non-Condensable Gas Fraction in Heat Exchanger".
2POV = "Partially Opened Valve in the IC Discharge Line (%)".
The "X3" parameter is defined slightly differently than the "XI" and "X2" parameters in Table
4.1 because of the location of the non-condensable gas fraction at the start of the transient. The
heat exchanger was selected as the location since this is where it is believed that most gases will
collect once the transient starts and also where they will have the greatest impact on the system,
preventing the steam released from the reactor to condense in its tubes. The associated
probabilities are also different from those yielded by the expert opinion in Table 4.1 for "X"
and "X2" because there is less belief that this fraction will have a value of "1". It is believed, in
this study, that there is only a .01% chance of having a 100% gas mixture in the heat exchanger
as shown in Table 5.1. The POV parameter values and assigned probabilities are consistent with
Table 4.1 from the RMPS study.
The parameters given in Tables 4.1 and 5.1 have continuous distributions but they are evaluated
by expert opinion in terms of multinomial distributions after assuming their independency. This
is reasonable because of the Central Limit Theorem (CLT). If there is large number of points, a
multinomial distribution converges to a multivariate normal distribution like a binomial
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distribution converging to a normal distribution by CLT. And the independency assumption
between two selected parameters (X3 and POV) yields the joint probability mass function shown
in Table 5.2 with all the 28 possible combinations of paired data sets shown.
Table 5.2 Joint Probability Mass Function
No. Paired sets Probability(Xl, POV)
1 (1, 100) 0.0000889
2 (1,50) 0.00001
3 (1, 10) 0.000001
4 (1, 1) 0.0000001
5 (0.8, 100) 0.00889
6 (0.8, 50) 0.001
7 (0.8, 10) 0.0001
8 (0.8, 1) 0.00001
9 (0.5, 100) 0.02667
10 (0.5, 50) 0.003
11 (0.5, 10) 0.0003
12 (0.5, 1) 0.00003
13 (0.2, 100) 0.045339
14 (0.2, 50) 0.0051
No. Paired sets Probability(X., POY)
15 (0.2, 10) 0.00051
16 (0.2, 1) 0.000051
17 (0.1, 100) 0.063119
18 (0.1, 50) 0.0071
19 (0.1, 10) 0.00071
20 (0.1, 1) 0.000071
21 (0.01, 100) 0.107569
22 (0.01, 50) 0.0121
23 (0.01, 10) 0.00121
24 (0.01, 1) 0.000121
25 (0, 100) 0.6397244
26 (0, 50) 0.07196
27 (0, 10) 0.007196
28 (0, 1) 0.0007196
5.3 Failure Criterion Selection
In the RMPS methodology, the failure criterion is reached if the conditions in equation (1) are
met. This equation represents a failure criterion that is a 20% deviation from nominal, or
reference, conditions for a particular chosen failure parameter in the general sense. For this
study a specific transient, reactor isolation, is analyzed for a passive and active decay heat
removal loop. The transient response from both the active and passive systems will be compared
using the same failure criterion. For the Isolation Condenser System (ICS), the GE Design
Control Document (DCD) states the following:
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"The ICS satisfies General Design Criteria 34 as it relates to the system design being capable of
removing fission product decay heat and other residual heat from the reactor core to preclude
reactor coolant pressure boundary over pressurization... ... the ICS automatically limits the
reactor pressure and prevents Safety Relief Valve (SRV) operation when the reactor becomes
isolated following scram during power operations." 26
Because the system is specifically designed to prevent SRV operation during the chosen
transient, the failure criterion is chosen to be a certain value of steam line pressure. The specific
failure value will be quantified using a similar approach as used in Chapter 4. It is important to
understand that reaching this failure criterion for this particular transient will not directly cause
any fuel failure in the core but it will cause the actuation of the SRVs which can cause
compounding problems such as a stuck open SRV resulting in a LOCA that may lead to fuel
failure. The reason this overpressure failure criterion was chosen is that it is one of the primary
missions of the Isolation Condenser system in the ESBWR during a reactor isolation sequence
which is consistent with the methodology in Chapter 4. The active system response to a similar
transient from the same steady state initial conditions will be assessed and compared to the
passive system.
A failure criterion is developed similar to that of Chapter 4:
(Z - Zref)/ Zref < (-0.05) (2)
Here, "Zret" equals the SRV setpoint (8.7MPa). The factor 0.05 (5%) provides a conservative
margin of error for the measured "Z" value in relation to Zref based on factors such as signal and
sensor errors. Solving equation (2) for the highest acceptable measured "Z" value without
failure (using the 5% margin) yields a maximum acceptable steam pressure of 8.265 MPa. For
each transient simulation, if the monitored "Z" value (steam line pressure) becomes greater than
8.265 MPa, then the simulation is deemed to indicate performance failure. Otherwise, the
simulation is considered a success.
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5.4 Computer Modeling
Once the model and transient were selected, a computational code could be selected to best
analyze the model during the transient condition. The TRACE code developed by the NRC was
selected because of its thermal hydraulic analysis capabilities along with its modularity for
varying system designs. First, a steady-state model was created to simulate a reactor operating at
100 percent power. Then, the code was used to run a variety of reactor isolation transients with
varying T-H initial conditions while it monitored the steam line pressure. The code produced
output files that were graphed in "AcGrace" (Analysis Code Graphing, Advanced Computation
and Exploration of data) to determine whether the failure criterion of steam line pressure was
reached. The TRACE code was run using Cygwin command codes in a bash shell. The input
files for the active and passive files were created using JEdit software and are shown in
Appendix A.
The models shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are similar in every way with the exception of the
pump which is added to the active model and provides a continuous, instantaneous flow rate
upon initiation of the cooling system. The vessels used in both models are BWRs with all the
same specifications including 2 channels of flow-a hot channel and a core average channel.
As stated earlier, this simple cooling loop could be applied to either a BWR or PWR although
BWRs have a greater affinity for natural circulation due to their longer driving buoyancy force
during normal operation. Both models begin with a 100% power, steady-state flow condition
using FILL and BREAK boundary conditions in the TRACE command structure to model the
steam flow to the turbine and constant feed water return to the reactor. Although not designed to
be an exact replica of either the ABWR or ESBWR, since much of the reactor specifications are
proprietary information unknown to the researcher, many of the ESBWR known parameters
were used as a basis for the vessel and steady-state thermal hydraulic specifications. The
modeled passive cooling loop's isolation valve is shut during the steady-state operating
conditions. Table 5.3 outlines many of the vessel and steady-state model specifications and their
comparison to ESBWR specifications at 100% power outlined in the ESBWR Design Control
Document.
82
Table 5.3 Model Vessel and Steady-State Specifications
27
Parameter UNITS ESBWR Model
Thermal Power MWt 4500 4500
Core flow kg/s 9034-10584 9455
Steam flow kg/s 2433 2433
Feed flow kg/s 2451 2426
Power density kW/L 54 54
Operating Pressure MPa 7.17 7.20
Pressure Drop (Core) MPa 0.07 0.082
Core Inlet Temp deg C 270 Core avg temp 287
Core inlet Enthalpy KJ/Kg 1183 Core avg enthalpy 1274
Feed inlet Temp deg C 215.5 215.5
Feed inlet Enthalpy KJ/Kg 925 925
Fuel Assembly Total 1132 1132
Fuel Pins Per Assembly number 92 92
Fuel Length m 3.7 3.7
The model core uses an axial power distribution as shown in Figure 5.3 below:
Axial Power Distribution
4 ---
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3
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Figure 5.3 Axial Power Distribution
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TRACE runs the steady-state model for 50 seconds at which time a control system parameter
simulates a reactor scram and the closure of the main steam isolation valve to the turbine which
stops all steam flow to the turbine and returns feed flow to the reactor. This simulation is the
same as a simultaneous closure of all MSIVs in an operating reactor following a scram. In a real
reactor, these valves could shut accidentally or by the operator (in the case of a steam line
rupture accident downstream of these valves). Once all of these valves are closed, the reactor is
considered isolated without a heat sink. The scram instantly decreases the reactor power to the
decay heat production level of roughly 6% of its original thermal value. This value continues to
decrease non-linearly over time. TRACE has built-in tables and functions to model this and
Figure 5.4 shows the shutdown reactor power level vs. time that was used by the code during the
simulation.
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Figure 5.4 Reactor Power vs. Time After Scram28
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Note that Figure 5.4 neglects the effects of fission heat after the first few seconds of the scram
and only takes into account the decay heat generated in the core. As the reactor continues to
generate decay heat per Figure 5.4, the coolant builds up pressure until the modeled loop
isolation valve is opened. This valve opens 3 seconds after the reactor scram and MSIV closure
allowing the cooling water from the modeled loop to travel through the core then back through
its heat exchanger. The valve in the model opens at a non-linear rate by using a manual input
table in TRACE shown in Table 5.4 in order to best benchmark the steam pressure response of
the ESBWR described later. The simulation control variables are the same for both the active and
passive models in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 and a summary of these control variables is shown in
Table 5.5. The heat exchanger is located higher than the center of the vessel, through usage of
the TRACE code "gravity" term, to aid in the natural circulation process upon initiation. It is a
vertical heat exchanger which also aids in this process with its tubes submersed in a pool of
water, similar to the ESBWR Isolation Condenser System. The model uses a constant
temperature boundary condition on the outside of the coolant piping at 30 degrees Celsius to
simulate the pool water temperature. Under normal operation in an ESBWR Isolation Condenser
System, the pool water will heat up over time and actually boil. For the purposes of this study, it
is assumed that the pool water would not dramatically change temperature over the first 50
seconds of operation due to the large volume of pool water in the actual design. Thus, the
boundary condition used is valid. The vertical piping connected to the heat exchanger has an
added heat structure to transfer heat losses to the ambient air as the piping heats up during
operation. These losses are much less significant.
Table 5.4 Modeled Loop Isolation Valve Position vs. Opening Time
Time (sec) POV (% open)
0.0 0
0.5 30
1.0 55
1.5 75
2.0 90
2.5 100
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Table 5.5 MSIV Closure Transient Sequence of Events
Time (sec) Event(s)
-50.0 Begin Steady-State Simulation
0.0 Reactor Scram; Closure of all MSIVs (linear over 3 seconds)
3.0 MSIVs fully closed, Cooling Loop Isolation Valve begins to open
5.5 Cooling Loop Isolation Valve fully open
50.0 End Simulation
Once all these hydraulic components were in place, the passive model (Figure 5.1) was
benchmarked against the actual ESBWR Isolation Condenser System performance in a similar
transient (reactor isolation) to ensure its comparable response. To do this, the following three
model parameters were varied using trial and error to achieve a similar result: Heat exchanger
height above the core, piping diameters, and the loop isolation valve stroke time (non-linear as
described in Table 5.4). The passive model flow rate determined from TRACE is a product of
all these parameters. The values in Table 5.6 show the final values used, and the benchmark
comparison is shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6.
Table 5.6 Final Model Parameters Based on ESBWR Benchmarking
Height of heat exchanger above core 10.7 m
Diameter of Steam Loop Piping 0.63 m
Diameter of Cooling Water Piping 0.37 m
Loop Flow Rate 66.7 kg/s
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Figure 5.6 TRACE Model Steam Line Pressure Response to Transient
The ESBWR transient shown in Figure 5.5 is from Chapter 15 of its Design Control Document
which simulated the same closure of all MSIV's and the Isolation Condenser transient response.
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The TRACE model nominal case response is shown in Figure 5.6 and is very comparable. Thus,
the key failure criterion, steam line pressure, follows the same trend in the model including the
maximum pressure reached, ~8 MPa. This validates the failure criterion.
It must be stressed again that the passive TRACE model is not intended to be an exact replica of
the ESBWR core or its associated Isolation Condenser System. The known parameters from the
ESBWR design were merely used and benchmarked to verify model acceptability. Unknowns
such as actual volumetric flow rates, height specifications, and valve timing diagrams along with
the absence of associated systems (i.e. vent piping to suppression tanks) makes the loop model a
lumped, simplified version of the isolation condenser system. Its one loop has roughly the same
the heat removal capacity of 3 of 4 ESBWR isolation condenser loops based on the
benchmarking that was done. The specific transient in the ESBWR DCD had some slight
variations as the transient in this study. First, the DCD transient did not start IC flow until 15
seconds after the scram. However, the TRACE model did not include neutronic feedback which
helps shutdown the reactor during this transient. Because of this, there are slight variations in the
core flow response as illustrated in Figures 5.7 and 5.8. Also note that the decay heat curve,
represented by the "Simulated Thermal Power" curve in Figure 5.7, is slightly different from the
one used by the TRACE code represented in Figure 5.4. The "Total Power" curve in Figure 5.7
represents the fission power that the TRACE model does not take into account.
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The active system TRACE model only differs from the passive model in that the maximum flow
rate achieved in the passive model shown in Table 5.7 is instantaneously and continuously
achieved in the active model. This obviously assumes that the pump starts and produces rated
flow every time the decay heat removal loop initiates, which does not always happen in reality.
This assumption will be accounted for in the results section using experimental pump reliability
data. Thus the model alone is simply comparing how the two T-H uncertainties selected (POV
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and non-condensable gas fraction) affect the operation of a simple decay heat removal cooling
loop of both natural circulation (passive) and instantaneous (active) flow. The active model is
not meant to be an exact replica of an active Generation III+ system because in the ABWR RCIC
system and EPR core cooling systems, the make up water comes from a separate tank unlike this
model which instead pumps the condensed steam from the loop back into the core after it passes
through the heat exchanger.
5.5 Evaluation and Results
Each model was run 28 times using the paired sets of parameters from Table 5.2, and the steam
line pressure failure criterion from equation (2) was monitored and recorded every 0.33 seconds
over a 50 second period. Lowering this time (0.33 seconds) increases the computing time
required to complete each simulation because more data must be recorded by TRACE. The
recording periodicity of 0.33 seconds was sufficient enough to not miss any significant "gaps" in
between recorded data. And since the goal of this project was to investigate how T-H
uncertainties affect the initial transient, 50 seconds of total monitoring is sufficient.
The simulation was considered a failure if the maximum pressure reached or exceeded 8.265
MPa at any time during the transient. As a reminder, the reason for this failure setpoint was that
the ESBWR system was designed to prevent a steam relief valve from lifting during this
transient and equation (2) assumed a 5% error margin to the 8.7MPa setpoint. Most of the
transient cases run followed a similar shape to the benchmark cases with flatter or steeper curves
depending on the parameters used. If a simulation successfully maintained pressure below 8.265
MPa, then the simulation was deemed a "success". Otherwise, it was considered a failure. The
results from each of the 28 paired sets of T-H parameters are shown in Table 5.7:
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Table 5.7 Safety Simulation Results
No. Paired sets Probability Passive 
Active
(Xl, POV) Model Model
1 (1, 100) 0.0000889 FAILURE FAILURE
2 (1, 50) 0.00001 FAILURE FAILURE
3 (1, 10) 0.000001 FAILURE FAILURE
4 (1, 1) 0.0000001 FAILURE FAILURE
5 (0.8, 100) 0.00889 FAILURE FAILURE
6 (0.8, 50) 0.001 FAILURE FAILURE
7 (0.8, 10) 0.0001 FAILURE FAILURE
8 (0.8, 1) 0.00001 FAILURE FAILURE
9 (0.5, 100) 0.02667 FAILURE SUCCESS
10 (0.5, 50) 0.003 FAILURE FAILURE
11 (0.5, 10) 0.0003 FAILURE FAILURE
12 (0.5, 1) 0.00003 FAILURE FAILURE
13 (0.2, 100) 0.045339 SUCCESS SUCCESS
14 (0.2, 50) 0.0051 FAILURE FAILURE
15 (0.2, 10) 0.00051 FAILURE FAILURE
16 (0.2, 1) 0.000051 FAILURE FAILURE
17 (0.1, 100) 0.063119 SUCCESS SUCCESS
18 (0.1, 50) 0.0071 FAILURE SUCCESS
19 (0.1, 10) 0.00071 FAILURE FAILURE
20 (0.1, 1) 0.000071 FAILURE FAILURE
21 (0.01, 100) 0.107569 SUCCESS SUCCESS
22 (0.01, 50) 0.0121 FAILURE SUCCESS
23 (0.01, 10) 0.00121 FAILURE FAILURE
24 (0.01, 1) 0.000121 FAILURE FAILURE
25 (0, 100) 0.6397244 SUCCESS SUCCESS
26 (0,50) 0.07196 FAILURE SUCCESS
27 (0, 10) 0.007196 FAILURE FAILURE
28 (0, 1) 0.0007196 FAILURE FAILURE
The highlighted values represent simulations of "successful" events while all others represent
system failures. There is a corresponding probability for each of the 28 paired set shown in the
middle column of Table 5.7. By summing up all the probabilities corresponding to a
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"successful" event, each model's probability of success can be calculated. The results from this
summation of probabilities for both the passive and active models are summarized in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8 Model Success Probabilities
Passive Model Probability of Success 85.58%
Active Model Probability of Success 97.36%
There are a few conclusions that can be drawn from these results. The first one is that active
systems handle potential T-H uncertainties better than passive systems with the same rated flow.
This conclusion takes into account an important assumption of instantaneous flow for the active
model as soon as the loop isolation valve opens which is the most optimistic case. In other
words, the probability of success for the active model in Table 5.8 is an upper bound or best case
scenario. Second, both safety systems modeled had very high overall probabilities of success
regardless of the T-H uncertainties imposed (X3 and POV). Structural failures like pipe breaks
or valve leaks would yield the same failure rate contributions for either system assuming the
same types of piping and valves are used which they were in this model. The last major
reliability factor that must be accounted for is the pump in the active system. It is not 100%
reliable as the simulation assumes. Using pump reliability data for various surveillance testing
intervals (STI) ranging from I month to 12 months, the overall active system reliability can be
determined by multiplying those pump reliability numbers by the 0.9736 success rate given that
the pump starts (from Table 5.8). Because the design basis requires 3 of 4 loops to operate and
the model lumps these loops together for simplicity, pump reliability data for three pumps in
series is used in Table 5.9. The overall active results including pump reliability are shown in
Table 5.9 next to the overall passive system case for comparison. The shaded columns represent
the higher reliability system for a given STI. Notice how the active system is only more reliable
when the pumps are tested at least every five months. Otherwise, passive systems are more
reliable even when the T-H uncertainties of X3 and POV are considered. Also, remember that
the active system values are a best case scenario because of assumed instantaneous flow, given
that the pump starts. If the pump does not start, the active system is assumed to fail because
there will be minimal flow.
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Table 5.9 Overall Success Probabilities3 0
STI (months) Pump Reliability Active System Reliability Passive System Reliability
1 0.970 0.9444 0.8558
2 0.949 0.9239 0.8558
3 0.927 0.9025 0.8558
4 0.906 0.8821 0.8558
5 0.886 0.8626 0.8558
6 0.866 0.8431 0.8558
7 0.847 0.8246 0.8558
8 0.827 0.8052 0.8558
9 0.809 0.7876 0.8558
10 0.791 0.7701 0.8558
11 0.773 0.7526 0.8558
12 0.755 0.7351 0.8558
Modeling T-H uncertainties properly is an important factor in determining an accurate CDF from
a PRA. This simulation proposes a method to help model these factors accurately. Based on the
results from this model, it is clear that active systems of similar design provide a greater margin
of safety when faced with these uncertainties assuming the pump is tested at least every five
months. The question remains as to whether this advantage (shown in Table 5.9) is significant
enough to make up for other potential disadvantages (such as cost) that active systems may have
compared to passive systems.
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Chapter 6. Economic Model and Results
6.1 Overview
30The MIT study, The Future of Nuclear Power , used a cost model to compare nuclear power to
other energy alternatives. Using that cost model, the study varied different parameters and
considered various carbon taxes to see what it would take to make nuclear power cost
competitive in the deregulated market. Using the same cost model, comparisons can be made
between reactors with passive safety systems and those with active ones. One of the potential
benefits from passive safety systems is reduced operating and maintenance (O&M) costs due to
fewer components. One of the potential disadvantages is the longer lead time necessary for
licensing reactors with new passive systems and first time construction considerations. Finally
the cost of capital itself should be considered to determine what design may achieve an
advantage in this area.
The economic model computes real levelized annual cost (LAC) of electricity production to
assess economic competitiveness. This cost is simply the constant dollar (2002 dollars used)
price of electricity that would be necessary over the economic life of the plant to cover all
expenses including operating expenses, loan repayments, and taxes. A simple spreadsheet was
used to calculate this cost and the base assumptions are shown in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1 Base Cost Assumptions (2002 dollars)31
Overnight Cost $2000/kWe
O&M Cost 1.5 cents/kWh(includes fuel)
O&M real escalation rate 1.0%/year
Construction Period 5 years
Capacity Factor 85%
Financing:
Equity 15% nominal
Debt 8% nominal
Inflation 3%
Income Tax Rate 38%
Equity Fraction 50%
Debt Fraction 50%
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)* 6.8%
Project Economic Life 40 years
Levelized Annual Cost (LAC) 6.7 cents/kWe-hr
*real WACC after taxes
The base factors yield a levelized annual cost (in 2002 real dollars) 6.7 cents/kWe-hr per the
MIT cost model used in their study. A more detailed breakdown of the spreadsheet used in this
study follows.
6.2 Economics Model Methodology
The MIT Future of Nuclear Power economics model uses a discounted annual cash flow analysis
using nominal dollars for tax calculations and then converts these amounts to constant real
dollars using the assumed 3% inflation rate. Once levelized using this inflation rate, these costs
can be converted to an equal annual payment over the lifetime of the plant which is done by the
spreadsheet to get the LAC.
The capital investment of the plant can be calculated in real dollars once the length of
construction time is known and cost of capital is determined. The total construction cost, CTOT,
is as follows:
CTOT - X Xj (1 + reff)-"
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where X,, = FC(1 + i)"
reff = (D*rd) + (E* re)
X, = total outlay (nominal dollars) in year "n"
n = years of construction including final licensing and testing
C0 = Overnight Cost
F= Fraction of overnight cost allocated to year "n"
reff effective interest rate
rd and re nominal cost of debt and nominal cost of equity
D and E = Debt fraction and Equity fraction of initial investment
i = general rate of inflation assumed
One can see how the time component can be a major factor considering the effective interest
rate. The "cost of capital" (reff) for this project also shows its importance in conjunction with the
time period (n) that it is applied. The revenue stream is based off the sale of electricity which is
simply the quantity of electricity produced multiplied the price of electricity.
R= Q * P
where Q = (L/1000) * (CF) * 8760 hrs/year
Pn = po (1 + i)"
Q = quantity of electricity produced
CF = plant capacity factor
L = plant net capacity
Pn = price of electricity in year "n"
n = number of years
Now that the revenue stream is clear, it is time to outline the cost stream which can be broken
down into fixed and variable operating expenses. It is assumed that most of these expenses
increase at the rate of inflation every year except in where a "real" escalation rate is used as
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shown in Table 6.1 for O&M expenses. The total operating expenses are calculated summing
the operating, fuel, waste, O&M, and decommissioning costs as shown below:
Cn (op) + Cn (fuel) + Cn (waste) + Cn (fixed O&M) + Cn (variable O&M) + Cn (decom) = Cn, tol
The taxes, Tn, for any given year "n" are calculated using the following equation:
Tn ='r [Rn - Cn (op) - Cn (incremental) - Dn - In]
where Dn = annual asset depreciation, In = annual interest payments to creditors, T = tax rate, and
Cn (incremental)= incremental capital expenditures. These taxes add to the cost stream for the
year. The final cash flow concern is the investor return based on the debt to equity fraction and
promised returns. The spreadsheet then converts the annual cash flows to constant real dollars
and determines a LAC for the project based on its lifetime.
6.3 Economic Analysis
The next step is to vary the O&M cost (not the O&M escalation rate), construction time, and cost
of capital to see what effect it has on the LAC. A way to see which of these three factors has the
most effect on LAC of nuclear energy is by analyzing what change in each parameter will result
in the same change in LAC. This approach is shown in Table 6.2. It is well known that the
capital cost of the nuclear plant is where most of the expense lies, however the opinion is mixed
as to which reactor would be cheaper to build in terms of overnight cost (as will be shown in
Chapter 7). Passive systems require taller structures but less internal components. Due to lack
of data, it is unclear whether either will have a significant advantage in overnight capital costs.
Table 6.2 Cost Effects
Parameter Changed Base Case Base LAC New Case New LAC
O&M cost 1.5 cents/kWeh 6.7 cents/kWe-hr 1.3 cents/kWeh 6.5 cents/kWe-hr
Construction Time 5 years 6.7 cents/kWe-hr 4 years 6.5 cents/kWe-hr
Real WACC after taxes 6.80% 6.7 cents/kWe-hr 6.35% 6.5 cents/kWe-hr
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As one can see, lowering O&M costs by 2 mills/kWe yields a 0.2 cent/kWe-hr decrease in the
LAC which is the same decrease in LAC seen when the construction time is reduced one year or
when the WACC decreases to 6.35%. Going from 6.7 to 6.5 cents/kWe-hr is a modest 3%
decrease in LAC. Comparatively, the plant can achieve this decrease in cost by decreasing
O&M costs 13% (from 1.5 to 1.3 cents/kWeh), reducing WACC by 6.6% (from 6.80% to
6.35%), or finishing construction in year 4 instead of year 5. A sensitivity analysis of all three
parameters and their affect on % change in LAC is shown in Figure 6.1. The % change of base
case LAC (6.7 cents/kWe-hr) was determined for a 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% change of each
parameter except for construction/licensing delays. For this delay parameter, the % change in
LAC was calculated for every year that the construction/licensing was completed ahead of
schedule (base case is set at 5 years total). All three are plotted in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1 Sensitivity of Levelized Cost
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Out of the three choices, it appears that cost of capital (WACC) has the most impact on the LAC.
Decreasing construction and licensing time by one year initially causes the same economic
benefits as decreasing the cost of capital by 5%. As the total construction time becomes less and
less, so does the economic benefit to the LAC of electricity.
The question remains as to whether any of these new goals for these parameters can be met
easier with a reactor with passive safety systems over one with active ones. If a reactor with
passive safety systems takes one year longer to license and build than one with active safety
systems, it will require a decrease in other areas (O&M costs for example) to offset the cost
disadvantage of taking one year longer, if it wants to remain competitive in a deregulated market.
The above examples give an idea of what it will take to meet these lower cost goals.
An interesting question surrounds the cost of capital for the new reactor. Will reactors with
passive safety systems obtain a lower cost of capital because investors believe they are safer and
less prone to being shutdown for liability concerns? Or will they obtain a higher cost of capital
since there is little experimental data on passive systems and the investors want to hedge that
risk? Because WACC is such a sensitive factor in the overall cost of nuclear energy, the
differences in investor opinion between active and passive safety models are important.
Passive safety promises smaller O&M costs due to fewer parts and equipment requiring less
maintenance. The problem with this promise is that it is only a promise until proven over time
after a reactor with passive safety systems is built and operated. Figure 6.1 shows how large the
promise of lower O&M will need to be to have the same impact as other factors. Also unknown
will be the total construction and licensing time since a reactor has not been built in quite some
time in the U.S. While the base case assumed five years, it could just as easily be more than that
which will cause a higher LAC and create a negative impact on electricity cost.
The next chapter focuses on the various expert opinions of passive systems including the three
parameters modeled here in this chapter. This will hopefully provide insight as to the current
perception of passive safety from various professional affiliations.
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Chapter 7. Survey on Attitudes Towards Passive Safety
7.1 Overview
A survey was conducted among nuclear energy experts of various affiliations to determine their
views and opinions on the safety, cost, and licensing of reactors with passive safety systems,
especially in comparison to reactors with active safety systems. The surveys were conducted via
face-to-face or phone interviews. A total of 31 experts were contacted representing seven
nuclear affiliation categories. The categorization was formed based on the role of the represented
party in the nuclear industry-regulators, vendors, utilities, academia, consultants, and both pro-
and anti-nuclear non-profit groups. The survey is not meant to be a scientific sample
representative of the US nuclear energy enterprise, with proportional representation of either the
institutions involved or the personnel of the various segments of the enterprise. Rather it is meant
to explore the range of opinions within the enterprise, with some representation of all its
important segments. Therefore the experts were chosen to be at the managerial level in their
institutions, and come from several institutions in each category of affiliation. Table 7.1
provides the total number of people surveyed in each category of affiliation along with the
specific institutions represented. All institutions are represented by one respondent unless
otherwise indicated in parenthesis.
Table 7.1 Survey Overview
Total
GROUP Surveyed Companies represented
Utilities 6 Exelon, Entergy, Dominion, Duke, Southern California Edison, Constellation
Vendors 6 General Electric (2), Westinghouse (2), Framatome ANP (2)
Consultants 5 Business America, Performance Improved Intl., INL, DOE, Sandia Nati. Lab
Academia 6 MIT (3), University of Wisconsin (2), UCLA
Regulators 4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (4)
Pro-Groups 2 EPRI (2)
Anti-Groups 2 Union of Concerned Scientists, NRDC
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A total of 10 questions were included in the survey. Participants were asked to express their
agreement or disagreement with statements on a I to 5 scale, with a I meaning "strongly
disagree" and a 5 meaning "strongly agree." Respondents were also allowed to answer "no
opinion" if they felt they did not wish to comment on a particular question. In addition, they
could add specific comments after each question to amplify their numeric response.
The first nine questions were statements about safety, cost, or licensing of systems, with the tenth
question being an overall feeling on the preference of passive safety systems compared to active
ones. The ten questions asked are:
1. In general, reactors with passive safety systems achieve a lower "core damage frequency"
(CDF) than ones with active safety systems.
2. Reactors with passive safety systems are licensed (start to finish) _ years earlier/later
than ones with active safety systems.
3. Reactors with passive safety systems can achieve higher capacity factors than ones with
active safety systems.
4. Reactors with passive safety systems are more profitable for utilities than ones with active
safety systems.
5. Current probabilistic risk assessment methods are adequate to quantify for passive safety
systems.
6. Reactors with passive safety systems are more accepted by the public and interest groups than
ones with active safety systems.
7. Reactors with passive safety systems have a lower initial capital cost than ones with active
safety systems.
8. Reactors with passive safety systems have a lower operating and maintenance (O&M) cost
than ones with active safety systems.
9. Reactors with passive safety systems have lower personnel required than ones with active
safety systems.
10. If all things (safety, cost, licensing etc.) were equal, I would prefer a reactor with passive
safety systems over one with active safety systems.
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Questions 1, 5 and 6 represent the "safety" category
Question 2 represents the "licensing" category
Questions 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 represent the "cost" category
Question 10 represents the "overall" category
The questions (or more accurately the statements) were set up this way to provide consistency
for scoring each in the same way. With the exception of question 2 on licensing, a score above
3.0 on a question represents a favorable opinion of passive safety systems. The higher the score
above 3.0, the more favorable the response is towards passive safety systems. Conversely, a
score below 3.0 represents a negative opinion of passive systems and in most cases, a preference
for active systems.
The next sections will present a break down the results of the survey by affiliation, category, and
specific question asked.
7.2 Affiliation Breakdown
7.2.1 Utilities
The job of a utility is to provide continuous uninterrupted power to its constituents. Obviously it
would prefer to do this and the lowest possible cost in order to get a larger market size (if the
plant is not a regulated market) or profit (if the plant is in a regulated market). Now that the
industry is moving towards deregulation, utilities are much more interested in choosing the most
cost effective means of producing the electricity. However, safety is just as important factor to
consider when evaluating the overall cost since the utility would lose income if the plant is idled
to resolve incidents and also is liable for any safety mishap that occurs. With the new
streamlined regulatory process, utilities are less concerned about the licensing time of a
particular plant design (more of a vendor concern) and more concerned about receiving their
early site permit to build a new plant.
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Several personnel associated with various utilities were given the aforementioned survey and
their results are summarized in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 Utility Results
Survey Question
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1.5-YR
Utilities 4.00 (Later) 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.67 2.33 5.00 4.00 4.00
It is clear from the results that the utilities favor passive plant systems. One of the interesting
things to note is how unanimously and strongly they feel that reactors with passive safety
systems will yield less "operation and maintenance" (O&M) costs over the life of the plant
(question #8). This was mainly due to less moving parts (especially pumps) which require
periodic maintenance.
Conversely, they feel the opposite is true for the initial capital cost (question #7). Some utilities
cited that because these systems were new, they may create longer construction lead times and
higher overnight costs. In addition, most see a larger "$/kW" overnight cost because the
maximum output of many reactors with passive systems is perceived to be smaller than ones
with their active counterparts. Many cited the AP1000 as too small to fully take advantage of
economies of scale. One mentioned that in order to take advantage of using a single rotor turbine
generator and longer refueling/higher burn-up cycles, a reactor with at least 1000 MWe output
was necessary. The fact that ESBWR has moved to the 1500 MWe size has in fact been a factor
in increased interest in the US among utilities anxious to maximize the power generated from
their plants. But given that the survey was conducted mostly in the summer and fall of 2005,
this new rating of the ESBWR may not have been well appreciated by those surveyed.
Another result that stands out is question #6 which shows that utilities feel reactors with passive
systems will be more accepted by public interest groups. Some of the specific comments on that
question were that passive systems had "better packaging" and were "less complicated."
Furthermore, the utility group feels that reactors with passive safety systems will achieve equal
capacity factors as those with active systems because the "maintenance done on the safety
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systems is not the limiting factor during the shutdown." Overall, utilities seem to prefer reactors
with passive safety systems as also indicated in question 10.
7.2.2 Vendors
Vendors would be expected to be more concerned with the licensing process and the desirability
of the reactors they design. To be fair, we surveyed various companies comprised of both the
active and passive safety system designers. It is no surprise that some of the more positive
reviews of passive systems came from those companies whose newer designs utilized this
technology. In turn, some of the negative responses came from those vendors who designed
comparable reactors with active safety systems. Still, the survey results yield some consensus
views in a couple of areas as shown in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3 Vendor Results
Survey Question
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1.33-YR
Vendors 3.67 (Later) 3.67 4.00 3.00 4.33 3.00 5.00 4.67 3.67
Similar to utilities, vendors unanimously believe that passive systems require less O&M costs
than active systems, and most agree that they require less total personnel at the plant (question
#9). It is also important to see that the perceived licensing time of a reactor with passive safety
systems is 1.33 years longer (not shorter) than one with active systems. The main reason for this
cited in the survey by the vendors was due to the "novelty of passive systems to regulators." In
other words, because this technology is relatively new, it may take regulators longer to study and
approve its design. This belief is common among most groups as will be discussed later.
Although not as strong a preference, vendors agree with utilities and prefer reactors with passive
safety systems overall (question #10).
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7.2.3 Consultants
The consultants interviewed do mostly energy consulting for utilities although some have also
worked for vendors. They bring a broader scope of background to the survey in the sense that
many have worked with multiple utilities, vendors, regulators, and non-profit groups to solve
various energy issues. Their results are shown in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4 Consultant Results
Survey Question
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1-YR
Consultants 4.00 (Later) 4.00 4.33 2.00 4.33 3.00 5.00 4.50 5.00
As can be seen, passive systems score high across the board with the exception of questions #5
and #7, the former being a question on the adequacy of current "probabilistic risk analysis"
(PRA) methods for reactors with passive safety systems. While this question has scored low in
other groups (including the ones already covered), it is particularly noticeable here since all other
marks are favorable for passive systems. Some of the specific concerns from consultants about
current PRA modeling are:
(1) There needs to be more system/component reliability testing on new applications and
more failure rate data collection.
(2) There also needs to be an assessment of human performance within the context of
these new passive systems.
In question #7, many consultants argued that there is an "expectation" that passive systems
could be less capital intensive than active systems in the long run, but since no new plant has
been built in the U.S. in about 15 years, most see the capital cost of a nuclear plant being the
same regardless of its safety systems.
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7.2.4 Academia
Various professors at MIT and other prominent nuclear engineering schools were surveyed in
order to get their perspective of the desirability of passive systems. Their opinion is important
due to the fact that they generally have done extensive research in some of these areas being
assessed. In addition, the academicians are not obviously biased towards the products of one
company, or the attitudes of industry versus those of the regulator bodies. Also, academia often
sees the technology as it is developed, before it is adopted in a particular form, since the
academic experts provide much of the preliminary research for many vendors, utilities, and the
regulators. The results are given in Table 7.5.
Table 7.5 Academia Results
Survey Question
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2-YR
Academia 4.33 (Later) 4.00 4.00 2.33 3.67 3.00 4.33 3.67 4.00
Professors generally score reactors with passive safety systems as more favorable with the
exception of acceptable PRA methods for these systems. They also see a much longer licensing
time for passive systems than previous groups. The highest scores were achieved on questions
#8 (O&M cost) and #1, which show that the academic experts believe reactors with passive
systems achieve a lower "core damage frequency" than those with active systems. They
specifically cite increased "inherent" safety and much improved performance in loss of electric
power accidents to energize the pumps. The specific worry about PRA stems from a
combination of larger thermal-hydraulic uncertainties due to lack of sufficient experimental data.
Overall, the academic experts are also more favorable towards passive systems.
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7.2.5 Regulators
Regulators are obviously an important component of the U.S. nuclear enterprise. Their mission
is to protect the public health and safety, and the environment, from the effects of radiation from
nuclear reactors, materials, and waste facilities. Thus, the regulators control the licensing of all
new designs and ensure their safety before granting them acceptance certificates or permits. It is
not surprising that this group refused to answer "no opinion" to some of the questions, as they
are to remain neutral in many areas (see "NO" for "no opinion" in question #4 on profitability).
The results are given in Table 7.6.
Table 7.6 Regulator Results
Survey Question
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.5-YR
Regulators 4.33 (Later) 3.67 NO 2.67 3.00 3.67 4.00 4.00 3.00
It is not surprising that the regulators feel that licensing of reactors with passive systems will be
very close to those with active systems. They cite that they have already seen most of the
passive designs now (i.e. the AP600, AP1000, and most recently ESBWR) and thus, it is no
longer a limiting factor. A more limiting factor on licensing is the sheer number of new
applications for plant uprates, new design certification, and site certification and what might
materialize for construction. This has occurred at a time the experience base within NRC has
suffered due to retirement of many of the experts in various disciplines. While the regulators do
not strongly state an overall preference for either type of reactor, they do show a favorable
impression of the passive systems, by affirming that they will cost less and achieve a lower CDF
(question #1). The reason they cite for a lower CDF is the diversity of the passive safety systems
to eliminate common mode failures often associated with repetitive active safety system trains.
The regulators also cite a reduction in the human error component of reliability with passive
systems. These specific questions will also be discussed in later phases of the work.
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7.2.6 Non-Profit Groups
Non-profit groups provide valuable independent opinions, and at times in-depth studies, of the
nuclear industry in a variety of areas. These groups can have a profound impact on public
opinion and consequently the future of the industry. While many groups claim no biases,
historical data shows otherwise for most of them. It is important to include both biases, pro-
industry and anti-industry, to look for common concerns or assurances within the groups. For
this study, the groups were simply broken up into "pro-nuclear" and "anti-nuclear" groups based
on the group's historical stance on nuclear power. The results are shown in Table 7.7.
Table 7.7 Non-Profit Results
Survey Question
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Pro- 2-YR
Grou s 4.00 Later 3.00 3.50 2.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.50 4.50
Anti- 3-YR
Groups 3.00 (Later) 3.00 4.00 1.50 3.00 3.00 3.50 2.50 3.00
It is interesting to see that the pro-nuclear groups generally prefer reactors with passive safety
systems and cite better CDF, profitability, and cost. Question #6 directly indicates that they are
more favorable towards those reactors with passive systems. Conversely, the anti-nuclear groups
do not show a clear preference towards either reactor. They also believe that the passive systems
would require longer licensing time, perhaps the longest seen in this survey, citing that these
systems are relatively untested. Furthermore, both groups believe that utilities see the passive
plants as more profitable (question #4) although they seem to believe they would yield slightly
less cost if any (questions #7-9). Both groups add to the prevailing opinion that more work
needs to be done in PRA of passive safety systems. Lack of experimental data was specifically
mentioned as it was by other groups.
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7.3 Breakdown by Question Category
We will now lump the questions together into the following categories:
Safety-questions 1, 5, and 6
Licensing-question 2
Cost-questions 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9
Preference--question 10
Averaging the results of each of the categories for each expert affiliation group yields (in rank
order with respect to favoring passive systems), we get the results shown in Table 7.8.
Table 7.8 Category Results
SAFETY LICENSING COST PREFERENCE
Utilities 3.89 Regulators 0.50 YRS Consultants 4.17 Consultants 5.00
Vendors 3.67 Consultants 1.00 YRS Vendors 3.67 Pro Groups 4.50
Consultants 3.44 Vendors 1.33 YRS Regulators 3.84 Utilities 4.00
Academia 3.44 Utilities 1.50 YRS Academia 3.80 Academia 4.00
Regulators 3.33 Academia 2.00 YRS Utilities 3.67 Vendors 3.67
Pro Groups 3.33 Pro Groups 2.00 YRS Pro Groups 3.40 Regulators 3.00
Anti Groups 2.50 Anti Groups 3.00 YRS Anti Groups 3.20 Anti Groups 3.00
Average 3.37 Average 1.62 YRS Average 3.68 Average 3.88
This shows that utilities hold the most favorable opinion of the passive systems with regards to
safety while consultants and vendors were most favorable in cost. The regulators felt that the
licensing was not much different between the two the types of systems while both non-profit
groups saw a significant lag in licensing time for reactors with passive systems. Note also the
average for each category at the bottom of the column. This shows that with the exception of
licensing (which most groups believe takes 1.62 years longer on average), reactors with passive
safety systems are preferred to those with active systems in all areas, with cost receiving more
favorable feedback (3.73) than safety (3.37). By averaging all but the licensing "category"
scores above for a particular group, we can get an overall score for each group (licensing does
not fit the 5.0 scale model like the other 3 categories' scores do). By doing it this way, cost will
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not be weighted more than safety even though it had more questions pertaining to its category.
Those "overall" results are shown in Table 7.9.
Table 7.9 overall Results In the Order of Favoring Passive Systems
Thus, consultants perceive reactors with passive safety as the more favorable alternative when
safety, cost, and personal general preference are taken into account. Anti-nuclear groups are the
only group that scored passive systems below a 3.0. Every other group shows favorable
assessments on reactors with passive safety systems. Nevertheless, all groups also believe that
the licensing would take anywhere from 0.5 to 3 years longer (refer to Table 7.7) although the
regulators themselves believe very close to equal licensing times.
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7.4 Question Breakdown
Now let's look at the overall average for each question to see any general trends or concerns
amongst the groups. This will help identify specific shortfalls, if any, in the future and determine
any general stereotypes that currently exist. The question-by-question averages were obtained
by averaging the affiliation group average scores. This way, a group with more survey
participants was not more heavily weighted than the other groups. The average scores for each
question are given in Table 7.10 (note the overall average in at the bottom).
Table 7.10 Question Results
Survey Question
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Regulators 4.33 0.5-YR (L) 3.67 NO 2.67 3.00 3.67 4.00 4.00 3.00
Utilities 4.00 1.5-YR (L) 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.67 2.33 5.00 4.00 4.00
Vendors 3.67 1.33-YR (L) 3.67 4.00 3.00 4.33 3.00 5.00 4.67 3.67
Consultants 4.00 1-YR (L) 4.00 4.33 2.00 4.33 3.00 5.00 4.50 5.00
Pro Groups 4.00 2-YR (L) 3.00 3.50 2.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.50 4.50
Anti Groups 3.00 3-YR (L) 3.00 4.00 1.50 3.00 3.00 3.50 2.50 3.00
Academia 4.33 2-YR (L) 4.00 4.00 2.33 3.67 3.00 4.33 3.67 4.00
Average 3.90 1.62-YR (L) 3.48 3.97 2.36 3.86 3.00 4.40 3.83 3.88
The question on which passive systems fared the best was achieving a lower operating and
maintenance cost (question #8). That question received an overall average of 4.40. This is
important because cost is one of the largest barriers for nuclear power, although not the operating
part of the cost. The second best was question #4 (3.97 average) which stated that reactors with
passive systems were viewed as more profitable by utilities. The third highest was that reactors
with passive safety systems can achieve a lower CDF than ones with active systems (3.90
average). This is important to both utilities and vendors. Utilities must think about liability
issues while the vendors need their design approved by the regulators before they can sell them.
The safer the design, the more licensable and marketable the reactor will be. All questions
scored above 3.0 showing a favorable bias towards passive systems with the exception of
questions #5 (on PRA) and #7 (on capital cost). Question #5 inquired about the acceptability of
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PRA for passive safety systems. The number one concern was lack of experimental data. Other
concerns voiced were that common mode production and maintenance failures have not been
fully identified yet. In addition, utilities worry about the human error factors such as input
assumptions and detecting out-of-specification conditions/configurations. Some groups cited
that event trees need to be expanded more to encompass all possible thermal hydraulic
uncertainties. Overall, this study clearly indicates the perception that reactors with passive safety
systems are superior to those with active systems in terms of cost, safety, and personal
preference but inferior in licensing time.
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Chapter 8. The Hybrid Approach of Passive and Active Systems
The NRC reviews all new designs submitted without any bias towards a particular type. Recent
U.S. policy has given a variety of benefits to new nuclear plants including production tax credits,
loan guarantees, and "standby support" for potential licensing delays (these were outlined in
Chapter 1). These benefits are to help jumpstart the new nuclear reactor order in general and are
not catered to a specific reactor type. Congress could have offered these benefits only to a
certain type of reactor (active or passive) had it felt that one design was truly superior to the
other. This type of lever could significantly affect the other market forces within the electricity
deregulated market. At this point, the reactor design decision is basically a market decision for
utilities since all designs currently receive the same benefits with the exception of the ESBWR
and EPR which have not completed their full licensing processes yet. The ESBWR should likely
finish within the next year while the EPR has just started the process. Some of the government
benefits mentioned only apply for the first few "new" reactors and thus, time is of the essence in
making a plant selection by utilities. With the ABWR and AP1000 already completing their
certification, the utilities would still have to decide between active and passive safety systems
even today. Which will they choose and why? And will that be the best decision for the public?
Cost and safety will be important factors in the decision. Without having any experience for
passive systems, decisions will have to be made on projections and computational models for
both cost and safety. The safety calculations and general opinion of passive safety will in turn
affect the cost of capital required to build the plant. The safer the plant design is perceived, the
less risky the investment and therefore, the less is the cost of capital. Thus, if investors believe
in passive systems' promised safety and cost reduction models and lower their cost of capital
compared to that of a reactor with active safety systems, the capital providers can also have a
large impact on which ALWR is desired by the utility. In addition, the utility wants to make as
large a profit as possible so these models are just as important to them directly. Obviously
operational cost projections (to include cost of capital) will be important, but so will safety and
risk projections. The utility surely does not want to have a high risk liability on their hands.
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Passive systems promise less expensive plants, and if they prove to be as reliable as the current
active plants, they can be a more competitive energy source. They also could be less susceptible
to human error, thus avoiding some accident initiators and reducing the risk of severe accidents
for the utilities and insurance companies. Expert opinion seems to be on their side as shown in
Chapter 7. Gravity is a force that the experts believe to be reliable. The major disadvantage is
the lack of operational and experimental data. There have been many tests done at facilities like
PANDA which test similarly designed passive systems, but most of the studies to prove passive
safety have been done using computational models. And with the dearth of experimental data,
there is limited ability to verify these computer models for accuracy. Second, some of the
computer codes were not designed to model natural circulation transients with a high degree of
accuracy. Finally, since flow is dependent on natural forces (not forced by a pump), thermal
hydraulic uncertainties in the system can have a larger effect on the flow and heat transfer
characteristics of the coolant, and thus the system performance. From a liability standpoint,
having a "button" to automatically start the coolant flow necessary to protect the core (i.e. a
pump) can provide added peace of mind. Of course, this is an additional cost and may eliminate
any of the cost advantages gained from its original elimination.
So the policy debate ends where nuclear safety debates often end. How safe is safe enough? All
the safety systems used in the four Generation III+ reactors discussed far surpass the NRC CDF
safety goal of I X 104 as discussed in Chapter 3. Both types of reactor provide a much lower
risk of core damage than the 103 currently in operation in the U.S. today. Active systems in the
103 reactors in operation provide years of experimental data that support the ALWRs with active
safety systems although the ALWR active systems are newer and more diverse. The passive
systems do provide potential advantages. The problem is in proving these advantages right now.
Therefore, early passive systems will be providing this pricing and safety data currently lacking
and will help prove these projections and models.
An intermediate alternative may be the design that Toshiba is currently working on known as the
AB1600. It combines many of the features of the ABWR and ESBWR thus attempting to
maximize the net benefit of both active and passive safety systems. The issue is can the reactor
combine both features while still keeping costs low. The AB1600 would improve
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countermeasures for severe accidents (SA) and the economics of the ABWR by introducing
"hybrid" active/passive safety systems and simplifying overall plant systems. Achieving
simplification of reactor system is primarily accomplished by reducing the number of fuel
bundles and control rods by adopting a larger bundle, which is 1.2 times as large as the current
ABWR fuel. The AB1600 incorporates passive systems such as PCCS, GDCS, and the isolation
condenser along with two, active ECCS divisions to make up the overall safety system. The
maximum power output of 4500 MWt is based on the maximum power without changing the
RPV diameter from the current ABWR. Because reactor internal pump (RIP) motor power is
increased from the current ABWR and simplification of the fuel characteristics, the number of
RIP can be reduced from 10 to 8. The current target of the AB 1600's first commercial operation
is set at the late 2010's. An overview of the design changes is outlined in Table 8.1 below.
Table 8.1 AB1600 Comparison of key parameters3 2
Parameter BWR/6 ABWR ESBWR AB1600
Power (MWt) 3293 3926 4500 4500
Power (MWe) 1290 1350 1550 1600
Vessel Height (m) 21.8 21.1 27.7 23.1
Vessel Diameter (m) 6.4 7.1 7.1 7.1
Fuel Bundles (number) 800 872 1132 600
Number of CRDs 193 205 269 137
Power Density (kWIl) 54.2 51 54.3 58.5
Number of RIPs N/A 10 0 8
The AB1600 uses a passive containment cooling system (PCCS) similar to the one already
discussed to cool the primary containment directly during a severe accident. In addition, the
AB1600 has a gravity driven core cooling system (GDCS) which together with the PCCS
provide the recycling needed for core cooling capability after severe accidents. The GDCS and
the PCCS also can keep the core water coverage and achieve in-vessel retention (IVR). The
condensate water by PCCS is returned to the GDCS pool that is installed in the drywell. The
GDCS can continue to inject water into the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) until the PCCS pool is
empty. The 2m extension of RPV height over the ABWR and introduction of the isolation
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..............
condenser (IC) can maintain the core coverage at the time of a LOCA and eliminate the need for
a high pressure core flooder system (HPCF).
By introducing these passive safety systems, the composition of the emergency core cooling
system (ECCS) / heat removal system can be reduced to two divisions configuration from three
divisions' configuration. Also, the trains of reactor building closed cooling water and reactor
seawater can be reduced to two divisions from three. This configuration change contributes to
improvement in economy by attaining amount-of-resources reduction in not only main systems
but also related systems. A further reduction in cost is achieved by simplifying the amount of
resources such as instruments/control cables, remote-control valves and pipes of the remaining
active systems and non-safety related components. Each ECCS division has two low pressure
flooder (LPFL) pumps and one emergency gas turbine generator (GTG). The LPFL pumps are
also used as the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps. Furthermore, the configuration of PCV
and layout concept of will be optimized and is considered for withstanding airplane crash. The
design goal of the AB1600 is to achieve 30% power generation cost reduction and a 20% capital
32
cost reduction from recent ABWR. No comparison is made to GE's ESBWR. Thus, the
AB 1600 has the possibility attaining both an economical and safety goal by simplification of
system and utilizing a "hybrid" active/passive safety system.
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Chapter 9. Concluding Remarks and Recommendations for Future
Work
9.1 General Conclusions
Generation III reactors, which have increased reliance on passive systems, will be the next
generation of reactors built in the U.S. Currently, active safety systems are utilized in 100% of
the operating reactors (Generation II) in the country. Reactors with passive systems have a lot of
promise, but limited experience. The current thermal hydraulic and risk assessment computer
models may not be sufficiently tuned to accurately calculate the reliability of these systems.
Thermal hydraulic uncertainty during transients is very complex and makes it difficult to
quantify the functional failure rates. In our work, we used a somewhat simplified system to
illustrate a general observation. When considering just the T-H uncertainties, it was no surprise
that the active system showed higher reliability in this study. However, after adding the pump
failure data, the two systems were much closer in their reliability.
A generalized conclusion could be that while the sources of inadequate performance could be
different, the passive and active systems may turn out to have comparable reliability. The active
systems gain reliability by periodic testing of the active components. Therefore, more frequent
testing will boost their reliability. Our example showed the active system is more reliable if the
pumps are tested at least every five months, but that the passive system is more reliable if the
pumps are tested at a lesser frequency. Vendor calculations show that the core damage
frequency of the passive systems is well below the safety goals set by the NRC such that even if
their computations are somewhat off based about the uncertainties, the system's performance
should still be well above that implied by the safety goals.
More passive system experimental data and/or field experience would be helpful to the
confidence in their performance. By gradual phasing in of the new types of reactors, such as
building only one or two of these reactor types may yield the answers to the uncertainties, and if
by chance problems develop, only one or two reactors would have to be modified. Another way
to ease the use of passive safety ECCS into newer reactors would be to combine presence of
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active and passive safety systems in one reactor design (like the AB 1600). This way,
experimental data on passive systems can be gathered while still maintaining the familiar and
reliable active systems in case unforeseen problems develop.
The cost savings and losses of passive systems are still unclear since no such nuclear reactors
have been built and even for the active systems, the foreign data is not easy to translate to the
U.S. Our survey shows that most experts feel the O&M cost will be reduced for passive systems.
However, the model for the levelized annual cost (LAC) of electricity shows that a 13% decrease
in O&M costs only yields a 3% decrease in the LAC for nuclear power. The model also showed
that a one year lag time can cost a 3% increase in LAC such that potential O&M gains may be
offset by lag times that may be required to certify the newer, unknown passive systems. The
capital costs won't be known until a reactor is finally built again in the U.S. Vendor data have
overnight costs as low as $1200/kWe for the ESBWR33 and other Generation III+ reactors claim
they can get close to $1500/kWe (the model used in our calculations assumes $2000/kWe). The
vendor estimates are likely to be optimistic since these new reactors will be the first ones built in
over 15 years. For this reason, and the policy breaks outlined in Chapter 1 for any new ALWR,
it is uncertain whether there will be much advantage gained by either type in terms of capital
costs.
An important factor in the overall cost of electricity produced from one of the new reactors will
be the cost of money it achieves when financing the project. Investors who are in favor of a
particular reactor type may offer lower rates for that type of reactor. The survey shows that
expert opinion in all groups seems to favor passive systems. It is unclear as to the extent this
opinion will have on the cost of money. But the important effects of a lower financing cost were
proven in the model. This effect outweighs any O&M and time lag (carrying cost) savings on a
percentage-wise saving basis if it can be achieved.
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9.2 Recommendations for Future Work
Future work should include surveys of potential investors to determine what factor, if any,
reactor safety system type has on the financing of the project. Expanding the survey (both in
terms of questions and expert affiliations) would be desirable to add confidence to the results.
In addition, other safety systems, such as the Gravity Drain Coolant System or Passive Core
Containment Cooling System should be modeled and analyzed during transients using a similar
method as performed here for the stuck valve event. Also, full PRA's should be reviewed to
determine the level of uncertainty already included in the models, and to verify vendor data
shown in Chapter 3.
To more completely compare active and passive systems, common mode failures and human
failure rates should be taken into account along with the thermal hydraulic uncertainty. Such
considerations can be examined within the framework of the full PRAs for these systems.
9.3 Concluding Remarks
This is an exciting time in the nuclear industry, with many new reactor orders being so near.
Current operators are more comfortable with active systems and would require some retraining if
passive systems are implemented. Still, introducing more passive systems is the right thing to do
if there are quantifiable safety and cost benefits which make nuclear power more competitive.
The ABWR is already operating in Japan and Taiwan. Experimental data is available. The EPR
is currently under construction in Finland and France and will be operational before anything
new will be built in the United States. The NRC scrutinized the AP 1000 design and determined
it to be adequately safe. There is enough confidence in the safety of all proposed systems to
allow building a few of them in the near future. The certified designs should be subjected to
periods of examination to verify the reliability of the passive systems embedded in the designs.
From potential annual maintenance cost reductions to safety system response, more data can be
obtained to continue to move towards future designs like using passive systems in gas cooled
cores. The initial step is the hardest.
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Overall, any of the four Generation III+ designs are on the market once licensed. This study has
shown that both models have high reliability, but both are subject to functional failures at low
probability. The thermal hydraulic uncertainty factors in passive systems should not be ignored
although that overall contribution to system failure when compared to an active system may not
amount to much difference. A full PRA using properly modeled T-H uncertainties and human
errors would be needed to more completely evaluate the differences in passive and active
systems.
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Appendix A. TRACE Steady-state Input File
free format
*
* main data *
*
* numtcr
1 0
Model of Reactor Core
ieos inopt nmat id2o
1 0 0
* namelist data *
*
&inopts
cpufg=l,
dtstrt=-l.0,
iadded= 10,
noair--O,
usesjc=3,
npower=1,
nhtstr=4,
igas=I
&end
*
* Model Flags *
*
* Act~~tj
dste timJ
0
* stdyst
0
* epso
1.OE-3
* oitmax
10
* ntsv
I
0.0
transi
1
epss
1.OE-3
sitmax
10
ntcb
0
ncomp
11
isolut
0
ntcf
0
njun
5
ipak
ncontr nccfl
0
ntrp
0
ntcp
0 0
*
* component-number data *
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t
** iorder* 1 11 26 41 51s
* iorder* 170 171 172 173 174s
* iorder* 184e
*
*
* Starting Signal Variable Section of Model *
********** ********* ****** *** *** **** **** ****** ***
*
* idsv isvn ilcn icnl icn2
1 0 0 0 0
* Finished Signal Variable Section of Model *
*
*
*
*
******* type
pipe
* ncells
2
* nsides
0
* ichf
0
* radin
0.0
* toutv
0.0
* dx *
* vol *
* fa *
* fric *
* grav *
*hd *
*nff *
*alp *
* vl *
* vv *
* tl *
* tv *
* p*
* pa *
*
num userid
I
nodes
0
iconc
0
th
0.0
pwin
0.0
1.4733
0.58123
).39451
0.0
0.0
0.70874
-1
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
7.0E6
0.0
1
component name
Loop I Hot leg
junI jun2 epsw
1 52 0.0
iacc ipow npipes
0 0
houtl houtv
0.0 0.0
pwoff rpw
0.0 0.0
1.4733e
0.58123e
0.39451 0.39451e
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.70874 0.70874e
-1 -le
0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
550.Oe
550.Oe
7.OE6e
0.Oe
1
toutl
0.0
nx p
0.0
wscl
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**d: Primary System Pressure
******* type
break
* junI
53
11
ibty
0
num useri
1
isat
1
d component name
System Pressure
ioff adjpress
0 0
* dxin volin alpin tin
1.4733 0.58123 0.0 550.0
* pain concin rbmx poff
0.0 0.0 0.0
pin
7.0E6
belv
0.0 0.0
*
*d: Vessel
******* type
vessel
* nasx
7
* idcu
6
* icrr
I
* igeom
0
* shelv
27.7
z 4.
z* 19
r * 2.-
* t * 90.0c
* lisrl
6
6
* level 1
*
num userid
26 1
nrsx
2
idcl
2
ntsx
component name
$26$ 3-d vessel
ncsr ivssbf
4 2 0
idcr icru
1 5 2
ilcsp iucsp
0 0
icrl
iuhp iconc
0 0
nvent nvvtb nsgrid
0 0 0
epsw
8.7 1
22.7
3.5e
180.0004
lisrf
3
3
2.7
27.7e
16.7s
270.0006
ijuns
1
41
360.0008e
zfrac
0.0
0.0
3.7E-3
3.7E-3
0.0
0.Os
0.Oe
3.7E-3s
3.7E-3e
0.Os
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Os
0.0
3.7E-3
3.7E-3
0.0
0.0
0.Oe
3.7E-3s
3.7E-3e
0.Os
0.Oe
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
cfzlyt *
cfzlyt *
cfzlz *
cfzlz *
cfzlxr *
cfzlxr *
cfzvyt *
cfzvyt *
cfzvz *
cfzvz *
cfzvxr *
cfzvxr *
0.0
0.0
3.7E-3
3.7E-3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.7E-3
3.7E-3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.7E-3
3.7E-3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.7E-3
3.7E-3
0.0
0.0
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0.1800935 0.1800935 0.1800935s
0.02116456 0.02116456 0.02116456e
0.1414256 0.1414256 0.1414256s
0.02681191 0.02681191 0.02681191e
0.4728711 0.4728711 0.4728711s
0.08696042 0.08696042 0.08696042e
0.1250877 0.1250877 0.1250877s
frvol *
frvol *
frfayt *
frfayt *
frfaz *
frfaz *
frfaxr *
frfaxr *
hdyt *
hdyt *
hdz *
hdz *
hdxr *
hdxr *
alpn *
alpn *
vvnyt*
vvnyt
vvnz
vvnz *
vvnxr
vvnxr4
vinyt *
vinyt *
vlnz *
vlnz *
vinxr *
vlnxr *
tvn *
tvn *
tin *
tin *
pn *
pn *
pan *
pan *
level 2
cfzlyt *
cfzlyt *
cfzlz *
cfzlz *
cfzlxr *
cfzlxr *
cfzvyt
cfzvyt
0.1800935
0.02116456
0.1414256
0.02681191
0.4728711
0.08696042
0.1250877
0.0
0.74
0.82
0.74
0.82
0.74
0.82
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
1.5513E7
1.5513E7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.013025
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.Oe
0.74s
0.82e
0.74s
0.82e
0.74s
0.82e
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
550.Os
550.Oe
550.Os
550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7
1.5513E7 1.5513E7
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.013025 0.013025
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
1.5513E7s
1.5513E7e
0.013025s
0.0
0.74
0.82
0.74
0.82
0.74
0.82
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
0.0
0.74
0.82
0.74
0.82
0.74
0.82
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
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**
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
cfzvz *
cfzvz *
cfzvxr *
cfzvxr *
frvol *
frvol *
frfayt *
frfayt *
frfaz *
frfaz *
frfaxr *
frfaxr *
hdyt *
hdyt *
hdz *
hdz *
hdxr *
hdxr *
alpn *
alpn *
vvnyt
vvnyt
vvnz
vvnz
vvnxr
vvnxr
vinyt
* vinyt
* vlnz
* vlnz
* vlnxr
* vlnxr
* tvn*
* tvn*
tln*
* tln*
* 1*
* pn*
*pn
* pan
* pan
* level 3
*
* cfzlyt
* cfzlyt
* cfzlz
* cfzlz
0.013025 0.013025 0.013025s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.1517568 0.1517568 0.1517568s
0.03891449 0.03891449 0.03891449e
0.1500133 0.1500133 0.1500133s
0.04108 0.04108 0.04108e
0.1780657 0.1780657 0.1780657s
0.1293782 0.1293782 0.1293782e
0.013025
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1517568
0.03891449
0.1500133
0.04108
0.1780657
0.1293782
0.1250111
0.0
0.23
0.41
0.013
0.41
0.23
0.41
0.0
0.0
* 0.0
* 0.0
0.0
* 0.0
* 0.0
* 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
* 0.0
*c 0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
1.5513E7
1.5513E7
* 0.0
* 0.0
* 0.0
* 0.0
* 0.0
* 0.0
1250111 0.1250111s.
0.Oe
0.23s
0.41e
3 0.013s
0.41 e
0.23s
0.41e
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.s
0.Oe
0.s
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
.0 550.Os
1.0 550.Oe
.0 550.Os
.0 550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7
1.5513E7 1.5513E7
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.5513E7s
1.5513E7e
0.s
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.1250111 0.
0.0 0.0
0.23 0.23
0.41 0.41
0.013 0.01
0.41 0.41
0.23 0.23
0.41 0.41
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
550.0 550
550.0 550
550.0 550.
550.0 550.
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*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
cfzlxr *
cfzlxr *
cfzvyt *
cfzvyt *
cfzvz *
cfzvz *
cfzvxr *
cfzvxr *
frvol *
frvol *
frfayt *
frfayt *
frfaz *
frfaz *
frfaxr *
frfaxr *
hdyt *
hdyt *
hdz *
hdz *
hdxr*
hdxr*
alpn *
alpn *
vvnyt
vvnyt
vvnz
vvnz
* vvnxr
* vvnxr
* vinyt
* vinyt
* vlnz
* vlnz
* vlnxr
* vlnxr
* tvn*
* tvn*
* tln*
* tln*
* pn*
* *pn
* pan
* pan'
* level 4
*
0.0 0.0 0.s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.0s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.08435715 0.08435715 0.08435715s
0.04328887 0.04328887 0.04328887e
0.09995437 0.09995437 0.09995437s
0.04484076 0.04484076 0.04484076e
0.2779249 0.2779249 0.2779249s
0.1426204 0.1426204 0.1426204e
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.08435715
0.04328887
0.09995437
0.04484076
0.2779249
0.1426204
0.0
0.0
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
* 0.0
0.0
0.0
* 0.0
* 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
* 0.0
* 0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
1.5513E7
1.5513E7
* 0.0
* 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
0.Os
0.Oe
0.013s
0.1 78e
0.013s
0.178e
0.013s
0.178e
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
550.Os
550.Oe
550.Os
550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7
1.5513E7 1.5513E7
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
1.5513E7s
1.5513E7e
0.0
0.0
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
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**
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
cfzlyt * 0.0
cfzlyt * 0.0
cfzlz * 0.0
cfzlz * 0.0
cfzlxr * 0.0
cfzlxr * 0.0
cfzvyt * 0.0
cfzvyt * 0.0
cfzvz * 0.0
cfzvz * 0.0
cfzvxr * 0.0
cfzvxr * 0.0
frvol * 0.08436409
frvol * 0.04329244
frfayt * 0.09996261
frfayt * 0.04484445
frfaz * 0.2779249
frfaz * 0.1426204
frfaxr * 0.0
frfaxr * 0.0
hdyt * 0.013
hdyt * 0.178
hdz * 0.013
hdz * 0.178
hdxr * 0.013
hdxr * 0.178
alpn * 0.0
alpn * 0.0
vvnyt* 0.0
vvnyt* 0.0
vvnz * 0.0
vvnz 0.0
vvnxr* 0.0
vvnxr * 0.0
vinyt * 0.0
K vinyt * 0.0
*' vlnz * 0.0
* vlnz * 0.0
* vlnxr* 0.0
* vlnxr* 0.0
* tvn * 550.0
* tvn * 550.0
* tln * 550.0
* tln * 550.0
* pn* 1.5513E7
* pn* 1.5513E7
0.0 0.0 0.s
0.0 0.0 O.Oe
0.0 0.0 O.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 O.Os
0.0 0.0 O.Oe
0.0 0.0 O.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.08436409 0.08436409 0.08436409s
0.04329244 0.04329244 0.04329244e
0.09996261 0.09996261 0.09996261s
0.04484445 0.04484445 0.04484445e
0.2779249 0.2779249 0.2779249s
0.1426204 0.1426204 0.1426204e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.013 0.013 0.013s
0.178 0.178 0.178e
0.013 0.013 0.013s
0.178 0.178 0.178e
0.013 0.013 0.013s
0.178 0.178 0.178e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7s
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
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pan * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.s
pan * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0e
* level 5
*
* cfzlyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* cfzlyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* cfzlz * 5.138E-3 5.138E-3 5.138E-3 5.138E-3s
* cfzlz * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* cfzlxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* cfzlxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* cfzvyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* cfzvyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* cfzvz * 5.138E-3 5.138E-3 5.138E-3 5.138E-3s
* cfzvz * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* cfzvxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* cfzvxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* frvol * 0.1124762 0.1124762 0.1124762 0.1124762s
* frvol * 0.05771849 0.05771849 0.05771849 0.05771849e
* frfayt * 0.1332725 0.1332725 0.1332725 0.1332725s
* frfayt * 0.05978768 0.05978768 0.05978768 0.05978768e
* frfaz * 0.1780657 0.1780657 0.1780657 0.1780657s
* frfaz * 0.1426204 0.1426204 0.1426204 0.1426204e
* frfaxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* frfaxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* hdyt * 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013s
* hdyt * 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178e
* hdz * 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013s
* hdz * 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178e
* hdxr * 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013s
* hdxr * 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178e
* alpn * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* alpn * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* vvnyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* vvnyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* vvnz * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.s
* vvnz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* vvnxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* vvnxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* vnyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* vlnyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* vlnz * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* vlnz * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* vlnxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* vlnxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* vnx* 550.0 550.0 550.0 550.s
* tvn * 550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Oe
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550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7s
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
cfzlyt *
cfzlyt *
cfzlz *
cfzlz *
cfzlxr *
cfzlxr *
cfzvyt *
cfzvyt *
cfzvz *
cfzvz *
cfzvxr *
cfzvxr *
frvol *
frvol *
frfayt *
frfayt *
frfaz *
frfaz *
frfaxr *
frfaxr *
hdyt *
hdyt *
hdz *
hdz *
hdxr*
hdxr*
alpn *
alpn *
vvnyt
vvnyt
vvnz
vvnz
vvnxr
vvnxr
* vinyt
* vinyt
* vlnz
* vlnz
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
1.0 1.0 1. s
1.0 1.0 1.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 O.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
1.0 1.0 L.Os
1.0 1.0 l.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.9478957 0.9478957 0.9478957s
0.1919029 0.1919029 0.1919029e
0.7093623 0.7093623 0.7093623s
0.08965547 0.08965547 0.08965547e
0.05128291 0.05128291 0.05128291s
0.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.9478957
0.1919029
0.7093623
6.08965547
0.05128291
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.23
0.178
0.23
0.178
0.23
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
* 0.0
* 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.23
0.178
0.23
0.178
0.23
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.23s
0.178e
0.23s
0.178e
0.23s
0.178e
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
*
*
*
*
*
*
tin *
tln *
pn *
pn *
pan *
pan *
550.0
550.0
1.5513E7
1.5513E7
0.0
0.0
* level 6
*
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.23
0.178
0.23
0.178
0.23
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
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* vlnxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* vlnxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0e
* tvn * 550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
* tvn * 550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Oe
* tin * 550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
* tin * 550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Oe
* pn * 1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7s
* pn* 1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
* pan * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.s
* pan * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* level 7
*
* cfzlyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* cfzlyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* cfzlz * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* cfzlz * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* cfzlxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* cfzlxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* cfzvyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* cfzvyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* cfzvz * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* cfzvz * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* cfzvxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* cfzvxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* frvol* 0.1925958 0.1925958 0.1925958 0.1925958s
* frvol* 0.0360128 0.0360128 0.0360128 0.0360128e
* frfayt * 0.2282058 0.2282058 0.2282058 0.2282058s
* frfayt* 0.02091093 0.02091093 0.02091093 0.02091093e
* frfaz * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* frfaz * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* frfaxr * 0.1426287 0.1426287 0.1426287 0.1426287s
* frfaxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* hdyt * 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35s
* hdyt * 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69e
* hdz * 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35s
* hdz * 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69e
* hdxr * 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35s
* hdxr * 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69e
* alpn * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* alpn * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* vvnyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* vvnyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* vvnz * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* vvnz * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* vvnxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* vvnxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
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0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7s
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
*
* type
pipe
* ncells
2
* nsides
0
num userid
41
nodes
0
* ichf iconc
0 0
* radin th
0.0 0.0
* toutv pwi
0.0 0.0
* dx * 1.4733
* vol * 0.58123
* fa * 0.39451
* fric * 0.0
* grav * 0.0
* hd * 0.70874
* nff* I
* alp * 0.0
*vl * 0.0
* vv * 0.0
* ti * 550.0
* tv * 550.0
*p
* pa
*
*
*
*
component name
1 $41$ int-loop c-leg vssl c6
junI jun2 epsw
51 41 0.0
iacc ipow npipes
0 0 1
houtl houtv
0.0 0.0
pwoff rpw
0.0 0.0
1.4733e
0.58123e
0.39451 0.39451e
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.70874 0.70874e
I -le
0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
mx
toutl
0.0
pwscl
0.0
550.Oe
550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
0.0 0.Oe
*d: Inlet flow from the cold leg.
******* type num userid
vinyt *
vinyt *
vlnz *
vlnz *
vlnxr *
vlnxr *
tvn *
tvn *
tln *
tln *
pn *
pn *
pan *
pan *
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
1.5513E7
1.5513E7
0.0
0.0
component name
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n
fill
* junI
51
* twtold
0.0
* dxin
1.4733
* pin
7.0E6
*
*
*d: MSIV
******* type
valve
* ll
51
ifty
2
rfmx
1.0E20
volin
0.58123
pain
0.0
1
ioff
0
concin
0.0
alpin
0.0
flowin
2450.0
num userid
184
d
2 0
I
junI
Vessel Inlet Flow
felv
0.0
vlin
0.0
vvin
0.0
tin
488.75
tvin
550.0
component name
unnamed
jun2 epsw
52 53 0.0
ivty
0
nvtb I
0
fminov
0.0
houtl
0.0
hvlve
ivps
2 0
nvsv
0 0
fmaxov
1.0
houtv
0.0
favlve
0.70874 1.
1.4733e
0.58123e
0.39451 0.39451e
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.70874 0.70874e
1 le
0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
558.979e
558.979e
7.OE6e
0.Oe
nvtb2
nvrf
V
V
* nside
0
* ichf
I
* ivtr
0
* ivtro
0
* rvm
0.2
* radir
0.0
* tout)
0.0
* dx *
* vol *
* fa *
* fric *
* grav *
*hd *
*nff *
*alp *
* v1 *
* vv *
*tl *
*tv *
* p*p
* pa *
*
*
S
iconc
0
ivsv
0
V ivtyo
0
x rvo
0.0
th
0.0
avlve
0.39451
1.4733
0.58123
0.39451
0.0
0.0
0.70874
-1
0.0
0.0
0.0
558.979
558.979
7.0E6
0.0
toutl
0.0
xpos
) 1.0
135
* Starting Heat Structure Section of Model *
*
******* type
htstr
* nzhstr
3
* nopowr
0
* nmwrx
1
* nhot
0
* dtxht(1)
4.0
* idbcin *
* idbcon *
*qflxbcol
*qflxbcol
*qflxbco I
* hcomon2
* hcomon2
* hcomon2
* dhtstrz *
rdx *
radrd *
radrd *
matrd *
matrd *
nfax *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
fpuo2 *
ftd *
gmix *
gmix *
gmles
pgapt
plvol
pslen
*
*
*
*
*
*
num userid component name
170 0 $140$ reactor-core fuel rods
ittc hscyl ichf
0 1 1
plane liqlev
3 1 0
nfci nfcil
I
nodes
8
dtxht(2)
50.0
0
2
0.Oe
0.Oe
0.Oe
26
26
26
1.2141
iaxcnd
hdri hdro
1 0.0
irftr nzmax
0 100
dznht hga
5.OE-3 6000.0
0
2
1
1.2 142
0.0
0
po
irftr2
Oe
2e
1.2141e
3e
4e
5e
9843.Oe
0.0 2.OE-3 3.OE-3 4.OE-3
4.7422E-3 5.05E-3 5.3594E-3e
1 1 1 Is
3 2 2e
5 5 5e
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Oe
0.Oe
*
*
0.945e
1.0
0.0
0.Oe
1.OE7e
0.0 e
0.0 e
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.Oe
4.6427E-3s
0.Os
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0.0 e
1.54E4 1.54E4 1.54E4e
******* type
htstr
* nzhstr
3
* nopowr
0
* nmwrx
I
* nhot
0
* dtxht(1)
4.0
*
* idbcin *
* idbcon *
*qflxbco I
*qflxbco I
*qflxbco I
* hcomon2
* hcomon2
* hcomon2
* dhtstrz *
*
*
*
*
*
*
* rdx*
* radrd *
* radrd* 4
* matrd *
* matrd *
* nfax*
* rftn*
* rftn*
* rftn*
* rftn*
* rftn*
* rftn*
* fpuo2 *
* ftd *
* gmix *
* gmix*
* gmles *
*
*
*
*
pgapt *
plvol *
pslen *
clenn *
num userid component name
171 0 $140$ reactor-core fuel rods
ittc hscyl ichf
0 1 1
plane liqlev
3 1 0
nfci nfcil
1
nodes
8
dtxht(2)
50.0
0
2
0.Oe
0.Oe
0.Oe
26
26
26
1.2141
9843.Oe
0.0
.7422E-3
1
3
5
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
0.Oe
0.945e
1.0
0.0
0.Oe
iaxcnd
hdri hdro
1 0.0 0.0
irftr nzmax
0 100
dznht
5.OE-3
0
2
1
1.2142
irftr2
0
hgapo
6000.0
Oe
2e
2
2
2
1.2141e
3e
4e
5e
2.OE-3 3.OE-3 4.OE-3
5.05E-3 5.3594E-3e
1 1 Is
2 2e
5
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
0.0
0.0
5e
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
0.0
0.Oe
4.6427E-3s
550.Os
550.Os
550.Os
550.Os
550.0s
550.Oe
0.Os
1.OE7e
0.0 e
0.0 e
0.0 e
* clenn *
* burn *
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* bum * 1.54E4 1.54E4 1.54E4e
******* type num userid component name
htstr 172 0 $140$ reactor-core fuel rods
* nzhstr ittc hscyl ichf
3 0 1 1
* nopowr
0
* nmwrx
I
* nhot
0
* dtxht(l)
4.0
*
* idbcin *
* idbcon *
*qflxbcol 
*
*qflxbcol 
*
*qflxbcol 
*
* hcomon2 *
* hcomon2 *
* hcomon2 *
* dhtstrz *
rdx *
radrd *
radrd *
matrd *
matrd *
nfax *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
fpuo2 *
ftd *
gmix *
*gmix
gmles
pgapt
pivol *
pslen *
clenn
bum *
3
plane liqlev
1 0
nfci nfcil
1
nodes
8
dtxht(2)
50.0
0
2
0.Oe
0.Oe
0.Oe
26
26
26
1.2141
iaxcnd
hdri
1 0.0
irftr nzmax
0 100
0.0
hdro
irftr2
0
dznht hgapo
5.OE-3 6000.0
0
2
Oe
2e
1
1.2142
3
3
3
1.2141e
3e
4e
5e
9843.Oe
0.0 2.OE-3 3.OE-3 4.OE-3
4.7422E-3 5.05E-3 5.3594E-3e
1 1 1 Is
3 2 2e
5 5 5e
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.0s
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Oe
0.Oe
0.945e
1.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.Oe
1.OE7e
0.0 e
0.0 e
0.0 e
1.54E4 1.54E4 1.54E4e
4.6427E-3s
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******* type
htstr
* nzhstr
3
* nopowr
0
* nmwrx
1
* nhot
0
* dtxht(l)
4.0
*
173
ittc
0
num userid component name
0 $140$ reactor-core fuel rods
hscyl
1
plane
ichf
1
liqlev iaxcnd
3 1 0
nfci nfcil
1
nodes
8
dtxht(2)
50.0
hdri
1 0.0 0.0
irftr nzmax
0 100
hdro
irftr2
0
dznht hgapo
5.OE-3 6000.0
0
2
* 0.Oe
* 0.Oe
* 0.Oe
26
26
26
1.2141
9843.Oe
0.0 2
4.7422E-3
1
3
5
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
0.Oe
0.945e
1.0
0.0
0.Oe
1.OE7e
0.0 e
0.0 e
0.0 e
1.54E4
0
2
Oe
2e
1 4 3e
1 4 4e
1
1.2142
4
1.2141e
5e
.OE-3 3.OE-3 4.OE-3 4.6427E-3s
5.05E-3 5.3594E-3e
1 1 Is
2 2e
5 5e
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
* idbcin *
* idbcon
*qflxbcol
*qflxbco I
*qflxbco 1
* hcomon2
* hcomon2
* hcomon2
* dhtstrz *
* rdx*
* radrd *
* radrd *
* matrd *
* matrd *
* nfax*
* rftn *
* rftn *
* rftn *
* rftn *
* rftn *
* rftn *
* fpuo2 *
* ftd *
* gmix *
* gmix *
* gmles
* pgapt
* pivot *
* pslen *
* clenn
* burn *
0.0
0.Oe
0.Os
1.54E4 1.54E4e
0.0
0.0
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* Finished Heat Structure Section of Model *
* ******** ********* ** *********
*
*
* Starting Power Components *
**** ****************** ******* *****
*
******* type
power
* numpwr C
4 0
*htnum * 17(
* irpwty
5 0
* izpwtr iz
0 1
* ipwrad i
0 0
* nzpwz
0 0
* react tn
0.0 0.
* rpowri 2
4.5E9
* extsou
0.0 0.
*rdpwr * 1.21(
* rdpwr *
num
174
hanpow
userid component name
I Power Comp for old ht str 140
171 172 173e
ndgx
pwsv
pwdep
nzpwi
eut
0
pwin
0.0
pldr
0
9 1
ndhx nrts nhist
0 10 0
nzpw'
promh
0.0
nfbp
0
rpwoff
0.0
zpwo
0.0
pdrat
1.334
.2371
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0
nzpwsv nzpwrf
0
eat decaheat
0.0 0.0
vt nrpwr
1 0
rrpwmx r
1.0E20 1.0
ff rzpwmx
0.0
fucrac
1.0
1.2703 1.3201
wtbypass
nrpwi
pwscl
1.3823s
* cpowr * 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.Oe
* zpwtbI* 0.Os
* zpwtbl* 0.93748s
* zpwtbI* 1.20535s
* zpwtbI* 0.83715e
* Finished Power Components *
* *********** ********** ** **** ** **** *****
*
*
*
end
*
* ** ** * *** **** *** *
* Timestep Data *
140
* dtmin dtmax tend rtwfp
0.05 1.0 50.0 10.0
* edint gfint dmpint sedint
12.0 0.5 12.0 12.0
*
* endflag
-1.0
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Appendix B. TRA CE Passive Model Restart File
free format
*
** *** ** ** * ***
* main data *
** **** *** * ***
*
* numtcr
1 0
Model of Reactor Core
*
*
* namelist data *
*
&inopts
cpuflg=l,
dtstrt=-1.0,
iadded= 10,
noair--O,
usesjc=3,
npower-1,
nhtstr-5,
igas=I
&end
*
* Model Flags *
* dstep
0
* stdyst
0
* epso
1.OE-3
* oitmax
10
* ntsv
I
timet
0.0
transi
1
epss
1.OE-3
sitmax
10
ntcb
0
ieos inopt nmat id2o
1 0 0
ncomp
16
njun
10 1
ipak
isolut ncontr nccfl
0
ntcf
0
0
ntrp
0
ntcp
0 0
*
* component-number data *
142
1
170
184
274e
11
171
194
26 41
172 173
214 254
51s
174s
264s
* Starting Signal Variable Section of Model *
*
* idsv isvn
1 0
ilcn icnl
0 0 0
* Finished Signal Variable Section of Model *
************** ** *************** ** ******** *** ***
*
*
*
*
******* type
pipe 1
* ncells nodes
2 0
* nsides
0
* ichf iconc
0 0
* radin th
0.0 0.0
* toutv
0.0
dx *
vol *
fa *
fric *
grav *
hd *
nff *
alp *
vl *
v *
tl *
tv*
p *
pa *
*
*
*
*
num userid component name
I Loop 1 Hot leg
juni jun2 epsw
1 52 0.0
iacc ipow npipes
0 0 1
houtl houtv toutl
0.0 0.0 0.0
pwin pwoff
0.0 0.0
1.4733
0.58123
0.39451
0.0
0.0
0.70874
-1
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
7.0E6
0.0
rpwmx
0.0 0.0
pwscl
1.4733e
0.58123e
0.39451 0.39451e
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.70874 0.70874e
-1 -le
0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
550.Oe
550.Oe
7.OE6e
0.Oe
* iorder*
* iorder*
* iorder*
* iorder*
*
*
icn2
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**
*d: Primary System Pressure
******* type
break
* jun1
53
11
ibty
0
num userid component name
I System Pressure
isat ioff adjpress
1 0 0
dxin volin alpin tin pin
1.4733 0.58123 0.0 550.0 7.0E6
pain concin rbmx poff belv
0.0 0.0
*
*
*d: Vessel
******* type
vessel
* nasx
7
* idcu
6
* icrr
1
100.0
num userid
26 1
nrsx ntsx
0.0 0.0
component name
$26$ 3-d vessel
ncsr ivssbf
2 4 4 0
idel idcr icru
2 1 5 2
ilcsp iuc
0 0
* igeom nvent
0 0
* shelv
27.7
z
z
r
t
* level I
*
epsw
0.0
* 4.7
* 19.7
* 2.3
* 90.00021
lisrl lisrc
6 1
6 1
6 5
6 5
8.7 1
22.7
3.5e
180.0004
lisrf
3
3
3
3
sp iuhp
icrl
iconc
0 0
nvvtb nsgrid
0 0
2.7
27.7e
16.7s
270.0006
Ijuns
1
62
41
61
360.0008e
zfrac
0.0 0.Os
0.0
3.7E-3
3.7E-3
0.Oe
3.7E-3s
3.7E-3e
0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.Oe
3.7E-3 3.7E-3s
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
cfzlyt *
cfzlyt *
cfzlz *
cfzlz *
cfzlxr *
cfzlxr *
cfzvyt *
cfzvyt *
cfzvz *
0.0
0.0
3.7E-3
3.7E-3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.7E-3
0.0
0.0
3.7E-3
3.7E-3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.7E-3
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cfzvz * 3.7E-3
cfzvxr * 0.0
cfzvxr * 0.0
frvol * 0.1800935
frvol * 0.02116456
frfayt * 0.1414256
frfayt * 0.02681191
frfaz * 0.4728711
frfaz * 0.08696042
frfaxr * 0.1250877
frfaxr * 0.0
hdyt * 0.74
hdyt * 0.82
hdz * 0.74
hdz * 0.82
hdxr * 0.74
hdxr * 0.82
alpn * 0.0
alpn * 0.0
vvnyt* 0.0
vvnyt* 0.0
vvnz* 0.0
vvnz * 0.0
vvnxr * 0.0
vvnxr * 0.0
vinyt * 0.0
vinyt * 0.0
vlnz * 0.0
vlnz * 0.0
vlnxr* 0.0
vinxr * 0.0
tvn * 550.0
tvn* 550.0
tln * 550.0
tln * 550.0
pn* 1.5513E7
pn* 1.5513E7
pan * 0.0
pan* 0.0
level 2
cfzlyt * 0.0
cfzlyt * 0.0
cfzlz * 0.013025
cfzlz * 0.0
cfzlxr * 0.0
3.7E-3 3.7E-3 3.7E-3e
0.0 0.0 0.s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.1800935 0.1800935 0.1800935s
0.02116456 0.02116456 0.02116456e
0.1414256 0.1414256 0.1414256s
0.02681191 0.02681191 0.02681191e
0.4728711 0.4728711 0.4728711s
0.08696042 0.08696042 0.08696042e
0.1250877 0.1250877 0.1250877s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.74 0.74 0.74s
0.82 0.82 0.82e
0.74 0.74 0.74s
0.82 0.82 0.82e
0.74 0.74 0.74s
0.82 0.82 0.82e
0.0 0.0 0.s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7s
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0
0.0
0.01
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3025 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.Os
0.Oe
13025
0.Oe
0.Os
0.013025s
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cfzlxr *
cfzvyt *
cfzvyt *
cfzvz *
cfzvz *
cfzvxr *
cfzvxr *
frvol *
frvol *
frfayt *
frfayt *
frfaz *
frfaz *
frfaxr *
frfaxr *
hdyt *
hdyt *
hdz *
hdz *
hdxr *
hdxr *
alpn *
alpn *
vvnyt*
vvnyt
vvnz
vvnz *
vvnxr
vvnxr
vinyt *
vinyt *
vlnz *
vlnz *
vinxr *
vlnxr *
tvn *
tvn *
tln *
tln *
pn *
pn *
pan *
pan *
level 3
cfzlyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.s
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.013025
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1517568
0.03891449
0.1500133
0.04108
0.1780657
0.1293782
0.1250111
0.0
0.23
0.41
0.013
0.41
0.23
0.41
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
1.5513E7
1.5513E7
0.0
0.0
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.013025 0.013025 0.013025s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.1517568 0.1517568 0.1517568s
0.03891449 0.03891449 0.03891449e
0.1500133 0.1500133 0.1500133s
0.04108 0.04108 0.04108e
0.1780657 0.1780657 0.1780657s
0.1293782 0.1293782 0.1293782e
0.1250111 0.1250111 0.1250111s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.23 0.23 0.23s
0.41 0.41 0.41e
0.013 0.013 0.013s
0.41 0.41 0.41e
0.23 0.23 0.23s
0.41 0.41 0.41e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7s
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
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cfzlyt *
cfzlz *
cfzlz *
cfzlxr *
cfzlxr *
cfzvyt *
cfzvyt *
cfzvz *
cfzvz *
cfzvxr *
cfzvxr *
frvol *
frvol *
frfayt *
frfayt *
frfaz *
frfaz *
frfaxr *
frfaxr *
hdyt *
hdyt *
hdz *
hdz *
hdxr *
hdxr *
alpn *
alpn *
vvnyt *
vvnyt *
vvnz *
vvnz *
vvnxr *
vvnxr *
vinyt *
vinyt *
vlnz *
vlnz *
vlnxr *
vlnxr *
tvn *
tvn *
tln *
tln *
pn *
pn *
pan *
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.08435715
0.04328887
0.09995437
0.04484076
0.2779249
0.1426204
0.0
0.0
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
1.5513E7
1.5513E7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
0.Os
0.Oe
0.013s
0.178e
0.013s
0.178e
0.013s
0.178e
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.s
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
550.Os
550.Oe
550.Os
550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7
1.5513E7 1.5513E7
0.0 0.0 0.Os
1.5513E7s
1.5513E7e
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.08435715 0.08435715 0.08435715s
0.04328887 0.04328887 0.04328887e
0.09995437 0.09995437 0.09995437s
0.04484076 0.04484076 0.04484076e
0.2779249 0.2779249 0.2779249s
0.1426204 0.1426204 0.1426204e
0.0
0.0
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
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0.0 0.0 0.0 O.Oe
cfzlyt * 0.0
cfzlyt * 0.0
cfzlz * 0.0
cfzlz * 0.0
cfzlxr* 0.0
cfzlxr * 0.0
cfzvyt * 0.0
cfzvyt * 0.0
cfzvz * 0.0
cfzvz * 0.0
cfzvxr* 0.0
cfzvxr* 0.0
frvol * 0.08436409
frvol * 0.04329244
frfayt * 0.09996261
frfayt * 0.04484445
frfaz * 0.2779249
frfaz * 0.1426204
frfaxr * 0.0
frfaxr * 0.0
hdyt * 0.013
hdyt * 0.178
hdz * 0.013
hdz * 0.178
hdxr * 0.013
hdxr * 0.178
alpn * 0.0
alpn * 0.0
vvnyt* 0.0
vvnyt* 0.0
vvnz * 0.0
vvnz * 0.0
vvnxr * 0.0
vvnxr * 0.0
vlnyt* 0.0
vinyt * 0.0
vlnz * 0.0
vlnz * 0.0
vlnxr * 0.0
vlnxr* 0.0
tvn* 550.0
tvn* 550.0
tln * 550.0
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.08436409 0.08436409 0.08436409s
0.04329244 0.04329244 0.04329244e
0.09996261 0.09996261 0.09996261s
0.04484445 0.04484445 0.04484445e
0.2779249 0.2779249 0.2779249s
0.1426204 0.1426204 0.1426204e
0.0
0.0
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
0.0
0.0
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
0.s
0.Oe
0.013s
0.178e
0.013s
0.178e
0.013s
0.178e
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.s
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
550.Os
550.Oe
550.Os
* pan *
* level 4
*
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**
*
*
*
tln *
pn *
pn *
pan *
pan *
550.0
1.5513E7
1.5513E7
0.0
0.0
* level 5
*
* cfzlyt * 0.0
* cfzlyt * 0.0
* cfzlz * 5.138E-3
* cfzlz * 0.0
* cfzlxr* 0.0
* cfzlxr * 0.0
* cfzvyt * 0.0
* cfzvyt * 0.0
* cfzvz * 5.138E-3
* cfzvz * 0.0
* cfzvxr * 0.0
* cfzvxr * 0.0
* frvol * 0.1124762
* frvol * 0.05771849
* frfayt * 0.1332725
* frfayt * 0.05978768
* frfaz * 0.1780657
* frfaz * 0.1426204
* frfaxr * 0.0
* frfaxr * 0.0
* hdyt * 0.013
* hdyt * 0.178
* hdz * 0.013
* hdz * 0.178
* hdxr* 0.013
* hdxr* 0.178
* alpn * 0.0
* alpn * 0.0
* vvnyt * 0.0
* vvnyt* 0.0
* vvnz * 0.0
* vvnz * 0.0
vvnxr 0.0
* vvnxr * 0.0
* vinyt * 0.0
* vinyt * 0.0
* vlnz * 0.0
* vlnz * 0.0
* vlnxr * 0.0
550.0 550.0 550.0e
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7s
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
0.0 0.0 .Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
5.138E-3 5.138E-3 5.138E-3s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
5.138E-3 5.138E-3 5.138E-3s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.1124762 0.1124762 0.1124762s
0.05771849 0.05771849 0.05771849e
0.1332725 0.1332725 0.1332725s
0.05978768 0.05978768 0.05978768e
0.1780657 0.1780657 0.1780657s
0.1426204 0.1426204 0.1426204e
0.0
0.0
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.Os
0.Oe
0.013s
0.178e
0.013s
0.178e
0.013s
0.178e
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
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0.0 0.0 0.0 O.0e
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7s
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
cfzlyt * 0.0
cfzlyt * 0.0
cfzlz * 1.0
cfzlz * 1.0
cfzlxr * 0.0
cfzlxr * 0.0
cfzvyt * 0.0
cfzvyt * 0.0
cfzvz * 1.0
cfzvz * 1.0
cfzvxr * 0.0
cfzvxr * 0.0
frvol * 0.9478957
frvol * 0.1919029
frfayt * 0.7093623
frfayt * 0.08965547
frfaz * 0.05128291
frfaz * 0.0
frfaxr * 0.0
frfaxr * 0.0
hdyt * 0.23
hdyt * 0.178
hdz * 0.23
hdz * 0.178
hdxr * 0.23
hdxr * 0.178
alpn * 0.0
alpn * 0.0
vvnyt* 0.0
vvnyt* 0.0
vvnz * 0.0
vvnz * 0.0
vvnxr* 0.0
vvnxr* 0.0
vinyt * 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
1.0 1.0
1.0 1.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
1.0 1.0
1.0 1.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.9478957 (
0.1919029 (
0.7093623 (
0.08965547
0.05128291
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.23
0.178
0.23
0.178
0.23
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.s
0.Oe
1.Os
1.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
.Os
1.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
.9478957
.1919029
.7093623
0.08965547
0.05128291
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.23
0.178
0.23
0.178
0.23
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
).9478957s
3.1919029e
0.7093623s
0.08965547e
0.05128291s
0.Oe
0.s
0.Oe
0.23s
0.178e
0.23s
0.178e
0.23s
0.178e
0.Os
0.Oe
0.s
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
vinxr *
tvn *
tvn *
tln *
tln *
pn *
pn *
pan *
pan *
level 6
150
vinyt * 0.0
vlnz * 0.0
vlnz * 0.0
vlnxr* 0.0
vlnxr* 0.0
tvn * 550.0
tvn * 550.0
tln * 550.0
tln * 550.0
pn* 1.5513E7
pn* 1.5513E7
pan * 0.0
pan * 0.0
level 7
cfzlyt * 0.0
cfzlyt * 0.0
cfzlz * 0.0
cfzlz * 0.0
cfzlxr * 0.0
cfzlxr * 0.0
cfzvyt * 0.0
cfzvyt * 0.0
cfzvz * 0.0
cfzvz * 0.0
cfzvxr * 0.0
cfzvxr * 0.0
frvol * 0.1925958
frvol * 0.0360128
frfayt * 0.2282058
frfayt * 0.02091093
frfaz * 0.0
frfaz * 0.0
frfaxr * 0.1426287
frfaxr * 0.0
hdyt * 0.35
hdyt * 1.69
hdz * 0.35
hdz * 1.69
hdxr* 0.35
hdxr* 1.69
alpn * 0.0
alpn * 0.0
vvnyt * 0.0
vvnyt * 0.0
vvnz * 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7s
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.1925958 0.1925958 0.1925958s
0.0360128 0.0360128 0.0360128e
0.2282058 0.2282058 0.2282058s
0.02091093 0.02091093 0.0 2091093e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.1426287 0.1426287 0.1426287s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.35 0.35 0.35s
1.69 1.69 1.69e
0.35 0.35 0.35s
1.69 1.69 1.69e
0.35 0.35 0.35s
1.69 1.69 1.69e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
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vvnz *
vvnxr *
vvnxr *
vinyt *
vinyt *
vlnz *
vlnz *
vlnxr *
vlnxr *
tvn *
tvn *
tln *
tln *
pn *
pn *
pan *
pan *
*
* type
pipe
* ncells
2
* nsides
0
* ichf
0
* radin
0.0
num userid
41
nodes
0
iconc
1 $41$
junl1
component name
int-loop c-leg vssl c6
jun2 epsw
51 41 0.0
iacc ipow npipes
0 0 0 1
th houtl houtv toutl
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
* toutv pwin pwoff rpw
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
*dx * 1.4733 1.4733e
*vol * 0.58123 0.58123e
*fa * 0.39451 0.39451 0.39451e
* fric *
* grav *
*hd *
*nff *
* alp *
* v1 *
*vv *
*tl *
*tv *
* p*p
*pa*
0.0
0.0
0.70874
1
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
1.5513E7
0.0
mx p
0.0
wscl
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.70874 0.70874e
1 -le
0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
550.Oe
550.Oe
1.5513E7e
0.Oe
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
1.5513E7
1.5513E7
0.0
0.0
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7s
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
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**d: Inlet flow from the cold leg.
******* type num userid
fill
* junI
51
* twtold
0.0
* dxin
1.4733
* pin
7.0E6
*
*
*d: MSIV
******* type
valve
* ncells
2
* nsides
0
* ichf
I
* ivtr
0
* ivtrov
0
* rvmx
0.2
* radin
0.0
* toutv
0.0
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
51
ifty
2
1
ioff
0
rfmx concin
L.0E20 0.0
volin alpin
0.58123 0.0
pain flowin
0.0 2450.0
num userid
184
nodes
0
iconc
0
ivsv
0
ivtyov
0
rvov
0.0
th
0.0
avlve
0.3945
1.4733
0.58123
0.39451
0.0
0.0
0.70874
-1
0.0
0.0
0.0
558.979
558.979
7.0E6
1
junI
component name
Vessel Inlet Flow
felv
0.0
vlin
0.0
vvin
0.0
tlin
488.75
tvin
550.0
component name
unnamed
jun2 epsw
52 53 0.0
ivty
0
nvtb 1
0
ivps nvtb2
2 0
nvsv
0 0
nvrf
fminov fmaxov
0.0
houtl
0.0
1.0
houtv
0.0
hvlve favlve
1 0.70874 1.0
1.4733e
0.58123e
0.39451 0.39451e
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.70874 0.70874e
I le
0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
558.979e
558.979e
7.OE6e
toutl
0.0
xpos
1.0
dx
vol
fa
fric
grav
hd
nff
alp
vl
tl
tv
p
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0.0 O.Oe
num userid
pipe
* ncell
2
* nside
0
* ichf
I
* radii
0.0
* tout)
0.0
*dx *
*vol *
*fa *
* fric *
* grav *
*hd *
* nff *
*alp *
* vl *
* vv *
* tl *
* tv *
* p*
* pa *
I
jun 1s
component name
unnamed
jun2 epsw
62 59 0.0
iacc
0
houtl
0.0
pwoff
0.0
ipow npipes
0 1
houtv toutl
0.0 0.0
rpwmx pwscl
0.0 0.0
194
s node
0
S
iconc
0
th
0.0
pwir
0.0
5.33
5.853551
1.098227
0.0
1.0
1.1825
1
0.0
0.0
0.0
558.979
558.979
7.0E6
0.0
type
valve
* ncells
2
* nsides
0
* ichf
1
* ivtr
0
* ivtrov
0
* rvmx
0.2
* radin
num userid
214
nodes
0
iconc
0
iVsV
I
ivtyov
0
rvov
0.0
th
I
juni
component name
unnamed
jun2 epsw
58 61 0.0
ivty
1
nvtb 1
1
ivps
2 0
nvsv
0 0
nvtb2
nvrf
fminov fmaxov
0.0 1.0
houtl houtv toutl
*pa *
*
type
5.33e
5.85355le
1.098227 1.098227e
0.0 0.Oe
1.0 -l.Oe
1.1825 1.1825e
I le
0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
558.979e
558.979e
7.OE6e
0.Oe
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* dx
* vol
* fa
fric
grav
hd
nff
alp
v
vv
tl
tv
p.
pa
vtb 1
0.0 0.0
toutv avlve
0.0 1.098227
* 0.15
* 0.1178097
* 0.7853982 (
* 0.0
* 0.0
* 1.0
* 1
* 0.0
* 0.0 (
* 0.0
300.0 3
* 300.0 3
* 7.0E6
* 0.0
* 0.0
0.0 0.0
hvlve favIve
1.1825 0.0
0.l5e
0.1 178097e
.7853982 0.7853982e
0.0
1.0
1
.Oe
.0
0.0
00.Oe
00.0e
7.OE6e
.Oe
0.Oe
0.Oe
0.Oe
1.Oe
le
0.Oe
0.Oe
type
pipe 254
* ncells node:
2 0
* nsides
0
* ichf iconc
1 0
* radin th
0.0 0.0
* toutv pwir
0.0 0.0
*dx * 5.33
* vol * 5.853551
* fa * 1.098227
* fric * 0.0
grav 1.0
*hd * 1.1825
*nff* 1
*alp * 0.0
*vl * 0.0
*Vv * 0.0
*tl * 300.0
* tv * 300.0
* P * 7.0E6
* pa * 0.0
num userid
1
jun1
component name
unnamed
jun2 epsw
60 58 0.0
iacc
0 0
houtl houtv
0.0 0.0
pwoff
0.0
ipow npipes
I
toutl
0.0
rpwmx
0.0 0.0
pwscl
5.33e
5.85355le
1.098227 0.7853982e
0.0 0.Oe
-1.0 0.Oe
1.1825 l.Oe
1 le
0.Oe
0.0
0.0
300.Oe
300.Oe
7.OE6e
0.Oe
0.Oe
0.Oe
0.0
xpos
0.0
*
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**
******* type
pipe
*
264
ncells nodes
2 0
* nsides
0
* ichf
1
* radin
0.0
* toutv
0.0
dx *
vol *
fa *
fric *
grav *
hd *
nff *
alp *
vi *
vv *
ti *
tv *
p *
pa *
iconc
0
num userid
1
jun1
component name
unnamed
jun2 epsw
60 59 0.0
iacc ipow npipes
0 0 1
th houtl houtv toutl
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
pwin pwoff
0.0 0.0
1.0
1.098227
1.098227
0.0
-1.0
1.1825
1
0.0
0.0
0.0
558.979
558.979
7.0E6
0.0
rpwmx
0.0 0.0
pwscl
1.Oe
1.098227e
1.098227 1.098227e
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 1.Oe
1.1825 1.1825e
I le
0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
558.979e
558.979e
7.OE6e
0.Oe
* Starting Heat Structure Section of Model *
************ ************** ****** ******* **
*
******* type
htstr
* nzhstr
3
* nopowr
170
ittc
0
num userid component name
0 $140$ reactor-core fuel rods
hscyl
1
plane liqlev
ichf
1
iaxcnd
0 3 1 0
* nmwrx
1
* nhot
0
* dtxht(1)
4.0
nfci nfcil
1
nodes
8
dtxht(2)
50.0
hdri hdro
irftr2
1 0.0 0.0
0
irftr nzmax
0 100
dznht hgapo
5.0E-3 6000.0
*
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0
2
Oe
2e
*
* idbcin *
* idbcon *
*qflxbcol
*qflxbco I
*qflxbcol
* hcomon2
* hcomon2
* hcomon2
* dhtstrz *
* rdx*
* radrd *
*radrd* 4
* matrd *
* matrd *
* nfax*
* rftn*
* rftn*
* rftn*
* rftn*
* rftn*
* rftn*
* fpuo2 *
* ftd *
* gmix *
* gmix*
* gmles *
* pgapt *
* pivol *
* pslen *
* clenn *
* bum *
1
1
1
1.2 14 le
3e
4e
5e
.OE-3 3.OE-3 4.OE-3
5.05E-3 5.3594E-3e
1 1 Is
2 2e
5 5e
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.Oe
1.54E4 1.54E4e
******* type
htstr 171
* nzhstr ittc
3 0
* nopowr pIa
0 3
* nmwrx nf
1 1
* nhot node
0 8
* dtxht(1) dtxht
4.0 50.0
*
num userid component name
0 $140$ reactor-core fuel rods
hscyl ichf
1 1
ne liqlev iaxcnd
hdri hdro
irftr2
1 0
ci nfcil
1 0.0 0.0
s
(2)
0
irftr nzmax
0 100
dznht hgapo
5.OE-3 6000.0
0
2
O.Oe
O.Oe
O.Oe
26
26
26
*
*
*
*
*
*
4.6427E-3s
1
1
1
1.2 1421.2141
9843.Oe
0.0 2
.7422E-3
1
3
5
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
0.Oe
0.945e
1.0
0.0
0.Oe
1.OE7e
0.0 e
0.0 e
0.0 e
1.54E4
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**
*
*
0
2
0.Oe
0.Oe
0.Oe
26
26
26
0
2
Oe
2e
* idbcin
* idbcon
*qflxbco 1
*qflxbcol
*qflxbcol
* hcomon
* hcomon
* hcomon
* dhtstrz *
* rdx*
* radrd *
* radrd *
* matrd *
* matrd *
* nfax*
* rftn *
* rftn *
* rftn *
* rftn *
* rftn *
* rftn *
* fpuo2 *
* ftd *
* gmix *
gmix *
* gmles *
' pgapt *
" pivol *
pslen *
clenn *
bum *
2
2
2
3e
4e
5e
1.2141 1.2142 1.2141e
9843.Oe
0.0 2.OE-3 3.OE-3 4.OE-3 4.6427E-3s
4.7422E-3 5.05E-3 5.3594E-3e
1 1 1 Is
3 2 2e
5 5 5e
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Oe
0.Oe
0.945e
1.0
0.0
0.Oe
1.OE7e
0.0 e
0.0 e
0.0 e
1.54E4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.Oe
0.Os
1.54E4 1.54E4e
htstr
*
******* type num userid
172
nzhstr ittc
3 0
nopowr
0
* nmwrx
1
* nhot
0
* dtxht(1)
4.0
*
* idbcin *
plane
3
nfci
nodes
8
dtxht(2)
50.0
component name
0 $140$ reactor-core fuel rods
hscyl
I
ichf
1
liqlev iaxcnd
1 0
hdri hdro
irftr2
nfcil
1 0.0 0.0
irftr nzmax
0 100 0
dznht hgapo
5.OE-3 6000.0
0 0 Oe
1
I
1
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*L
* idbcon * 2
*qflxbcol * 0.Oe
*qflxbcol * 0.Oe
*qflxbcol * 0.Oe
* hcomon2 * 26
* hcomon2 * 26
* hcomon2 * 26
* dhtstrz * 1.2141
* rdx * 9843.Oe
* radrd * 0.0
radrd *
matrd *
matrd *
nfax*
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
fpuo2 *
ftd *
gmix *
gmix *
gmles *
pgapt *
pivot *
pslen *
clenn *
burn *
4.7422E-3
1
3
5
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
0.Oe
0.945e
1.0
0.0
0.Oe
1.OE7e
0.0 e
0.0 e
0.0 e
1.54E4
2.OE-3 3.OE-3 4.OE-3
5.05E-3 5.3594E-3e
1 1 Is
2 2e
5 5e
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.0s
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
0.0
0.0
1.54E4
0.0
0.Oe
0.Os
1.54E4e
*
* type
htstr
* nzhstr
3
* nopowr
0
* nmwrx
1
* nhot
0
* dtxht(1)
4.0
*
* idbcin *
* idbcon *
num userid
173
ittc
0
plane
component name
0 $140$ reactor-core fuel rods
hscyl
1
ichf
1
liqlev iaxcnd
3 1 0
nfci
1
nodes
8
dtxht(2)
50.0
0
2
0.0
0
nfcil hdri
1 0.0
irftr nzmax
0 100
dznht hgapo
5.OE-3 6000.0
0 Oe
2 2e
2 2e
1
1
1
1.2 142
3
3
3
1.2141e
3e
4e
5e
4.6427E-3s
hdro
irftr2
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*qflxbcol * O.Oe
*qflxbcol * 0.Oe
* qflxbcol * 0.Oe
* hcomon2 * 26 1 4 3e
* hcomon2 * 26 1 4 4e
* hcomon2 * 26 1 4 5e
* dhtstrz* 1.2141 1.2142 1.2141e
* rdx * 9843.Oe
* radrd * 0.0 2.OE-3 3.OE-3 4.0E-3 4.6427E-3s
* radrd * 4.7422E-3 5.05E-3 5.3594E-3e
* matrd * 1 1 1 Is
* matrd * 3 2 2e
* nfax* 5 5 5e
* rftn * 550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
* rftn * 550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
* rftn * 550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
* rftn * 550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
* rftn * 550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Os
* rftn * 550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Oe
* fpuo2 * 0.Oe
* ftd * 0.945e
* gmix * 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.Os
* gmix * 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* gmles * 0.Oe
* pgapt* 1.OE7e
* pivol * 0.0 e
* pslen * 0.0 e
* clenn * 0.0 e
* bum * 1.54E4 1.54E4 1.54E4e
******* type
htstr
* nzhstr
2
* nopowr
1
* nmwrx
0
* nhot
0
* dtxht(1)
2.0
*
* idbcin *
* idbcon *
* hcomon *
num userid
274
ittC
0
0
hscyl
1
ichf
I
component name
unnamed
plane liqlev iaxcnd
3 0 0
nfci nfcil
0
nodes
2
dtxht(2)
10.0
2
5
264
hdri hdro
0 0.0 0.0
irftr nzmax
0 100
dznht
1.OE-3
irftr2
0
hgapo
6300.0
2e
5e
1 0 Oe
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* hcomonl * 264 2 0 Oe
* tsurfo2 * 300.Oe
* tsurfo2 * 300.Oe
* dhtstrz* 1.0 1.Oe
* rdx* 1.Oe
* radrd * 0.59125 0.69125e
* matrd * 6e
* nfax* 1 le
* rftn * 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.Oe
* Finished Heat Structure Section of Model *
*
*
*
* Starting Power Components *
*
******* type
power
* numpv
4
* htnum *
* irpwty
5
* izpwtr
0
* ipwrad
0
* nzpwz
0
* react
0.0
* rpowri
4.5E9
* extsou
0.0
* rdpwr *
* rdpwr *
* cpowr *
* zpwtb 1*
* zpwtbl*
* zpwtbl *
* zpwtb 1*
nu
174
chanpo
0
170
ndgx
0
izpwsv
1
ipwdep
0
nzpwi
0
tneut
0.0
zpwin
0.0
pldr
0.0
1.2109 1
0.0 0.
1.0 1
0.Os
0.93748s
1.20535s
0.83715e
m userid component name
1 Power Comp for old ht str 140
w
171 172 173e
ndhx nrts nhist
0 10 0
nzpwtb
1 0
promheat
0.0 0.0
nzpwsv nzpwrf
0
decahe
0.0
nfbpwt nrpwr
0 1 0
rpwoff
0.0 1.
zpwoff
0.0
pdrat
1.334
rrpwmx
0E20
rzpwmx
0.0
fucrac
1.0
.2371 1.2703 1.3201
0 0.Oe
.0 1.0 1.Oe
at wtbypass
nrpwi
rpwscl
1.0
1.3823s
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* Finished Power Components *
*
*
*
end
*
* *** *** ** ** ** *
* Timestep Data *
* ****** ** ** ** *
* dtmin dtmax tend rtwfp
0.05 1.0 50.0 10.0
* edint gfint dmpint sedint
12.0 0.5 12.0 12.0
*
* endflag
-1.0
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Appendix C. TRACE Active Model Restart File
free format
*
* main data *
** ***** ** * ***
*
* numtcr ieos inopt nmat id2o
1 0 1 0 0
Model of Reactor Core
*
*
* namelist data *
*
&inopts
cpufg=l,
dtstrt=-1.0,
iadded= 10,
noair=O,
usesjc=3,
npower=1,
nhtstr=5,
igas=I
&end
*
* Model Flags *
*
* dstep timet
0 0.0
* stdyst transi ncomp njun ipak
0 1 17 11 1
* epso epss
1.0E-3 1.OE-3
* oitmax sitmax isolut ncontr nccfl
10 10 0 0 0
* ntsv ntcb ntcf ntrp ntcp
1 0 0 0 0
*
* component-number data *
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** iorder*
* iorder*
* iorder*
* iorder*
1
170
184
274
11
171
194
284e
26
172
214
41
173
254
51s
174s
264s
*
*
* Starting Signal Variable Section of Model *
*
* idsv isvn ilcn icnl icn2
1 0 0 0 0
* Finished Signal Variable Section of Model *
*
*
*
*
******* type
pipe
* ncells
2
* nsides
0
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
dx
vol
fa
fric
grav
hd
nff
* alp
* vI
* vv
* ti
* tv
* pa
*pa
ichf
I
num userid
I
nodes
0
iconc
component name
Loop I Hot leg
junI jun2 epsw
1 52 0.0
iacc ipow npipes
0 0 0 0
radin th houtl houtv
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
toutv pwin pwoff rpw
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
* 1.4733 1.4733e
* 0.58123 0.58123e
* 0.39451 0.39451 0.39451e
* 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* 0.70874 0.70874 0.70874e
* -1 -1 -le
* 0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
7.0E6
0.0
*
*
*
*
*
*
0.Oe
0.0
0.0
550.Oe
550.Oe
7.OE6e
0.Oe
1
toutl
0.0
mx p
0.0
wscl
0.Oe
0.Oe
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**
*d: Primary System Pressure
******* type
break
* jun1
53
* dxin
1.4733
num userid
11
ibty
0
volin
0.58123
* pain concin
0.0 0.0
*
*
*d: Vessel
******* type
vessel
* nasx
7
* idcu
6
* icrr
I
* igeom
0
*
*
*
*
*
z
z
r
t
* level I
*
1
isat
1
component name
System Pressure
ioff adjpress
0 0
alpin tin
0.0 550.0
rbmx poff
100.0 0.0
num userid
26 1
nrsx ntsx
pin
7.0E6
belv
0.0
component name
$26$ 3-d vessel
ncsr ivssbf
2 4 4 0
idel
2
idcr
I
ilcsp iucsp
0 0
nvent
0
shelv eps
27.7 0.0
* 4.7
* 19.7
* 2.3
* 90.00021
lisrl lisrc
6 1
6 1
6 5
6 5
icru
5 2
icrl
iuhp iconc
0 0
nvvtb nsgrid
0 0
w
8.7 1
22.7
3.5e
180.0004
lisrf
3
3
3
3
2.7
27.7e
16.7s
270.0006 360.0008e
juns
1
62
41
61
zfrac
0.0 0.Os
0.0
3.7E-3
3.7E-3
0.0
0.Oe
3.7E-3s
3.7E-3e
0.Os
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.Oe
3.7E-3 3.7E-3s
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
cfzlyt *
cfzlyt *
cfzlz *
cfzlz *
cfzlxr *
cfzlxr *
cfzvyt *
cfzvyt *
cfzvz *
0.0
0.0
3.7E-3
3.7E-3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.7E-3
0.0
0.0
3.7E-3
3.7E-3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.7E-3
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cfzvz *
cfzvxr *
cfzvxr *
frvol *
frvol *
frfayt *
frfayt *
frfaz *
frfaz *
frfaxr *
frfaxr *
hdyt *
hdyt *
hdz *
hdz *
hdxr *
hdxr *
alpn *
alpn *
vvnyt
vvnyt
vvnz
vvnz
Svvnxr
vvnxr
vinyt
vinyt
vlnz
vlnz
vInxr
vlnxr
tvn*
ICtvn*
tln*
* tln*
* pn *
pn
* panl
* pan
* level 2
*
* cfzlyt
* cfzlyt
* cfzlz
* cfzlz
* cfzlxr
3.7E-3
0.0
0.0
0.1800935
0.02116456
0.1414256
0.02681191
0.4728711
0.08696042
0.1250877
0.0
0.74
0.82
0.74
0.82
0.74
0.82
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
* 0.0
* 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
1.5513E7
1.5513E7
0.0
0.0
*c 0.0
* 0.0
* 0.013025
0.0
* 0.0
3.7E-3 3.7E-3 3.7E-3e
0.0 0.0 O.Os
0.0 0.0 O.Oe
0.1800935 0.1800935 0.1800935s
0.02116456 0.02116456 0.02116456e
0.1414256 0.1414256 0.1414256s
0.02681191 0.02681191 0.02681191e
0.4728711 0.4728711 0.4728711s
0.08696042 0.08696042 0.08696042e
0.1250877 0.1250877 0.1250877s
0.0
0.74
0.82
0.74
0.82
0.74
0.82
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
1.551
1.551
0.0
0.0
0.0 0.Oe
0.74 0.74s
0.82 0.82e
0.74 0.74s
0.82 0.82e
0.74 0.74s
0.82 0.82e
0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.Oe
550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.Oe
550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.Oe
3E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7s
3E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.013025 0.013025
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.013025s
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* cfzlxr* 0.0 0.0
* cfzvyt * 0.0 0.0
* cfzvyt* 0.0 0.0
* cfzvz * 0.013025 0.013
* cfzvz * 0.0 0.0
* cfzvxr* 0.0 0.0
* cfzvxr * 0.0 0.0
* frvol* 0.1517568 0.1517
* frvol * 0.03891449 0.0389
* frfayt* 0.1500133 0.150(
* frfayt* 0.04108 0.041(
* frfaz * 0.1780657 0.1780
* frfaz * 0.1293782 0.1293
* frfaxr * 0.1250111 0.125
* frfaxr * 0.0 0.0
* hdyt * 0.23 0.23
* hdyt * 0.41 0.41
* hdz * 0.013 0.013
* hdz * 0.41 0.41
* hdxr * 0.23 0.23
* hdxr * 0.41 0.41
* alpn * 0.0 0.0
* alpn * 0.0 0.0
* vvnyt* 0.0 0.0
* vvnyt* 0.0 0.0.
*vvnz * 0.0 0.0
vvnz 0.0 0.0
vvnxr 0.0 0.0
* vvnxr 0.0 0.0
* vnyt* 0.0 0.0
* vinyt * 0.0 0.0
* vlnz * 0.0 0.0
* vlnz * 0.0 0.0
* vlnxr * 0.0 0.0
* vlnxr* 0.0 0.0
* 5vn5* 0.0 550.0
* tvn * 550.0 550.0
* tln * 550.0 550.0
* tln * 550.0 550.0
* pn* 1.5513E7 1.551
* pn* 1.5513E7 1.551
* pan * 0.0 0.0
* pan * 0.0 0.0
* level 3
*
* cfzlyt * 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.s
0.0 0.Oe
)25 0.013025 0.013025s
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.Oe
568 0.1517568 0.1517568s
1449 0.03891449 0.03891449e
133 0.1500133 0.1500133s
8 0.04108 0.04108e
657 0.1780657 0.1780657s
782 0.1293782 0.1293782e
)111 0.1250111 0.1250111s
0.0
0.23
0.41
0.013
0.41
0.23
0.41
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
3E7
3E7
0.0
0.0
0.Oe
0.23s
0.41e
0.013s
0.41e
0.23s
0.41e
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
550.Os
550.Oe
550.Os
550.Oe
1.5513E7
1.5513E7
0.Os
0.Oe
1.5513E7s
1.5513E7e
0.0 0.Os
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**
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
cfzlyt *
cfzlz *
cfzlz *
cfzlxr *
cfzlxr *
cfzvyt *
cfzvyt *
cfzvz *
cfzvz *
cfzvxr *
cfzvxr *
frvol *
frvol *
frfayt *
frfayt *
frfaz *
frfaz *
frfaxr *
frfaxr *
hdyt *
hdyt *
hdz *
hdz *
hdxr*
hdxr*
alpn *
alpn *
vvnyt'
vvnyt
* vvnz
* vvnz
* vvnxr
K vvnxr
* vly* vinyt
*' vinyt '
* vlnz
* vlnz
* vlnxr
* vlnxr
* tvn*
* tvn*
* tln*
* tln*
* *
pn
* pn*
* pan'
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.08435715
0.04328887
0.09995437
0.04484076
0.2779249
0.1426204
0.0
0.0
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.0
0.0
* 0.0
* 0.0
0.0
* 0.0
* 0.0
* 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
K 0.0
K 0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
1.5513E7
1.5513E7
K 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.(
0.0 0.
0.08435715
0.04328887
0.09995437
0.04484076
0.2779249
0.1426204
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.013 0.013 0.013s
0.178 0.178 0.178e
0.013 0.013 0.013s
0.178 0.178 0.178e
0.013 0.013 0.013s
0.178 0.178 0.178e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7s
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
) 0.Oe
0.08435715 0.08435715s
0.04328887 0.04328887e
0.09995437 0.09995437s
0.04484076 0.04484076e
0.2779249 0.2779249s
0.1426204 0.1426204e
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0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
cfzlyt *
cfzlyt *
cfzlz *
cfzlz *
cfzlxr *
cfzlxr *
cfzvyt *
cfzvyt *
cfzvz *
cfzvz *
cfzvxr *
cfzvxr *
frvol *
frvol *
frfayt *
frfayt *
frfaz *
frfaz *
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.08436409
0.04329244
0.09996261
0.04484445
0.2779249
0.1426204
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.08436409
0.04329244
0.09996261
0.04484445
0.2779249
0.1426204
frfaxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0
frfaxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0
hdyt * 0.013 0.013 0.013
hdyt * 0.178 0.178 0.178
hdz * 0.013 0.013 0.013
* hdz * 0.178 0.178 0.178
* hdxr * 0.013 0.013 0.013
* hdxr * 0.178 0.178 0.178
* alpn * 0.0 0.0 0.0
* alpn * 0.0 0.0 0.0
* vvnyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0
* vvnyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0
* vvnz * 0.0 0.0 0.0
* vvnz * 0.0 0.0 0.0
* vvnxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0
* vvnxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0
* vnyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0
* vlnyt * 0.0 0.0 0.0
* vlnz * 0.0 0.0 0.0
* vlnz * 0.0 0.0 0.0
* vinxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0
* vlnxr * 0.0 0.0 0.0
* tlnx* 550.0 550.0 550.0
* tvn * 550.0 550.0 550.0
* tin * 550.0 550.0 550.0
0.s
0.Oe
0.s
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.08436409
0.04329244
0.09996261
0.04484445
0.2779249
0.1426204
0.08436409s
0.04329244e
0.09996261s
0.04484445e
).2779249s
0. 1426204e
0.Os
0.Oe
0.013s
0.178e
0.013s
0.178e
0.013s
0.178e
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
550.Os
550.Oe
550.0s
* pan*
* level 4
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
169
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.0e
1.5513E7 1.5513E7
1.5513E7 1.5513E7
0.0 0.0 0.s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
cfzlyt * 0.0
cfzlyt * 0.0
cfzlz * 5.138E-3
cfzlz * 0.0
cfzlxr * 0.0
cfzlxr* 0.0
cfzvyt * 0.0
cfzvyt * 0.0
cfzvz * 5.138E-3
cfzvz * 0.0
cfzvxr * 0.0
cfzvxr * 0.0
frvol* 0.1124762
frvol* 0.05771849
frfayt* 0.1332725
frfayt * 0.05978768
frfaz * 0.1780657
frfaz * 0.1426204
frfaxr * 0.0
frfaxr * 0.0
hdyt * 0.013
hdyt * 0.178
hdz * 0.013
hdz * 0.178
hdxr * 0.013
hdxr * 0.178
alpn * 0.0
alpn * 0.0
vvnyt * 0.0
vvnyt* 0.0
vvnz * 0.0
vvnz * 0.0
vvnxr * 0.0
vvnxr * 0.0
vinyt * 0.0
vinyt * 0.0
vlnz * 0.0
vlnz * 0.0
vInxr* 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
5.138E-3 5.138E-3 5.138E-3s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
5.138E-3 5.138E-3 5.138E-3s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.1124762 0.1124762 0.1124762s
0.05771849 0.05771849 0.05771849e
0.1332725 0.1332725 0.1332725s
0.05978768 0.05978768 0.05978768e
0.1780657 0.1780657 0.1780657s
0.1426204 0.1426204 0.1426204e
0.0
0.0
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.013
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.s
0.Oe
0.013s
0.1 78e
0.013s
0.178e
0.013s
0.178e
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
tin *
pn *
pn *
pan *
pan *
level 5
1.5513E7
1.5513E7
0.0
0.0
1.5513E7s
1.5513E7e
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0.0 0.0 0.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7s
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
cfzlyt * 0.0
cfzlyt * 0.0
cfzlz * 1.0
cfzlz * 1.0
cfzlxr* 0.0
cfzlxr* 0.0
cfzvyt * 0.0
cfzvyt* 0.0
cfzvz * 1.0
cfzvz * 1.0
cfzvxr * 0.0
cfzvxr * 0.0
frvol * 0.9478957
frvol* 0.1919029
frfayt * 0.7093623
frfayt* 0.08965547
frfaz * 0.05128291
frfaz * 0.0
frfaxr * 0.0
frfaxr * 0.0
hdyt * 0.23
hdyt * 0.178
hdz * 0.23
hdz * 0.178
hdxr * 0.23
hdxr * 0.178
alpn * 0.0
alpn * 0.0
vvnyt * 0.0
vvnyt * 0.0
vvnz * 0.0
vvnz * 0.0
vvnxr* 0.0
vvnxr * 0.0
vlnyt* 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
1.0 1.0 1. s
1.0 1.0 1.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
1.0 1.0 1. s
1.0 1.0 l.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.9478957 0.9478957 0.9478957s
0.1919029 0.1919029 0.1919029e
0.7093623 0.7093623 0.7093623s
0.08965547 0.08965547 0.08965547e
0.05128291 0.05128291 0.05128291s
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.23
0.178
0.23
0.178
0.23
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.23
0.178
0.23
0.178
0.23
0.178
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.23s
0.178e
0.23s
0.178e
0.23s
0.178e
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
0.Oe
0.Os
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
vlnxr *
tvn *
tvn *
tln *
tln *
pn *
pn *
pan *
pan *
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
1.5513E7
1.5513E7
0.0
0.0
* level 6
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vinyt *
vlnz *
vInz *
vinxr *
vinxr *
tvn *
tvn *
tin *
tin *
pn *
pn *
pan *
pan *
level 7
cfzlyt *
cfzlyt *
cfzlz *
cfzlz *
cfzlxr *
cfzlxr *
cfzvyt *
cfzvyt *
cfzvz *
cfzvz *
cfzvxr *
cfzvxr *
frvol *
frvol *
frfayt *
frfayt *
frfaz *
frfaz *
frfaxr *
frfaxr *
hdyt *
hdyt *
hdz *
hdz *
hdxr *
hdxr *
alpn *
alpn *
vvnyt *
vvnyt *
vvnz *
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
1.5513E7
1.5513E7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1925958
0.0360128
0.2282058
0.02091093
0.0
0.0
0.1426287
0.0
0.35
1.69
0.35
1.69
0.35
1.69
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7s
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.1925958 0.1925958 0.1925958s
0.0360128 0.0360128 0.0360128e
0.2282058 0.2282058 0.2282058s
0.02091093 0.02091093 0.02091093e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.1426287 0.1426287 0.1426287s
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.35 0.35 0.35s
1.69 1.69 1.69e
0.35 0.35 0.35s
1.69 1.69 1.69e
0.35 0.35 0.35s
1.69 1.69 1.69e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
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vvnz *
vvnxr *
vvnxr *
vinyt *
vinyt *
vinz *
vInz *
vlnxr *
vinxr *
tvn *
tvn *
tin *
tln *
pn *
pn *
pan *
pan *
*
**** type
pipe
*
41
ncells node
2 0
* nsides
0
* ichf
0
* radin
0.0
* toutv
0.0
* dx *
* vol 
*
*fa *
* fric *
* grav *
*hd *
*nff *
* alp *
* v1 *
* vv *
*tl *
*tv *
*p
* pa
*
*
*
iconc
0
th
0.0
pwin
0.0
1.4733
0.58123
).39451
0.0
0.0
0.70874
1
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
num userid
1 $41$ int-loop c
s juni jun2
51 41 0.0
iacc
0
component name
-leg vssl c6
epsw
ipow npipes
0 1
houtl houtv
0.0 0.0
pwoff rpw
0.0 0.0
1.4733e
0.58123e
0.39451 0.3945le
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.70874 0.70874e
I -le
0.Oe
0.0
0.0
550.Oe
550.Oe
mx
toutl
0.0
pwsel
0.0
0.Oe
0.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
0.0 0.Oe
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
1.5513E7
1.5513E7
0.0
0.0
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.0e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
550.0 550.0 550.Os
550.0 550.0 550.Oe
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7s
1.5513E7 1.5513E7 1.5513E7e
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
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*d: Inlet flow from the cold leg.
******* type num. u
fill
* juni
51
* twtold
0.0
* dxin
1.4733
* pin
7.0E6
*
*
*d: MSIV
******* type
valve
* ncells
2
* nsides
0
* ichf
-1
* ivtr
0
* ivtrov
0
* rvmx
0.2
* radin
0.0
* toutv
0.0
dx *
vol *
fa *
fric *
grav *
hd *
nff *
alp *
v *
vv *
tl *
tv *
p *
51
ifty
2
rfmx
1.0E20
volin
0.58123
pain
0.0
1
serid compon
Vessel Inlet Flow
ioff
0
concin
0.0
alpin
0.0
flowin
2450.0
num userid
184
nodes
0
iconc
0
ivsv
0
ivtyov
0
rvov
0.0
th
0.0
avlv
0.3945
1.4733
0.58123
0.39451
0.0
0.0
0.70874
-1
0.0
0.0
0.0
558.979
558.979
7.0E6
I
junI
felv
0.0
viin
0.0
vvin
0.0
ent name
tlin
488.75
tvin
550.0
component name
unnamed
jun2 epsw
52 53 0.0
ivty
0
nvtb I
0
fminov
0.0
ivps
2 0
nvsv
nvtb2
nvrf
0 0
fmaxov
1.0
houtl houtv
0.0 0.0
e hvlve favlv
1 0.70874 1.
1.4733e
0.58123e
0.39451 0.39451e
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.70874 0.70874e
I le
0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
558.979e
558.979e
7.OE6e
e
0
toutl
0.0
xpos
1.0
174
0.0 O.Oe
******* type
194
ncells nodes
2 0
* nsides
0
* ichf
1
* radin
0.0
* toutv
0.0
* dx
* vol
*
*
fa *
fric *
grav *
hd *
nff *
alp *
vi *
v *
tl *
tv*
p *
pa *
*
valve
iconc
0
th
0.0
pwin
0.0
num userid
1
junI
component name
unnamed
jun2 epsw
62 59 0.0
iacc ipow npipes
0 0 1
houti
0.0
pwoff
0.0
houtv toutl
0.0 0.0
rpwmx
0.0 0.0
pwscl
5.33 5.33e
5.853551 5.85355le
1.098227 1.098227 1.098227e
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
1.0 1.0 -1.Oe
1.1825 1.1825 1.1825e
1 1 le
0.0
0.0
-0.0
558.979
558.979
7.0E6
0.0
type
* ncells
2
* nsides
0
* ichf
1
* ivtr
0
* ivtrov
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nodes
0
iconc
0
ivsv
I
ivtyov
0 0
* rvmx
0.2
* radin
rvov
0.0
th
0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.Oe
558.979e
558.979e
7.OE6e
0.Oe
num userid
I
jun 1
component name
unnamed
jun2 epsw
63 61 0.0
ivty
I
nvtb I
1
fminov
0.0
ivps
2 0
nvsv
nvtb2
nvrf
0 0
fmaxov
1.0
houtl houtv toutl
* pa *
*
*
pipe
*
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0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
* tout
0.0
* dx *
* vol *
* fa *
* fric *
* grav *
*hd *
*nff *
* alp *
* vl *
* vv *
*tl *
*tv *
* p*p
* pa *
*vtbl *
*
*
pipe
V avive
1.098227
0.15 (
0.1178097
1.098227 0.
0.0 0
0.0
1.1825
1
0.0
0.0 0
0.0
300.0 3
300.0 3
7.0E6 7
0.0
0.0
type
hvlve
1.1825
favlve
0.0
.15e
).1178097e
7853982 0.7853982e
.0
0.0
1.0
1
).Oe
.0
).0
)0.Oe
00.Oe
.OE6e
).Oe
.Oe
xpos
0.0
0.Oe
0.Oe
I.Oe
le
0.Oe
0.Oe
num userid
254 I
ncells nodes juni
2 0 60
* nsides
0
* ichf
1
* radin
0.0
* toutv
0.0
* dx *
* vol *
* fa *
* fric *
* grav *
*hd *
*nff *
* alp *
* vl *
* vv *
* tl *
* tv *
* p*
* pa *
iconc iacc
0 0
th houtl
0.0 0.0
pwin pwoff
0.0 0.0
5.33
5.853551
1.098227
0.0
1.0
1.1825
1
0.0
0.0
0.0
300.0
300.0
7.0E6
0.0
component name
unnamed
jun2 epsw
64 0.0
ipow npipes
0
houtv
0.0
1
toutl
0.0
rpwmx
0.0 0.0
pwscl
5.33e
5.853551e
1.098227 1.098227e
0.0 0.Oe
-1.0 0.Oe
1.1825 1.1825e
1
0.Oe
0.0
0.0
300.Oe
300.Oe
7.OE6e
0.Oe
le
0.Oe
0.Oe
*
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num userid
264 1
ncells nodes junI
2 0 60
* nsides
0
* ichf
I
* radin
0.0
* toutv
0.0
* dx *
* vol 
*
* fa *
* fric *
* grav *
*hd *
* nff *
* alp *
* vl *
*vv *
*tl *
*tv *
* p*p
* pa *
*
*
pump
*
iconc iacc
0 0
th houtl
0.0 0.0
pwin pwoff
0.0 0.0
component name
unnamed
jun2 epsw
59 0.0
ipow npipes
0 1
houtv toutl
0.0 0.0
rpwmx
0.0 0.0
pwscl
1.0 l.Oe
1.098227 1.098227e
1.098227 1.098227 1.098227e
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
-1.0 0.0 1.Oe
1.1825 1.1825 1.1825e
1 1 le
0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
0.0 0.0 0.Oe
558.979 558.979e
558.979 558.979e
7.0E6 7.OE6e
0.0 0.Oe
type
ncells nodes
0 0
* ichf iconc
1 0
* icbvl icbvv
I I
* vilim vvlim
66.0 66.0
*dx *f 0.0000e+00e
* vol *f 0.0000e+00e
*fa * f 1.098227e
* fric * f 0.Oe
* grav * f 0.Oe
*hd * f 1.1825e
num userid
284 1
junI1 jun2
component name
unnamed
epsw
64 63 0.0
ipmpty
11
irp ipm
0 0
*
*
******* type
pipe
*
177
* nff *
* alp *
* vl *
* VI
vv
*tl *
*tv *
* p*p
*pa *
*
*
f le
f 0.0000e+00e
f 0.Oe
f 0.Oe
f 0.0000e+00e
f 0.0000e+00e
f 0.0000e+00e
f 0.0000e+00e
* Starting Heat Structure Section of Model *
* *** *** *** ********* *** *** ********* *******
*
******* type
htstr
*
num userid
170
nzhstr
3
* nopowr
0
* nnmwrx
I
* nhot
0
* dtxht(1)
4.0
*
* idbcin *
* idbcon*
*qflxbcol *
*qflxbcol *
*qflxbcol *
* hcomon2 *
* hcomon2 *
* hcomon2 *
* dhtstrz *
component name
0 $140$ reactor-core fuel rods
ittc hscyl
0 1
plane liqlev
3 1 0
nfci nfcil
1
nodes
8
dtxht(2)
50.0
ichf
1
iaxcnd
hdri hdro
1 0.0 0.0
irftr nzmax irftr2
0 100 0
dznht hgapo
5.OE-3 6000.0
0 0 Oe
2
0.Oe
0.Oe
0.Oe
26
26
26
1.2141
2 2e
1
1
1.2 142 1.2141 e
3e
4e
5e
* rdx* 9843.Oe
* radrd * 0.0 2.OE-3 3.OE-3 4.OE-3
* radrd * 4.7422E-3 5.05E-3 5.3594E-3e
* matrd * 1 1 1 Is
* matrd * 3 2 2e
* nfax* 5 5
* rftn * 550.0 550.0
* rftn * 550.0 550.0
* rftn * 550.0 550.0
* rftn * 550.0 550.0
5e
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
4.6427E-3s
550.Os
550.Os
550.Os
550.Os
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* rftn*
* rftn*
* fpuo2 *
* ftd *
* gmix *
* gmix*
* gmles *
* pgapt *
* pivot *
* pslen *
* clenn *
* burn *
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.0s
550.0 550.0 550.0 550.Oe
0.Oe
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.Oe
1.54E4 1.54E4e
******* type
htstr
* nzhstr
3
* nopowr
0
* nmwrx
I
* nhot
0
* dtxht(1)
4.0
*
* idbcin *
* idbcon*
*qflxbcol *
*qflxbcol *
*qflxbcol *
* hcomon2 *
* hcomon2 *
* hcomon2 *
* dhtstrz *
* rdx*
* radrd *
* radrd *
* matrd *
* matrd *
* nfax*
* rftn*
* rftn*
* rftn*
* rftn*
* rftn*
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ittc
0
3
num userid component name
0 $140$ reactor-core fuel rods
hscyl
I I
plane liqlev
1 0
nfci nfcil
1
nodes
8
dtxht(2)
50.0
0
2
0.Oe
0.Oe
0.Oe
26
26
26
1.2141
9843.Oe
0.0 2
4.7422E-3
1
3
5
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
ichf
iaxcnd
hdri
1 0.0 0.0
irftr nzmax
0 100
hdro
irftr2
0
dznht hgapo
5.OE-3 6000.0
0
2
Oe
2e
1 2 3e
1
1
1.2 142
2
2
1.214 1e
4e
5e
.OE-3 3.OE-3 4.OE-3
5.05E-3 5.3594E-3e
I I Is
2 2e
5
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
5e
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
4.6427E-3s
550.Os
550.Os
550.Os
550.Os
550.Os
0.s
0.945e
1.0
0.0
0.Oe
1.OE7e
0.0 e
0.0 e
0.0 e
1.54E4
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550.0 550.0 550.Oe
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.Oe
0.Os
* rftn*
* fpuo2 *
* ftd *
* gmix *
* gmix
* gmles *
* pgapt *
* pivol *
* pslen *
* clenn *
* burn *
*
******* type num userid component name
htstr 172 0 $140$ reactor-core fuel rods
* nzhstr ittc hscyl ichf
3 0 1 1
nopowr
0
* nmwrx
I
* nhot
0
* dtxht(1)
4.0
*
* idbcin *
* idbcon*
*qflxbcol *
*qflxbcol *
*qflxbcol *
* hcomon2 *
* hcomon2 *
* hcomon2 *
plane liqlev
3 1 0
nfci nfcil
I
nodes
8
dtxht(2)
50.0
0
2
0.Oe
0.Oe
0.Oe
26
26
26
*dhtstrz* 1.2141
* rdx * 9843.Oe
iaxcnd
hdri
1 0.0 0.0
irftr nzmax
0 100
hdro
irftr2
0
dznht hgapo
5.OE-3 6000.0
0
2
Ge
2e
1
1.2142
3
3
3
1.214le
3e
4e
5e
* radrd * 0.0 2.OE-3 3.OE-3 4.OE-3
* radrd * 4.7422E-3 5.05E-3 5.3594E-3e
matrd *
matrd *
nfax*
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
1
3
5
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
1
2
5
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
I
2e
5e
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
4.6427E-3s
Is
550.Os
550.Os
550.Os
550.Os
550.Os
550.Oe
550.0
0.Oe
0.945e
1.0
0.0
0.Oe
1.OE7e
0.0 e
0.0 e
0.0 e
1.54E4 1.54E4 1.54E4e
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
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*A.
0.0 0.0 0.Os
0.0 0.Oe
1.54E4 1.54E4e
******* type
htstr
* nzhstr
3
* nopowr
0
* nmwrx
1
* nhot
0
* dtxht(1)
4.0
*
* idbcin *
* idbcon *
*qflxbcol *
*qflxbcol *
*qflxbcol *
* hcomon2 *
* hcomon2 *
* hcomon2 *
* dhtstrz *
num userid
173
itt
0
component name
0 $140$ reactor-core fuel rods
hscyl
1
ichf
I
plane liqlev
3 1 0
nfci nfcil
1
nodes
8
dtxht(2)
50.0
0
2
0.Oe
0.Oe
0.Oe
26
26
26
1.2141
* rdx * 9843.Oe
iaxcnd
hdri
1 0.0 0.0
irftr nzmax
0 100
dznht hga
5.OE-3 6000.0
0
2
Oe
2e
1 4 3e
1 4 4e
1
1.2142
4
1.2141e
2.OE-3 3.OE-3 4.OE-3
5.05E-3 5.3594E-3e
1 1 Is
2 2e
5
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
5e
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.Os
550.Os
550.Os
550.Os
550.Os
550.Oe
* fpuo2 *
* ftd *
* gmix *
* gmix *
* gmles *
* pgapt*
* pivol *
* pslen *
* clenn *
* bum *
*
O.Oe
0.945e
1.0
0.0
0.Oe
1.OE7e
0.0 e
0.0 e
0.0 e
1.54E4
hdro
irftr2
0
po
5e
4.6427E-3sradrd *
radrd *
matrd *
matrd *
nfax*
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
rftn *
fpuo2 *
0.0
4.7422E-3
1
3
5
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
550.0
0.Oe
181
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.Oe
0.Os
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
******* type
htstr
* nzhstr
2
* nopowr
I
nmwrx
0
* nhot
0
* dtxht(1)
2.0
*
* idbcin *
* idbcon *
* hcomonl
* hcomonl
* tsurfo2 *
* tsurfo2 *
* dhtstrz *
* rdx *
*
*
274
num userid
0
ittc hscyl
0 1
ichf
I
component name
unnamed
plane liqlev iaxcnd
3 0 0
nfci nfcil hdri
0 0 0.0 0.0
nodes
2
dtxht(2)
10.0
2
5
264
264
300.Oe
300.Oe
1.0
1.Oe
irftr
hdro
nzmax irftr2
0 100 0
dznht hgapo
1.OE-3 6300.0
2e
5e
1
2
0
0
Oe
Oe
1.Oe
* radrd * 0.59125 0.69125e
* matrd * 6e
* nfax* I le
* rftn * 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.Oe
* Finished Heat Structure Section of Model *
*
*
*
* Starting Power Components *
*
182
ftd *
gmix *
gmix *
gmles *
pgapt *
pivot *
pslen *
clenn *
burn *
0.945e
1.0
0.0
0.Oe
1.OE7e
0.0 e
0.0 e
0.0 e
1.54E4 1.54E4 1.54E4e
******* type
power
*
num userid
174 1 Power
numpwr chanpow
4 0
* htnum *
* irpwty
5
component name
Comp for old ht str 140
170 171 172 173e
ndgx
0
* izpwtr izpwsv
0 1
ndhx nrts nhist
0 10 0
nzpwtb
1 0 0
2
.0
* ipwrad ipwdep promheat
0 0 0.0 0.0
* nzpwz nzpwi nfbpwt
0 0 0 1
* react tneut rpwoff n
0.0 0.0 0.0 1.OE
* rpowri zpwin zpwoff
4.5E9 0.0 0.0 0
nzpwsv nzpwrf
decaheat wtbypass
0.0
nrpwr nrpwi
0
wmx rpwscl
0 1.0
rzpwmx
* extsou pldr pdrat fucrac
0.0 0.0 1.334 1.0
*rdpwr* 1.2109 1.2371 1.2703 1.3201
* rdpwr * 0.0 0.0 0.Oe
* cpowr* 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.Oe
* zpwtbl* 0.Os
*zpwtbI* 0.93748s
*zpwtbI* 1.20535s
*zpwtbI* 0.83715e
* Finished Power Components *
*
*
*
end
*
* Timestep Data *
* dtmin dtmax
0.05 1.0
* edint gfint
12.0 0.5
tend
50.0
dmpint
12.0
1.3823s
rtwfp
10.0
sedint
12.0
* endflag
-1.0
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